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Abstract
by Francisco Javier Cabrera Herna´ndez
This thesis gathers research on three impact evaluations of interventions at the school
and student level in Mexico. The first chapter evaluates the effects of a School Break-
fast Program (SBP) on children’s outcomes such as cognitive skills, illness, height and
weight and grade repetition in the period 2002 to 2005. Quasi-experimental estimations
provide evidence of positive effects on children’s weight; however, such gains push
children over their ’ideal’ standardized average causing them overweight. This effect
is significantly higher in the case of poorer children. The second chapter evaluates a
Full-Time Primary Schools Program implemented in 2007, to work out if changing the
time pupils spend at school can enhance skills in language and mathematics. Differ-
ences in Differences regressions point to a significant improvement of 0.11 standard
deviations in mathematics and Spanish test scores after four years of treatment. These
gains are three times higher in schools located in deprived areas and do not seem to
be driven by students self-selection. The last chapter focuses on an exogenous policy
change in Mexico which eliminates enforced grade repetition for all first to third grade
students. This reform helped schools to reduce repetition rates from varying higher lev-
els to almost zero in one academic year. Estimations coming from two-way fixed effects
models using a panel of schools show an average reduction in dropout rates after reform
implementation of 0.3% points along with no seeming effects on pupil’s performance.
General findings from the three chapters are of strong significance when placed into
the broader debate about what works best in schools for improving children’s academic
performance and general education outcomes in Mexico.
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Introduction
In recent years Mexico has transited through a period of high flux in terms of education
policies. The last two Mexican presidents (2006-2012 and 2012-2018), for example,
have introduced the so-called ”Educational Reform” as a key topic in their political
agendas and public speech. The first step towards placing education at the center of
the debate included the creation in 2006 of a massive national standardised evaluation
of pupil’s knowledge in mathematics, Spanish and science to diagnose the state of the
education in Mexico, it was named the ENLACE test.
Results were not promising. From the first waves of the national standardised test,
estimations showed that around 70% of Mexican children had an ‘insufficient’ level of
knowledge. International tests, such as PISA and TIMMS, only confirmed that Mexico
was among the worst in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). For example, the 2009 PISA results ranked Mexico as the 48th place in reading
and 50th in math out of 65 evaluated countries and furthermore, they also revealed that
the country was not performing better than others with similar income, such as Uruguay
and Chile and even poorer countries like Cuba.
The results coming from the national and international evaluation were worrying as
economic research has provided evidence that improvements on math, language and
science test scores relate to increases in economic growth (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000;
Barro and Lee, 2001; Hanushek, 2013), earnings in adulthood (Murnane, Willett, and
Levy, 1995; Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, and Tyler, 2000; Lazear, 2003) and to the
reduction of the inequality of income between social groups (Hanushek, 2004). Evi-
dence has also shown that there are other non-monetary benefits from education such
as improved health status and lowered crime (Lochner, 2011). However the literature
is still limited on providing a clear guidance of what policies and specific investments
should be pursued to increase educational outcomes in specific contexts and thus, it has
proved to be harder for governments to design policies based on conclusive evidence.
xiii
The Mexican government opted to start a range of different policies addressing diverse
problems in basic schools seeking to close the knowledge gaps with other similar and
developed countries. Nowadays a total of nine policies are present at the school level
in basic education. The most relevant programs due to their size and public investment
address diverse challenges and topics, ranging from health and safety interventions “Es-
cuelas Seguras”, infrastructure “Escuelas Dignas”, information technology “Programa
de Inclusion Digital”, to programs seeking to decentralise schools’ decisions and in-
crease their autonomy ”Escuelas de Calidad”, to help children’s nutrition through the
provision of free-breakfast ”Desayunos Escolares del DIF”, and to lengthen the school
day ”Programa Escuelas de Tiempo Completo”. Further reforms have sought to change
the structure of teacher’s evaluations and their monetary incentives ”Carrera Magiste-
rial” along with the way children are assessed in order to facilitate their promotion to
higher education levels.
Along with the supply in education programs for basic education, federal and local gov-
ernments spending on education has also increased. According to the OECD1 Mexico’s
spending on education as a proportion of its GDP grew from 4.4% to 5.5% in 2014.
The amount spent on primary and secondary education (3.9%) is even higher than that
of the OECD countries (3.7%). Between 2005 and 2012 only, the money invested in
primary and secondary schools observed a real growth of 11% per student. However,
despite the increasing efforts to design and finance a broad range of policies, most of the
programs implemented have not been evaluated, for which it remains unknown whether
the money spent on these, financed through taxation, has improved general education
outcomes or not.
This thesis seeks to contribute to education policy in Mexico by presenting three impact
evaluations. The first one examines one of the oldest policy interventions in this country,
the school’s breakfast program “Desayunos Escolares del DIF”. The second and third
one relate to two recent modifications seeking to increase the time that pupils spend in
primary schools by lengthening the school day from four and a half to eight hours daily
(”Programa escuelas de tiempo completo” or PETC, for its abbreviation in Spanish),
and a recent law change that abolished grade retention during the first three grades of
primary education seeking to reduce dropout rates among Mexican children of age 6
to 9. These three policies are representative of the different strategies adopted by the
Mexican government as they differ in their organisation objectives and costs.
1See the 2015 ”Education at a Glance” report
The first chapter of this thesis includes the impact evaluation of the school breakfast
program. Starting in the 1960s, the program is still active and it has not been broadly
updated since. As it will be explained in detail, its presence is now often related to
political reasons rather than to school improvements. Nonetheless, only between 2007
and 2012, approximately 3.8 billion dollars were invested in the distribution of about 3.5
billion breakfasts nationally, accounting for approximately 0.05% of the annual Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in that period.
At the moment this evaluation was conducted. The school breakfast program was the
second largest social program in Mexico. For example, in 2012, 12.2% of the house-
holds in Mexico had at least one member receiving a school breakfast, a number only
below PROGRESA.2 However, to the best of my knowledge, the evaluation presented
in Chapter 1 is the first one on its potential causal impacts on health, cognitive outcomes
and school performance at the national level of this large school breakfast program that
is aimed to be an important component of the social safety net of children in Mexican
low-income households.
The second chapter evaluates the effects of the full-time schools program PETC, on
primary student’s academic achievement, measured in standardised test scores of math-
ematics and Spanish from 2008 to 2013. PETC seeks to improve learning opportunities
by increasing the time children spend at school from four and a half to eight hours
everyday, while incorporating new subjects and activities in the curricula (e.g foreign
languages, arts, culture and nutrition). The program grants every year a fixed stipend
for operative expenses and a varying fund according to the number of professors and
students in each school.
PETC started in 2007 and up to 2013 it represented a spending of about US$460 mil-
lions. Moreover, the 2012 elected federal government announced an expansion of the
program in order to reach 40,000 primary and secondary schools by 2018. According to
the Secretariat of Finance in Mexico, the 2014-2015 budget programmed for PETC rose
to US$1 billion. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, the most recent expansion
of PETC was dictated without any previous public evaluation on the potential causal
impacts on school and children’s outcomes such as test scores and grade repetition at
the national level of this large program that is aimed to be an important component of
the educational strategy in Mexico.
2PROGRESA, OPORTUNIDADES or PROSPERA, as named since 2012, is a poverty reduction
conditional transfer program that has important education and health components, as families receive
transfers for sending their children to school and to visit health clinics (Rodrı´guez, 2005).
The third chapter presents the impact evaluation of abolishing grade retention in the first
three grades of primary school on pupil’s dropout rates and children’s performance. In
2012, Mexico made an important change in its evaluation policies and passed from a
punitive system in which all children graded below a given threshold were not promoted
to the next academic level, to one focused on the mandatory ”social promotion” of
students. The reform allowed children in the first three years of primary education to
be automatically promoted regardless of their level of achievement. This change caused
an exogenous reduction of grade repetition rates independent of school’s characteristics
and previous trends.
This change in the retention laws varies from the first two programs analysed in Chap-
ters 1 and 2 as it did not imply a modification of school’s inputs and consequently it did
not represent any increase in resources. Therefore, the chapter includes a broader dis-
cussion on the determinants of dropout rates and how this can vary independent of chil-
dren’s socioeconomic status and family investments in the context of a low-cost reform.
Interestingly, maybe because the policy change did not imply a big initial investment,
the rules to promote young primary students are now back to what they were before
2012, as a new change was introduced in 2012 that brought back the previous punitive
system of evaluation and promotion for children in second and third grade. Similar to
the original reform, the counter-reform took place without any empirical evidence of
what could the be positive or negative effects attached to it.
The main conclusions coming from the different empirical analysis in this study repre-
sent useful inputs to redirect or reinforce education policy efforts in Mexico and offer
a clearer idea on how to improve the specif policies addressed. For example, effects
on the school breakfast program suggest that it is causing overweight problems among
Mexican children, specially among the poorest. This exhibits the importance of updat-
ing the objectives of such policy. Similarly, as it is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2,
lengthening the school day seems to be having a positive effect on children’s achieve-
ment, and this positive result is three times higher in more deprived schools. These
outcomes works to justify a more informed expansion of the program. Last but not
least, Chapter 3 offers some support to social promotion as it shows a robust reduc-
tion on dropout rates, and offers a guidance for future amendments to retention laws in
primary schools.
Chapter 1
Impacts of the School Breakfast
Program in Mexico on Children’s
outcomes: IQ, Health and Grade
Repetition
Research in laboratories has found negative effects of short-term fasting on cognitive
abilities like short term memory and attention due to low glucose concentrations, par-
ticularly among children who are at nutritional risk.1 Plausibly, this may occur due
to the short-term absence of nutrients and glucose needed for the cognitive processes
demanded in the learning process (Pollitt, 1995). Moreover, the sustained absence of
breakfast can also have an impact on children’s physical development in the long term,
affecting their immune system and their general health (Pollitt, 1995). In sum, the long
absence of nutrients may result in sickness and, by consequence, in lower school atten-
dance which may potentially affect children’s educational outcomes.
Considering the plausible detrimental effects of breakfast absence on education out-
comes, different school breakfast or lunch programs have been applied at the school
level in developed and developing countries seeking to improve the nutritional status
of children. These kind of polices have been generally directed towards those who are
undernourished or come from an impoverished background, where the risk of a poor
nutrition is higher. Plausibly, the provision of breakfast in schools can potentially in-
crease low-income children’s nutritional status and improve their academic outcomes.
1For a review of these studies see Pollitt, Cueto, and Jacoby (1998)
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2A policy of free breakfasts could also make poorer children healthier and decrease ab-
senteeism due to illness. Finally, the provision of free food for deprived children could
also represent money savings for poor families allowing them to reallocate resources
towards the acquisition of other inputs related to offspring’s education.2
In regard to this, a few studies based on Randomized Control Trials (RCT) have shown
that the provision of breakfast has had positive effects on different outcomes like height
and weight, daily attendance and the reduction of drop-out rates in Jamaica (Pow-
ell, Walker, Chang, and Grantham-McGregor, 1998), Peru (Cueto and Chinen, 2008),
United Kingdom (Shemilt, Harvey, Shepstone, Swift, Reading, Mugford, Belderson,
Norris, Thoburn, and Robinson, 2004), and in other developing countries3
Notwithstanding, more recent evidence for the United States (US) have brought into
consideration the possible negative general effects of a free food or reduced price pol-
icy on children’s health. For example, Schanzenbach (2009) studies the effect of the
National School Lunch Program (NSLP) in the US taking advantage of a discontinuity
in the eligibility for a reduced price lunch. The author found that the obesity rate in
participants is higher than in nonparticipants. In a second study, Millimet, Tchernis,
and Husain (2010) using a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach, also found a
positive impact on weight concluding that the NSLP contributes to obesity. However,
the authors also analyse the effect of the School Breakfast Program (SBP) in the US
and found that this, by the contrary, reduces overweight. As argued by Hinrichs (2010),
one of the main problems in the evaluations conducted in the US is the presence of two
similar programs, the NSLP and SBP, and the confounding effects coming from these.
This chapter focuses on the evaluation of the School Breakfast Program in Mexico, and
its potential effects on cognitive outcomes, height and weight by sex and age, illness
and grade repetition probabilities of children in a sample extracted from two waves of
the Mexican Life and Family Survey (MxFLS) for the years 2002 and 2005.4 To the
best of our knowledge this is the first paper to evaluate the potential causal impacts on
health, cognitive outcomes and school performance at the national level of this large
child nutrition program that is aimed to be an important component of the social safety
net of children in Mexican low-income households.
2For example, Babu and Hallam (1989) found that the provision of food from school feeding programs
enables households to increase expenditures on non-food goods.
3A review of the literature finding positive effects on attendance rates in Bangladesh, Haiti, India,
Brazil and Honduras can be also found in CARE (2004).
4A detailed description of the data is offered in Section 1.2.
3Different nutrition programs directed to vulnerable people in Mexico have been imple-
mented since 1929, when free rations of milk started to be offered in deprived schools of
Mexico City under the program “A Drop of Milk”. Since then, with the creation of the
National Association for the Infant Protection (INPI, for its abbreviation in Spanish) in
the 1960s, modified versions of a breakfast program became the core of the alimentary
strategy at the national level.5
From 2007 to 2012, approximately 3.8 billion dollars were invested in the distribu-
tion of about 3,5 billion breakfasts nationally, accounting for approximately 0.05% of
the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in that period. The SBP is the second so-
cial program with highest number of beneficiaries in Mexico. In 2012, 12.2% of the
households in Mexico had at least one member receiving a breakfast, a number only be-
low PROGRESA,6 the most important social program in Mexico, that in the same year
reached 18.8% of the households with a cost of 30.8 billion dollars or 0.4% of the GDP
(Gutierrez, Rivera, and Shamah, 2012). However, as mentioned, there has not been an
evaluation of the SBP effects at the national level.
The 32 state governments in Mexico publish a yearly administrative evaluation of the
SBP.7 However, these documents do not try to find any causal effects on specific out-
comes and rely exclusively on the description of costs, implementation issues, the
amount of children treated and in exceptional cases the description of the socioeco-
nomic characteristics and nutritional habits of the children in the program.8 Although
these studies are relevant to understand the application and targeting of the program,
they do not offer further conclusions about its potential effects.
Other evaluations seeking to find causal effects of different breakfast interventions in
Mexico are inconclusive.Vera (2005) performs an evaluation of a breakfast interven-
tion for preschool children on cognitive-motor development of preschool students (4-5
years old) in deprived and rural areas in Sonora, a northern state of Mexico. The author
evaluated different attention, memory and cognitive skills before and after the program
among 300 children treated and 150 untreated. The results show positive effects on
5All historical references as well as the figures regarding government spending on the breakfast pro-
gram are taken from SNDIF (2012).
6PROGRESA, OPORTUNIDADES or PROSPERA, as named since 2012, is a poverty reduction, con-
ditional transfer program that has important education and health components, as poorer families receive
transfers for sending their children to school and to visit health clinics (Rodrı´guez, 2005). PROSPERA
scholarships are thus assigned to the poorest children in each school, according to a socioeconomic survey
applied to households located in identified vulnerable areas in Mexico.
7This represents 31 states conforming the Mexican Federation and Mexico City
8See for example, Shamah, Morales, and Hernandez (2010); DIF (2011); SNDIF (2012)
4attention and perception processes of the children under treatment. However, authors
picked up schools that could not be treated for political and administrative reasons as
their counter factual. One problem with this setup is that such political and administra-
tive issues in this case related to school’s inputs and pupil’s socioeconomic environment,
for which the “experimental” design did not achieve the comparability of the socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the control and treatment groups, specifically regarding income
and goods’ availability. Moreover, the methodology presented does not try to control
for such differences. This undermines the validity of the results.
Similarly, Ramirez, Grijalva, Valencia, Ponce, and Artalejo (2005) attempt to evaluate
the SBP’s impact on weight and other bio-chemical indicators of vascular risk in 17
municipalities of Sonora. The authors compared the results of 254 children treated and
106 untreated after one academic cycle. The results do not show any significant effects
on neither, Body Mass Index (BMI), the percentage of fat, cholesterol, sugar levels
nor cardiovascular risk. However, this study suffers form a high attrition rate, since
approximately 40% of the students treated dropped out from the experiment and does
not discuss how this issue may have affected their results given that, apparently, the
most deprived children are the ones drooping out from their study.
Assessing the causal effects of a program like SBP is difficult for two main reasons.
First, if the program is focused on disadvantaged children, those receiving free break-
fasts are likely to differ from non-participants in observed and unobserved ways not
present in the data.9 Secondly, there is an apparent threat from the under-report of par-
ticipation in programs such as the SBP, that may bias the estimations. In this regard,
Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper (2012) argue that miss-reporting could be one of the
reasons why some of the evaluations of the NSLP in the US have found negative effects
on children’s obesity.
When subjects self-select into the treatment group on the basis of attributes unobserved
by the researcher, but correlated with the outcome of interest, the estimations are no
longer suitable to find causal effects. However, as it will be presented in Section 1.4,
the identification strategy of this paper relies on the fact that the assignment of the pro-
gram is in practice determined by school variables which are observable (i.e. principals’
education and gender, number of teachers and number of students) rather than children’s
9For example Millimet and Tchernis (2012) show that unobserved ways of self-selection into treat-
ment are important in the results of the evaluation of the SBP in the US. The authors conclude that
the SBP has a positive relation with children’s weight in estimations that do not control for unobserved
heterogeneity, nonetheless, when the authors use an IV estimator that exploits heteroscedasticity for iden-
tification, they found a causal negative effect on weight.
5characteristics such as height and weight and/or household’s or parent’s characteristics.
This allows for a statistical matching with a broad common support, useful to compare
the outcomes of children with similar background characteristics who are treated and
untreated.Therefore, in addition to OLS estimations I present the results of a PSM using
different parametric and non-parametric algorithms on a sample of children between 6
and 12 years old, in order to find the arguably causal effects of the SBP. To the best of
my knowledge this is the first study to evaluate the SBP at the national level and also dif-
ferentiates from Ramirez et al. (2005) by contributing to the analysis of heterogeneous
effects among poorer children and measures on educational attainment and cognitive
outcomes.
Another important characteristic of this study is that program participation does not
come from self-reporting but from administrative records. The data used includes a
section with information about the schools in the municipalities where the survey was
conducted, allowing to identify those schools that are participating in the breakfast pro-
gram. The data also permits us to relate children and background characteristics, like
their parent’s education and occupation to the schools in which they study. In effect,
underreporting should not be a major problem.
The results of this paper are generally similar in the OLS and PSM and despite some
differences in their magnitude, they offer the same general conclusions. The provision
of free breakfasts in primary schools in Mexico seems to have a positive effect on the
weight of students between 9 and 12 years old, who have been treated for at least 4
and up to 6 years. This effect is stronger for those at the bottom part of the income
distribution pushing them above their standardized average by age and sex. However
there is no evidence of impacts on cognitive skills, health, children’s height nor grade
repetition.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 includes a detailed de-
scription of The Integral Strategy for Social and Alimentary Assistance (EIASA, for its
abbreviation in Spanish) in Mexico, which includes the SBP. Section 1.2 describes the
data and the variables to be used and shows some descriptive statistics of the sample.
Section 1.3 shows the main results obtained with OLS. Section 1.4 discusses the char-
acteristics of the assignment into treatment. Section 1.5 exhibits the main impacts of
the program on the outcomes described. Section 1.6 offers some concluding remarks
and policy implications.
61.1 The Breakfast Program in Mexico
The EIASA seeks to improve the nutritional status of the vulnerable population in the
country (i.e. elder, poor, homeless or children with low weight and height) and aims
to promote better nutrition habits in order to avoid obesity among the population. It
is managed by the National System for Integral Family Development (SNDIF, for its
abbreviation in Spanish) a sub-office of the Ministry of Health in Mexico, and it consists
of four different programs:10
• School breakfast: consisting of a daily breakfast for children in public primary
schools in need of social assistance (i.e. with low height and weight)
• Alimentary assistance for children under 5 years old: it provides food to children
who are not in school and in need of social assistance (i.e. with low height and
weight)
• Alimentary assistance for vulnerable individuals: consisting of the distribution of
a regular larder to elder, handicapped, pregnant or lactation women.
• Alimentary assistance for homeless families: it consists of the distribution of
breakfast and meals.
As mentioned, this research is focused only on the evaluation of the School Breakfast
Program. This policy operates with the use of national guidelines provided by the Fed-
eral government concerning the attributions and obligations of each of the 32 states of
Mexico and defining the targeting of schools and children in the program. This guide-
lines state that the program should focus on public kindergarten and primary schools
with a higher proportion of undernourished children, or in risk of being undernour-
ished. Preferably, treated schools should be located in rural zones or deprived urban
areas, and/or should have a higher concentration of indigenous people. (SNDIF, 2012,
p.3).
Regarding program’s funding and targeting, each of the 32 Mexican states receive fed-
eral funds based on a formula that takes into consideration the number of schools and
students from vulnerable areas. Afterwards, state governments acquire from the private
sector the necessary inputs for the breakfasts and decide which schools to be treated,
10All the information about the organization, application and funding of the SBP as discussed in this
section comes from SNDIF (2012)
7normally, supported by a pre-selection made by the municipalities. Consequently, mu-
nicipalities have a strong influence on the choice of schools to be treated according to
their “good will” or independent criteria to apply the national guidelines (SNDIF, 2012,
pp.10-11).
In Mexico there are some established mechanisms for which the Ministry of Finance
enforces the local governments to inform the destination of all the resources received
from the Federation, and plausibly, this is also true for the resources received for the
application of the SBP. Nonetheless, there is no mechanism to enforce the targeting of
the SBP. Finally, school’s principals are not allowed to provide SBP to certain students
and all children in each of the schools included in the program are treated, regardless of
their individual nourishing conditions.
A recent qualitative study gathers information about SBP targeting in a sample of four
representative states of Mexico (Soto and Lorenzo, 2008).11. The results exhibit that the
extension of the program differs according to each state’s capabilities and limitations
(i.e. infrastructure, budget, distribution line, etc.). However, all local governments
declare that the program is “always directed to schools with low-size children that are
located in deprived zones.12 This is also declared by other governments in the central
part of Mexico (i.e. Estado de Mexico, Federal District) in some official documents (see
Shamah et al., 2010; DIF, 2011).
The specific contents of the breakfast are relatively homogeneous and even if there is
some variation from state to state according to their availability of fresh produce, they
are aimed to cover the same nutritional requirements. As a general rule, a cold breakfast
should include, 250 milliliters of milk; a minimum of 25 grams of seeds and oils, one
fresh fruit from the region or at least 20 grams of dry fruit. The hot breakfast should
include 250 milliliters of milk, and a meal made of vegetables, cereals and/or legumes
and a piece of fresh fruit.
The information explaining how the program is assigned is of great relevance for the
analysis conducted on this paper. It is clear that, if the breakfast is effectively directed
towards all children who are most in need, it could be difficult to find a counter-factual
to evaluate the effects of the program. However, if the way states’ authorities assign
the program to those more in need is not effective enough, if for example, they choose
the schools which are easier to reach rather than the more deprived, there is a chance
11Chiapas, Jalisco, Veracruz and Baja California
12With the exception of the state of Chiapas in the southern part of Mexico, that in the recent years
chose to apply the SBP ”universally” and declares to have reached already 95% of the students
8to find students that should have been treated but are not treated and vice versa. A
further discussion regarding the assignation into treatment in the case of this program is
presented in Section 4.
Finally, it is important to notice that the nutritional challenges in Mexico are now differ-
ent from what they were years ago when the SBP started at the national level. Mexican
children have passed, on average, from undernourishment to obesity in the past decades.
One explanation of this is that the diet of many families have changed to include prod-
ucts rich in fats and calories and low in nutrients. In fact, only 1.6% of the Mexican
children between 5 and 11 years old are undernourished, 13.6% have a low size, 19.8%
have excess weight and 14.6% are obese (Gutierrez et al., 2012). Recently, the ali-
mentary strategy of the federal government has changed and created other initiatives to
reduce children’s obesity;13 however, no major changes have been implemented on the
design, operation and application of the SBP.
1.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This study uses a panel of households extracted from the MXFLS for the years 2002
and 2005. The dataset includes information on family characteristics such as parent’s
education, household’s income and number of children in the two periods. It also in-
cludes a set of Raven’s tests applied to all the members of the family which are useful
to measure cognitive skills independent of schooling (Raven, 1998). Other individual
measures are included in both waves, such as anthropometric variables like height and
weight.
The 2002 survey also includes information of the characteristics of schools. These
include variables such as the number of students, the number of teachers and principals
information including their gender and education. It also includes variables regarding
schools sanitation such as cleaning personnel and bathroom facilities. Unfortunately,
school’s characteristics are not measured again in 2005. The implications of only having
school’s characteristics measured in 2002 on the design of the evaluation are discussed
below, where I define the sample to be used.
Further detail of the outcome variables to be measured as well as the control variables
and the waves of the MxFLS on which they are present is shown in Table 1.1.
13One example is the “Acuerdo Nacional para la Salud Alimentaria (ANSA)”, designed to combat
children’s excess weight and obesity (Gutierrez et al., 2012, p.154).




Cognitive test scores Raven’s cognitive test scores standardized by age x x
Illness A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the kid had a
disease in the last months and zero otherwise
x x
Height child’s height standardized by age and sex x x
Weight child’s weight standardized by age and sex x x
Grade Repetition A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the kid has repeated grade
during his primary studies
x x
A. Context Variables
Log of Income Natural logarithm of the Household’s income x x
Household’s Head Schooling Years of Schooling of the household’s head x x
Spouse’s Schooling Years of Schooling of the spouse x x
Number of siblings Child’s number of sibling x x
PROGRESA A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the household receives
conditional transfers or zero otherwise
x x
Girl A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the kid is a girl or zero
otherwise
x x
Age Kid’s age in years x x
B. School Characteristics
Multiple Grade School A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the school has students
from different grades in the same classroom and zero otherwise
x
# of teachers Number of teachers working in the school x
# of students Number of teachers registered in the school x
Principals education A categorical value that takes the value of 1 if the principal’s
highest level of education is high school , 2 University and 3
postgraduate studies.
x
Breakfast A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the school is participating
in the Breakfast Program or zero otherwise
x
Principal’s sex A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the principal is a female
and zero otherwise
x
Principal has another job A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the principal has a second
job outside the primary school or zero otherwise
x
Cleaning Personnel A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the school has full-time
cleaning personnel and zero otherwise
x
Bathroom water/soap A dummy that takes the value of 1 if the school’s bathroom has
pipe water and soap and zero otherwise
x
This rich dataset allows to include an important number of observable characteristics
relevant to both, the analysis of the effects of the breakfast program and the assignment
into treatment. However, there is an important limitation of the data at hand. As shown
in Table 1.1, schools’ information included in the survey, for which is possible to know
whether any school is participating in the SBP or not, is only present in the survey of the
year 2002. Additionally, it is only possible to know, retrospectively, if the program was
applied during the scholar cycle 2000/2001 and 2001/2002. Therefore, it is not possible
to know for how many more years the schools have been applying the program and if
they continued applying it after 2002.
These limitations offer two challenges: first, it is not possible to know whether the
children who are studying higher grades in a primary school participating in the SBP
in 2002, received the treatment during all the time they were registered in that school
or if they received it only during the previous and the present year, as registered by the
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survey. However, since the survey was taken from May to August of 2002, the way I
address this problem is by restricting the sample to those children who are 6 to 9 years
old in 2002 and/or study the first to the third year in the primary school. The logic of
this restriction is shown in Figure 1.1 and it can be explained as follows:
• If children in a treated school are 6 years old or are in their first year in the summer
of 2002 (letter a in Figure 1.1), they started receiving breakfast on September
2001, when the scholar cycle started for them. Therefore, it can be assured that
they have received at least one academic year of treatment (i.e. September to
June).14
• If children are 9 years old or in their third year in the summer of 2002 (letter b
in Figure 1.1) and the school only implemented the program during the present
academic cycle, they have been treated for at least one year; but if the school
started implementing the program since the cycle 2000/2001 they have received
two years of treatment.
• If the school has had the program from before the cycle 2000/2001 (something
that is not possible to know with the available data) the children who are 9 years
old or in their third year (letter b in Figure 1.1) have potentially received a maxi-
mum of three years of treatment since they were 6 years old when started primary
school (letter c in Figure 1.1)
Consequently, the sample of children from 6 to 9 years old has received a minimum of
1 year and up to 3 years of treatment.
The second challenge arises because it is not possible to know if the schools in the SBP
continued applying the program after 2002. However, as mentioned, it is possible to
know how many schools were applying the program in the cycle 2000/2001 and how
many continued doing it in the next cycle: 2001/2002. According to the MxFLS, only 5
out of 92 schools dropped out of the program from one year to the other. Given this low
rate of schools dropping from the SBP, I assume that the schools in the program remain
in it once they have been selected into treatment.
It is possible to “observe” in 2005 the same children who were receiving treatment in
2002 who are now between 9 and 12 years old and who are in the third to the sixth grade
of their primary school studies (letters d and e in Figure 1.1). If the schools in which
14From now on I use year as an equivalent of academic year
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they study remained in the program, these children have received at least four and up to
six years of treatment (this is represented by the union of the dotted, the gray and the
black line in Figure 1.1).15
15Approximately 20% of children received breakfast during 4 years and 80% during 5 and up to 6
years
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FIGURE 1.1: Timeline:Observed, potential and assumed treatment duration for children 6 to 9 years old in 2002
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Finally, the sample only includes children who attended the morning shift in public
primary schools in Mexico, who did not stop attending school during the period 2002 to
2005 and who did not change their residency during that period. The sample of the 2002
cohort consists of 344 schools from which 94 were treated and 250 were untreated. In
the balanced panel (2002-2005) there are 283 schools from which 87 are treated and
196 are not treated. This results in 1839 children for the cohort of 2002 and 1337 who
can be observed in 2002 and 2005, as shown in Table 1.2.
TABLE 1.2: Sample of children 6 to 12 years old in cohorts and panel 2002-2005
Variable Treated % Untreated % Total
Sample 2002 687 37 1152 63 1839
Panel 2002-2005 522 38 815 62 1337
The main regression framework includes four dependent variables: Children’s Raven’s
scores, a dummy variable indicating if the child had a disease during the previous month
and the standardized measures of height and weight by age and gender. These variables
are regressed on a set of controls including context characteristics, individual attributes
of children (i.e. height, weight and Raven’s scores in 2002) and school characteristics
including their sanitation. The same regressors are also used to analyze the selection
into treatment and to calculate a Propensity Score to match students treated and un-
treated and obtain the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) and the Average Treat-
ment Effect (ATE) of the SBP.
The regressions also include a dummy variable indicating whether the student is partici-
pating in PROGRESA or not. It is important to control for the presence of this program,
because plausibly the SBP is directed to the same population than PROGRESA and the
results here presented could be capturing the effects of such program and not the effect
of the breakfast.
I use the data of the 2002 cohort to perform OLS regressions and PSM to observe the
short-term effects of the SBP (i.e. 1 to 3 years of treatment). The same analysis is
performed on the panel (2002-2005) to obtain the medium-term effects (i.e. 4 to 6 years
of treatment).
Table 1.3 shows the main descriptive statistics of the variables used as controls in the
OLS model and to calculate the propensity score in the matching process. It is possible
to observe the differences between the treatment group and the untreated as well as their
statistical significance. The main context variables that significantly differ between
treated and untreated are the parent’s years of schooling, the proportion of students
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receiving PROGRESA transfers and the standardized Raven’s scores by age and sex.
However, anthropometric measures such as height and weight and their standardized
values are not significantly different between the two groups, despite being one of the
main selection criteria declared by the local authorities. By the contrary, treated and
untreated schools exhibit different characteristics.
For example, the proportion of children attending multiple grade schools is higher
in the treated group.16 The literature shows that in multiple grade schools there is
more poverty, pedagogical difficulties and lower achievement than in full-grade schools
(Cueto and Chinen, 2008, p.134). This is an intuitive result and is also consistent with
the lower number of teachers and students on average in the treatment group. However,
contrary to the intuition, principals’ education in treated schools is significantly higher
than in the untreated, and these teachers could be more prone to be located in better
schools and urban areas. Furthermore, schools infrastructure, captured by the presence
of bathroom facilities with tap water and cleaning products is higher on average for the
treated group.
TABLE 1.3: Descriptive statistics of a panel of kids 6 to 9 years old in 2002
Treated Untreated Difference
Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S. D.
A. Context Variables
Log of Income 433 9.78 1.02 658 9.85 1.20 -0.07
HH Years of Schooling 438 7.15 3.01 659 7.50 3.18 -0.35 *
Spouse Years of Schooling 407 7.06 2.85 561 7.47 2.99 -0.40 **
Number of Siblings 522 2.30 1.64 815 2.39 1.84 -0.09
PROGRESA 521 0.20 0.40 811 0.15 0.36 0.05 **
B. Kid’s Characteristics
Girl 522 0.50 0.50 815 0.49 0.50 0.01
Age 2002 522 8.27 1.24 815 8.26 1.19 0.00
Age 2005 522 11.49 1.19 815 11.39 1.17 0.10
Std. Cognitive Test Scores 519 0.02 0.94 810 -0.09 1.01 0.12 **
Kid had a disease in 2001 522 0.58 0.49 815 0.60 0.49 -0.02
Height (cm) 487 126.77 9.80 715 126.88 9.40 -0.11
Weight (kg) 476 28.02 7.63 694 28.08 7.16 -0.06
Standarized Height 487 0.08 0.64 715 0.10 0.65 -0.01
Standarized Weight 476 0.02 0.88 694 0.04 0.92 -0.02
C. School Characteristics
Multiple grade school 522 0.20 0.40 815 0.08 0.27 0.11 ***
# of teachers at school 522 9.81 4.84 788 10.45 5.44 -0.63 **
# of students registred 512 285.83 174.93 790 329.41 357.67 -43.58 ***
Principal’s education 521 1.73 0.74 798 1.55 0.67 0.18 ***
Principal is a female 522 0.27 0.44 815 0.39 0.49 -0.12 ***
Principal has another Job 522 0.33 0.47 815 0.38 0.48 -0.05 *
Cleaning Personnel 522 0.68 0.47 815 0.74 0.44 -0.06 **
Bathroom water/soap wash 500 0.43 0.49 813 0.29 0.45 0.14 ***
Ceiling Condition 500 0.86 0.34 813 0.86 0.34 0.00
16Multiple grade schools have students from different grades sharing one classroom and one teacher.
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1.3 OLS estimation of the effects of the SBP on chil-
dren’s outcomes
I estimate the effects of the school breakfast program using OLS in both the panel of
children from 2002 to 2005 and the cohort of 2002. This allows observing the effect of
the SBP in the medium run (4 to 6 years of treatment) and in the short run (1 to 3 years of
treatment). The OLS estimation is consistent and unbiased if the selection into treatment
is not directly determined either by family’s nor children’s characteristics influencing
children’s outcomes, but by other observable and/or unobservable variables not having
an influence on the outputs of interest. The intuition behind using OLS is that if the SBP
in Mexico is not targeted towards children who are more in need and the assignation
is explained by observable school characteristics and other independent unobservables
(e.g. political ties to the municipalities), OLS results are potentially consistent. Hence,
pooled and simple OLS results are presented as a benchmark before the PSM results are
included.
The first set of regressions (i.e. using panel data) include five dependent variables mea-
sured in 2005: Raven’s scores, a dummy indicating if the child had a disease during the
last 12 months, the standardized height and weight by age and sex and a dummy indi-
cating if the child has repeated grade during his primary studies. The breakfast program
or treatment status is the main explanatory variable. The regression for the panel takes
the form:
Yit = α+βSBPi + γ1Cit + γ2Xit + γ2Wi2002 + γ3Sit +pii +µit (1.1)
Where SBPit is the treatment status of the individual i; Cit represents a vector of back-
ground controls measured in 2002: household’s income, parent’s education, number of
siblings and if the child receives a PROGRESA scholarship or not; Xit are the controls
for the children’ sex and age; Wi2002 are the controls for the children’ outcomes in 2002:
Raven’s scores, a dummy variable indicating if the child had a disease during the last
month and the standardised height and weight of the child i; Sit are schools characteris-
tics measured in 2002: a dummy variable showing whether it is a multiple grade school
or not, the number of teachers, the number of students, principal’s education and sex,
and a set of dummies indicating if the school has cleaning personal, bathrooms with
water and soap and if school’s ceilings are in good condition; pii are municipality fixed
effects and µit is the error term.
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Municipality fixed-effects allow to control for observable and unobservable character-
istics at the municipality level that do not change over time and could simultaneously
affect children’s outcomes and school’s treatment status, like the incumbent party in the
municipality, infrastructure, quality of institutions, etc. Although the fixed-effects do
not address the changes in time across municipalities, the period of time of this study
(3 years) is short enough to believe that changes across municipalities do not have big
effects on children’s outcomes.
The second set of regressions (i.e. using the cohort data from 2002) include the same
five dependent variables but measured in 2002. The regression for this cohort takes the
form:
Yit = α+βSBPi + γ1Ci + γ2Xi + γ2Si +pii +µi (1.2)
The only difference with the Equation (1.1) used for panel data is that it does not include
Wi2002 or the controls for the children characteristics in 2002: Raven’s scores, a dummy
indicating if the child had a disease during the last 12 months and the standardised
height and weight of the child i, since these represent now the outcomes to be measured.
Hence only sex and age of children are included in Xi.
Table 1.4 presents the main results of the pooled OLS regression for the five dependent
variables. The first column includes the results of SBP with no controls. The coefficients
in this column indicate positive and statistically significant effects on Raven’s scores and
a reduction on the probabilities of having a disease. Column 2 includes context controls
and the SBP effects on IQ and health remain, while there is a significant reduction on the
probability of repeating grade during primary school. Column 3 includes PROGRESA
transfers as a control, and it is possible to observe effects on all the outcomes but height.
Nonetheless, in the fourth and fifth columns including a full set of children and school
characteristics measured in 2002 as controls, all the effects are non-significant, except
for the case of the standardized weight, on which SBP has an effect of 0.11 to 0.13 SD.
Columns 6 to 10 in Table 1.4 show the results of models incorporating municipality
fixed-effects. The only significant outcome is the effect on weight. Note that the es-
timations regarding children’s weight are very similar between column 7, which only
includes school characteristics as controls, and column 9 which shows the results in-
cluding a full set of controls (i.e. from 0.17 SD to 0.19 SD). Also, while the estimation
in column 8 regarding weight is significantly higher this is only due to the exclusion of
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the 2002 children characteristics. Consequently, OLS results show that the only consis-
tent effect is that of SBP on weight, while the results for the rest of outcomes are not
robust to different specifications and moreover to the inclusion of municipality fixed
effects.
Finally, Column 10 presents the effects of SBP including a full set of controls but ex-
cluding all children receiving PROGRESA transfers. The results exhibit that for all out-
comes, the coefficients do not change dramatically between the full sample presented
in column 9 and the subsample in column 10 and moreover the coefficient of weight
remains in-line (i.e. approximately 0.16 SD).
Table 1.5 presents the main results of simple OLS regressions using the 2002 cohort
data. This regression includes a sample of children observed in the panel but focuses
on the 2002 outcomes. The first column shows the regression with no controls. In this
column, no statistically significant effects are found. The table also shows the results of
the gradual inclusion of context, child’s and school’s characteristics, as well as school’s
infrastructure as controls from Columns 2 to 6. It can be noted that the only effect of
the SBP is on Raven’s cognitive test scores, and this is robust to different model specifi-
cations before including fixed-effects. Once municipality fixed-effects are included the
effect of SBP on Raven’s scores remains significant but only when children receiving
PROGRESA transfers are excluded from the sample. However, this significant results
should be read carefully since they do not include previous information of cognitive
tests as controls.
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TABLE 1.4: OLS results of children’s outcomes on treatment status and general controls in a panel
of students 2002-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A. Cognitive Test Scores
SBP 0.147* 0.171** 0.163** 0.117 0.104 0.088** 0.102 0.125 0.044 0.030
(0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.078) (0.084) (0.035) (0.072) (0.075) (0.062) (0.069)
Observations 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 468
R2 0.006 0.072 0.074 0.161 0.179 0.150 0.184 0.196 0.259 0.285
B. Illness Probability
SBP -0.071* -0.069* -0.067* -0.066 -0.071 -0.068 -0.039 -0.035 -0.043 -0.028
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.057) (0.051) (0.053) (0.061) (0.052)
Observations 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 487
R2 0.005 0.017 0.017 0.031 0.049 0.143 0.162 0.176 0.183 0.194
C. Standardized Height
SBP 0.015 0.068 0.091 0.051 0.089 -0.127 0.002 0.084 0.059 0.056
(0.083) (0.081) (0.079) (0.062) (0.068) (0.081) (0.100) (0.091) (0.096) (0.104)
Observations 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 461
R2 0.000 0.101 0.118 0.487 0.494 0.182 0.263 0.301 0.563 0.558
D. Standardized Weight
SBP 0.068 0.116 0.126* 0.109* 0.135** 0.124*** 0.192** 0.283*** 0.174* 0.157*
(0.079) (0.077) (0.076) (0.056) (0.063) (0.044) (0.077) (0.070) (0.091) (0.079)
Observations 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 461
R2 0.001 0.083 0.087 0.517 0.527 0.138 0.190 0.226 0.573 0.560
E. Grade Repetition
SBP -0.043 -0.054* -0.056* -0.037 -0.040 0.001 -0.017 -0.041 -0.024 -0.025
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.061) (0.054) (0.050) (0.059) (0.060)
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 487
R2 0.003 0.078 0.078 0.141 0.153 0.127 0.153 0.216 0.247 0.275
Context Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PROGRESA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kid’s Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors, clustered on school, in parentheses. Context Controls are parent’s education, log of Income and number of
siblings; children’s controls are age, sex and cognitive test scores, illnesses, height and weight in 2002; School controls are a dummy for
multiple-grade schools, number of teachers and students, principal’s education and gender and their interactions, if principal has another
job or not and school’s sanitation/infrastructure. Column 10 excludes children receiving PROGRESA scholarships
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TABLE 1.5: OLS results of children’s outcomes on treatment status and general controls in a
cohort of students in 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Cognitive Test Scores
SBP 0.107 0.149∗ 0.149∗ 0.149∗ 0.215∗∗ -0.0602 0.102 0.163 0.286∗
(0.0817) (0.0790) (0.0797) (0.0802) (0.0875) (0.136) (0.162) (0.159) (0.149)
Observations 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 487
R2 0.003 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.135 0.203 0.232 0.262 0.287
B. Illness Probability
SBP 0.0302 0.0345 0.0329 0.0326 0.0330 -0.0506 0.0319 0.0302 -0.0202
(0.0406) (0.0407) (0.0409) (0.0410) (0.0448) (0.0646) (0.0610) (0.0591) (0.0611)
Observations 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 487
R2 0.001 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.040 0.157 0.190 0.198 0.231
C. Standardized Height
SBP 0.0155 0.0680 0.0905 0.197∗∗ 0.0891 -0.127 0.00170 0.0591 0.0568
(0.0836) (0.0810) (0.0798) (0.0851) (0.0682) (0.0819) (0.100) (0.0961) (0.104)
Observations 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 461
R2 0.000 0.101 0.118 0.165 0.494 0.182 0.263 0.563 0.558
D. Standardized Weight
SBP -0.0491 -0.00603 -0.00450 0.000903 0.0960 -0.0780 0.00241 0.0623 0.175
(0.0718) (0.0685) (0.0682) (0.0688) (0.0686) (0.0919) (0.119) (0.116) (0.121)
Observations 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 587 487
R2 0.001 0.100 0.101 0.105 0.169 0.211 0.263 0.295 0.321
E. Grade Repetition
SBP -0.00236 -0.00943 -0.0101 -0.000170 -0.0201 0.0990∗ 0.0920∗ 0.0494 0.0540
(0.0283) (0.0278) (0.0281) (0.0275) (0.0299) (0.0576) (0.0509) (0.0416) (0.0443)
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 586 486
R2 0.000 0.053 0.053 0.108 0.123 0.137 0.148 0.264 0.277
Context Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PROGRESA Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kid’s Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors, clustered on school, in parentheses. Context Controls are parent’s education, log of Income and number of
siblings; children’s controls are age, sex and cognitive test scores, illnesses, height and weight in 2002; School controls are a dummy
for multiple-grade schools, number of teachers and students, principal’s education and gender and their interactions, if principal has
another job or not and school’s sanitation/infrastructure. Column 9 excludes children receiving PROGRESA scholarships.
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1.4 Characteristics of the assignment into treatment
This section includes the results of a logistic regression used to analyze the main deter-
minants in the assignation of the SBP to schools. The results obtained here are important
to investigate the validity of the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) in order
to find the causal effects of the SBP through a matching process. The CIA assumes
that conditional on X, the selection into treatment and the outcomes are independent;
where X is the vector of observed variables included in the logistic model (Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd, 1998). In other words, there is a set of covariates X observable to
the researcher and after controlling for these, the potential outcomes are independent of
the treatment status or this is “as good as random”.
Formally:
(Yi,Yo)⊥ D | X
The independent variables (X) included in the logistic regression should determine the
treatment status (D) and once controlling for this, other unobservable factors should not
have influence in the outcomes variables. This is crucial for correctly identifying the im-
pact of the SBP, since it ensures that although treated and untreated groups differ, these
differences may be accounted to avoid the selection bias. This allows the construction
of a counter-factual for the treatment group, as shown in the next section.
The dependent variable of the logistic regression is a dummy indicating the treatment
status; it takes the value of one if the child is in a school participating in the SBP or
zero otherwise. The set of independent variables are the same used in the OLS calcu-
lations including family context, child’s and school’s characteristics. I also include a
conditional Logit model that allows for the inclusion of fixed effects at the municipality
level.
Table 1.6 presents the results of the logistic regressions. The first column including the
context variables shows that none of these have a significant influence on the probability
of being treated. The second column adds the dummy related to PROGRESA; this is
significant and suggests that children receiving this conditional transfers are more likely
to be in the SBP. This conclusion does not change once the children’s characteristics
are included in the third column; however, once school characteristics are included
in the fourth column, the PROGRESA dummy is no longer significant. Note that in
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the specification presented in column 4, the school’s characteristics result to be highly
significant in determining the probability of being treated. The number of teachers,
principals education and other characteristics like the presence of cleaning personnel in
the school as well as the hygiene of the bathrooms seem to be the main predictors of the
treatment status.
Columns 5 to 7 in Table 1.6 show the results for the conditional Logit regression in-
cluding municipality fixed effects.17 The first of these models include only school
controls and municipality fixed effects. Despite the fact that most of the variables are
non-significant, some school characteristics are still determinant of the assignment into
treatment, i.e. the number of students registered and some interactions of principals
gender and education. These variables remains significant in the next two specifica-
tions when children’s (Column 6) and context characteristics (Column 7) are added as
controls. Once controlling for context, children and fixed-characteristics of the munic-
ipalities, the infrastructure of the school (approximated by the ceilings condition in the
classrooms) is also a significant predictor of the treatment.
Notice that despite the local authorities generally declare that the main selection cri-
teria is children’s height and weight, such variables are not significant in any of the
model specifications. Furthermore, as shown in the Annex Table A1, other Logit mod-
els with different measures of height in centimeters, weight in kilograms, Body Mass
Index (BMI) and height over weight by age and sex, show that none of these differ-
ent variables are significant in the assignment into treatment. Similarly, socioeconomic
characteristics of the students do not seem to be important determinants of the treatment
status.
Consequently, there seems to be evidence of an administrative bias or program place-
ment bias in the application of the SBP based on certain characteristics of the schools.
Selection bias may arise from actions on the part of those implementing the interven-
tion (Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vazquez, 2010). Even when there is an explicit targeting
criterion, there could be a bias if administrators of the program select those schools
more willing to participate in the program, where it is easier to implement it (i.e. in
schools with better infrastructure) or where the principal has more empathy with the
local authorities.
17Given that municipality fixed- effects require of intra-municipality variation across time, children
in schools for which there is no variation in some of their characteristics are dropped from the sample,
reducing the number of available observations in Columns 5 to 7.
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TABLE 1.6: Determinants of the assignment into treatment SBP in Mexico, 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log of Income 0.708 0.669 0.677 0.874 2.965
(0.484) (0.483) (0.512) (0.734) (2.304)
Log of Income sq. -0.044 -0.041 -0.042 -0.053 -0.147
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.039) (0.116)
Mother Schooling -0.017 -0.015 -0.026 -0.010 -0.104
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.042) (0.090)
Father Schooling -0.012 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 0.098
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.082)
#Siblings 0.016 0.003 0.019 0.020 0.251
(0.055) (0.057) (0.058) (0.066) (0.167)
PROGRESA 0.402* 0.481** 0.096 0.824
(0.231) (0.245) (0.277) (0.612)
Girl 0.182 0.248 0.481 0.426
(0.171) (0.186) (0.309) (0.282)
Age -0.081 0.065 0.420*** 0.352*
(0.075) (0.082) (0.156) (0.184)
IQ 0.165* 0.233** 0.262 0.333
(0.089) (0.099) (0.216) (0.232)
Standardised Height 0.079 0.166 -0.124 -0.054
(0.213) (0.225) (0.512) (0.475)
Standardised Weight -0.047 0.066 0.179 0.234
(0.144) (0.152) (0.292) (0.290)
Illness 0.136 0.144 0.234 0.446
(0.174) (0.194) (0.294) (0.332)
Multiple Grade Schools 0.540 0.655 0.648 0.689
(0.333) (1.172) (1.193) (1.122)
#Teachers 0.267*** 0.494 0.534 0.580
(0.077) (0.402) (0.376) (0.430)
#Teachers Sq. -0.007*** -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
(0.002) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
#Students -0.002 -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Principal Grad. 0.060 -0.272 -0.151 -0.115
(0.246) (1.236) (1.166) (1.152)
Principal Posgrad. 1.625*** 0.327 0.320 0.459
(0.370) (1.188) (1.064) (1.086)
Principal is a female -1.133*** -2.226 -2.517* -2.419*
(0.302) (1.378) (1.371) (1.324)
P.Grad*Female 0.990** 1.158 1.298 1.235
(0.463) (1.789) (1.710) (1.671)
P.Posgrad*Female -1.635** -2.442* -2.396* -2.704**
(0.675) (1.307) (1.279) (1.318)
Principal has another job -0.216 -0.570 -0.546 -0.522
(0.221) (0.923) (0.935) (0.856)
Cleaning Personnel -1.044*** 0.946 0.763 1.198
(0.267) (1.291) (1.188) (1.127)
Bathroom Water/soap 0.896*** 0.238 0.336 0.078
(0.221) (0.534) (0.558) (0.544)
Ceilings in good conditions 0.238 1.848 1.975 2.224*
(0.275) (1.464) (1.370) (1.155)
Observations 587 587 587 587 317 317 317
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.010 0.019 0.147 0.337 0.375 0.405
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors, clustered on schools, in parentheses
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In regard to this, different authors of the qualitative and quantitative studies conducted
in Mexico have mentioned that political affinities with the local authorities are impor-
tant in the application of the program. For example, Vera (2005) chooses his control
group based in four schools that were not treated because the municipality in which
they were located was ruled by the leftist party PRD, whereas the state where the study
was conducted is governed by the official and incumbent party in Mexico, PRI. The
author argues that the reason why the schools did not apply the program was due to
political differences with the state authorities.
The application of the fixed-effects in the Logit models presented are useful to control
for the political characteristics of each municipality, which presumably do not change
dramatically in the span of time considered in this study. Once controlling for these time
invariant factors, observable characteristics such as principal’s education and sex, which
arguably reflect the degree of affinity with certain political party, remain significant in
the assignment into treatment. Hence, the school characteristics including principal’s
attributes seem to be a more direct determinant of the treatment status rather than chil-
dren characteristics and hence, they result to be a main consideration of the CIA and
PSM.
1.5 Effects of the School Breakfast Program after Match-
ing
Matching is a widely used method of evaluation. It is based on the idea of contrasting
the outcomes of program participants (denoted Y1) with the outcomes of “comparable”
non-participants (denoted Y0). The differences in the outcomes of the two groups are
attributable to the program. The importance of the logistic regression presented above
is that it is useful to calculate the propensity score on which the two groups with similar
observable characteristics on average can be compared in order to determine the effects
of the program. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proved that matching units based on each
of the covariates X, is equally valid to match on the propensity score. In other words,
the probability of participation in the program summarizes all the relevant information
contained in the X variables. In effect, conditioning on the propensity score is equivalent
to conditioning on the full vector X, as long as this vector contains all the relevant
information to satisfy the CIA (Heinrich et al., 2010).
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Figure 1.2 shows the propensity score using the full set of covariates and interactions
for both groups, treated and non-treated before matching. Note that a good proportion
of the two distributions is already overlapped before the matching procedure. This
means that there is a considerable group of children in the sample who share similar
family and individual observable characteristics attending similar schools which are
treated and untreated, offering a good common support for the comparison of outcomes.
The probability distribution of the treated represented by the solid line in the graphic,
also suggests that given this set of covariates, the program does not seem to be fully
directed to one specific group, since the distribution of probabilities of the assignment
into treatment are centered around 50 and distributed in a broad range of propensity
scores.
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To estimate the treatment effect for each treated person i, outcome Y1i is compared to
an average of the outcomes Y0i for matched persons in the control group constructed on
the basis of observed characteristics X. Typically, when the observed propensity score
of an untreated person is closer to the propensity score of the treated person (i.e. the
nearest neighbor) this observations are selected as a match. Alternatively, more than one
persons in the control group can also be used as matches (i.e. the five nearest neighbors)
and also these matches in the control group can be used for a different treated person (i.e.
replacement). Alternatively, the untreated person gets a higher weight in constructing
the match if is closer to the treated observation given a specific distance measure. For
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example, the Kernel methods construct matches using all individuals in the comparing
sample and putting less weight in “distant” observations (Heckman et al., 1998, pp.262).
I focus on the measure of the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT). In principle,
given that the SBP should be directed to children in need, the evaluation is not interested
in the potential effect of the program on all children, including those more advantaged;
nonetheless the ATE results are also presented given the way the SBP was assigned. 18
Table 1.7 shows the results for the panel of children 2002-2005 after PSM. The out-
comes to be measured are the same as in the OLS model presented above, all of them
measured in 2005. Column 1 shows the ATT and ATE for a Nearest Neighbour (NN)
matching with replacement, using the five closest observations in the control group.
Column 2 presents the results for a model using the Mahalanobis distance (MD) of the
X covariates.19 Column 3 shows the results for a radius computation, which establishes
that the matched observations from the control group can differ only by 0.001 in their
propensity score from those in the treatment group. This could be considered as the least
biased estimator of those presented, since the treatment and control groups are very sim-
ilar in their propensity to be treated. Column 4 shows the results with a slightly wider
radius (0.003) which allows increasing the common support between the two groups
while keeping balance between treated and untreated units. The last columns present
the results of the Kernel non-parametric matching technique which down-weights as
matches those units far from the center of the Kernel distribution of each of the treat-
ment units.20
The results indicate that the only treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the SBP is on
weight. This result is robust to most of the different specifications presented in Table
1.7. The effect goes from a range of 0.16 standard deviations (S.D.) as presented in
column 2 using the MD technique of matching, and up to 0.27 S.D. as presented by
what is the least biased estimator in the column 3 (Radius 0.001). Note that all the
results presented, except for the MD, suggest that the two groups, treated and untreated,
are statistically and jointly equal on average and with 99% of confidence, given the
18The Average Treatment Effect (ATE) estimates the mean impact of the program obtained by the
average impact across all individuals of the population or, in other words, the effect of the program on an
individual of the population randomly chosen
19The MD takes into account the correlation in the data, since it is calculated using the inverse of
the variance–covariance matrix of the data set of interest. If interest is in the ATT, it uses the variance
covariance matrix of X in the full control group. If interest is in the ATE the variance covariance matrix
of X considered is for the pooled treatment and full control group
20For a broader analysis on different multivariate matching techniques and distance measures see Stuart
(2010).
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set of covariates used for the matching. Note that despite the MD only achieve the
average balance of the treated and untreated groups at the 90% of confidence, the MD
estimations do not differ dramatically from the other estimation presented.21
Note that OLS results for the panel of children presented in Table 1.4, exhibit the same
conclusions than the different specifications of the PSM, supporting a positive effect on
weight. The effect of the SBP on weight was also robust to most of the different OLS
specifications including the full set of controls and municipality fixed-effects. Finally,
in comparison, OLS coefficients regarding the effects on weight go from 0.11 up to 0.28
S.D. These estimations are slightly lower but in line with the PSM results in Table 1.7.
Both, OLS and PSM estimations require that, once controlling for a given set of co-
variates X, the remaining unobservable variables of the treatment and control groups
are not related to the selection into the program nor children’s outcomes. If the CIA
is accomplished these results offer two important conclusions: on one hand, slightly
higher estimations on PSM show that matching treated and untreated groups allows to
control for differences between the two groups of children that have an influence on
the outcomes which were not considered in OLS. On the other hand, the similarity of
the general results with both techniques offer a support to the PSM findings, because
arguably, OLS is a technique that involves less decisions made by the researcher in
comparison with PSM (i.e. algorithm and bandwidth selection) and in that sense is less
vulnerable to a researcher bias.
Figure 1.3 shows the kernel distribution of the propensity scores after matching. The
balance achieved by the NN(5) matching seems to be the least effective equalizing both
propensity distributions. As expected, the Radius estimation with a caliper of 0.001
as well as the Kernel estimation with a bandwidth of just 0.001 are the most effective
matching the two distributions among treated and untreated. In the case of the Radius
and Kernel (0.001) the two distributions are skewed to the left, suggesting that the group
of treated children who are better matches for the untreated, are those who have a low
propensity to be treated (conditional on the set of X covariates) but participate in the
program.
Table 1.8 presents the PSM results for the 2002 cohort. These results show the effect
of the SBP on children’s short-term outcomes, when they have been treated from 1 to
3 years. The six columns of the table include the same matching techniques previously
explained and the outcomes to be considered are the same but measured in 2002. The
21Details on the matching balance for each of the covariates are presented in the Appendix.
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TABLE 1.7: Average treatment on the Treated (ATT) and Average Treatment Effects
(ATE) of the SBP on children’s outcomes in 2005
Nearest (5) Mahala. (5) Radius (0.001) Radius (0.005) Kernel(0.001) Kernel(0.005)
A. Cognitive Test Scores
ATT 0.027 0.195* -0.049 0.076 -0.038 0.055
(0.160) (0.108) (0.117) (0.055) (0.117) (0.111)
ATE 0.053 0.129 -0.056 0.075 -0.049 0.059
(0.140) (0.092) (0.119) (0.064) (0.118) (0.113)
B. Illness Probability
ATT -0.154 -0.072 -0.084 -0.083*** -0.096 -0.072
(0.095) (0.052) (0.063) (0.030) (0.063) (0.058)
ATE -0.057 -0.038 -0.019 -0.048 -0.028 -0.047
(0.075) (0.047) (0.057) (0.033) (0.056) (0.054)
C. Standardized Height
ATT 0.072 0.103 0.074 0.077 0.072 0.070
(0.176) (0.077) (0.094) (0.048) (0.095) (0.113)
ATE 0.033 0.087 0.036 0.002 0.028 0.006
(0.136) (0.071) (0.084) (0.052) (0.085) (0.100)
D. Standardized Weight
ATT 0.084 0.162** 0.267*** 0.195*** 0.257*** 0.189*
(0.148) (0.080) (0.091) (0.045) (0.091) (0.114)
ATE 0.094 0.149* 0.162* 0.089* 0.143* 0.095
(0.131) (0.081) (0.087) (0.051) (0.086) (0.103)
E. Grade Repetition
ATT -0.084 -0.105*** -0.051 -0.022 -0.038 -0.020
(0.085) (0.044) (0.060) (0.032) (0.059) (0.043)
ATE -0.053 -0.087** -0.027 -0.038 -0.021 -0.045
(0.066) (0.038) (0.059) (0.032) (0.059) (0.046)
p > chi2 0.758 0.086 0.906 0.463 0.985 0.406
Observations 536 536 536 536 536 536
on-support 505 536 188 392 188 392
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Abadi and Imbens (2006) Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
only significant effects of the SBP are the ATE on Raven’s scores in Columns 4 and
6; however, this result does not seem robust to other different matching specifications.
The results shown come from the comparison of two groups statistically balanced on
average or equal in terms of a full set of covariates. Note that the MD matching, as it
considers all the treated and untreated units and not only those in the common support,
only achieves the average balance of the two groups with the 90% of confidence.22
Jointly, the results presented in Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 suggest that the SBP is probably
not having any significant average or treatment effects on any of the analyzed outcomes
in the short term. Nonetheless, in the medium run, where the children have already
received between 4 and up to 6 years of treatment, the SBP seems to have a positive
effect on weight. Finally, OLS results in Table 1.5 focusing on the short term outcomes
while controlling for municipality fixed-effects, are closely related to those presented
after PSM. In general both, OLS and PSM results offer the same conclusions of no
significant effects of the SBP in the short term.
22The detail of the matching balance for each of the covariates for this sample of children as well as
the graphics of the propensity score after matching for the cohort 2002 can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 1.9 presents PSM results using the panel data of 2002-2005 but only for the sam-
ple of children not receiving a PROGRESA Scholarship. The ATT is less robust to
the different specifications of PSM; possibly due to the reduction in the sample size.
Nonetheless, the effects on weight remain statistically significant in the MD, the Ra-
dius (0.005) and Kernel (0.005). Note that for this sample the MD matching results
presented in Column 2 did not achieve the balance of the two groups on average and
the point estimator of the ATT (0.13 S.D.) is smaller than the other two significant ATT
which present a similar result (i.e. 0.17 and 0.16 S.D.).
For the case of weight, the estimations in the Table 1.9 suggest a smaller effect that
in the case of the full sample (where the range was from 0.16 to 0.27 S.D. depending
on the PSM algorithm). These results indirectly suggest that the effect of the SBP on
weight is higher for children receiving PROGRESA.
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TABLE 1.8: Average treatment on the Treated (ATT) and Average Treatment Effects
(ATE) of the SBP on children’s outcomes in 2002
Nearest (5) Mahala. (5) Radius (0.001) Radius (0.005) Kernel(0.001) Kernel(0.005)
A. Cognitive Test Scores
ATT 0.092 0.012 0.109 0.093 0.110 0.105
0.184 0.083 0.120 0.078 0.121 0.080
ATE 0.158 0.052 0.124 0.180*** 0.114 0.179***
0.131 0.080 0.106 0.073 0.107 0.073
B. Illness Probability
ATT 0.037 0.020 -0.059 -0.023 -0.051 -0.026
0.079 0.045 0.060 0.042 0.061 0.043
ATE 0.015 0.020 -0.042 0.005 -0.034 0.006
0.064 0.040 0.057 0.041 0.057 0.042
C. Standardized Height
ATT -0.071 -0.028 0.013 -0.046 0.026 -0.042
0.103 0.045 0.062 0.045 0.062 0.046
ATE -0.044 -0.017 -0.031 -0.032 -0.026 -0.032
0.076 0.042 0.059 0.037 0.059 0.038
D. Standardized Weight
ATT -0.214* -0.063 0.030 -0.102 0.042 -0.089
0.130 0.070 0.096 0.072 0.096 0.072
ATE -0.118 -0.052 -0.003 -0.062 -0.001 -0.057
0.104 0.066 0.091 0.062 0.090 0.063
E. Grade Repetition
ATT -0.042 0.021 -0.004 -0.028 -0.008 -0.028
0.067 0.029 0.039 0.029 0.040 0.029
ATE -0.021 0.022 -0.011 -0.004 -0.008 0.000
0.049 0.027 0.040 0.029 0.041 0.030
p > chi2 0.444 0.027 0.246 0.252 0.165 0.336
obs. 587 587 587 587 587 587
on-support 558 587 234 414 234 414
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Abadi and Imbens (2006) Robust standard errors below point estimates
In order to investigate possible heterogeneous effects of the SBP on children depend-
ing on their socioeconomic background, Table 1.10 presents the results of the PSM by
the sample of children in the panel 2002-2005 below and above the national median of
income in 2005. The results exhibit that for those children at the bottom part of the dis-
tribution of household’s income, there is a significant effect on weight. By the contrary,
for those children in the upper part of the distribution, no robust effects are found on any
of the analyzed outcomes. For example, in Column 1, the matching estimation shows
a significant ATT of 0.40 S.D. for low-income children, whereas for children at the top
half of the distribution of income, as presented in Column 2, the ATT is not significantly
different from zero. Columns 3 and 4 show similar results.
Higher positive and significant effects of the SBP on low-income children are also pre-
sented in Columns 5 and 7, showing the estimations of the Radius (0.01) and Kernel
(0.01) respectively. There, the ATT considering children at the bottom part of the in-
come distribution is of 0.30 and 0.31 S.D with no significant effects on richer children.23
23It is worth noting that grouping treated and untreated observation by household’s income allows to
increase the caliper and bandwidth of the PSM to 0.01 (established in the previous PSM estimations to
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TABLE 1.9: Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) and Average Treatment Effects
(ATE) of the SBP on Kid’s outcomes in 2005 in a sample of kids without PROGRESA
transfers
Nearest (5) Mahala. (5) Radius (0.001) Radius (0.005) Kernel(0.001) Kernel(0.005)
A. Cognitive Test Scores
ATT -0.011 -0.071 -0.052 0.082 -0.055 0.097
0.180 0.103 0.131 0.078 0.133 0.079
ATE -0.096 -0.084 -0.113 0.017 -0.120 0.014
0.146 0.090 0.131 0.080 0.133 0.083
B. Illness Probability
ATT -0.129 -0.055 -0.029 -0.067 -0.029 -0.069
0.089 0.052 0.075 0.041 0.076 0.043
ATE -0.068 -0.042 -0.045 -0.052 -0.043 -0.057
0.071 0.046 0.071 0.046 0.072 0.047
C. Standardized Height
ATT 0.011 0.043 0.009 -0.048 0.040 -0.062
0.179 0.077 0.110 0.069 0.110 0.070
ATE 0.021 0.013 0.006 -0.043 0.035 -0.047
0.131 0.074 0.105 0.070 0.106 0.071
D. Standardized Weight
ATT 0.130 0.131* 0.082 0.171*** 0.121 0.163***
0.158 0.076 0.116 0.062 0.115 0.064
ATE 0.121 0.109 0.095 0.119* 0.117 0.120*
0.132 0.081 0.110 0.064 0.109 0.065
E. Grade Repetition
ATT -0.052 -0.050 -0.023 -0.072** -0.024 -0.063**
0.072 0.039 0.053 0.030 0.053 0.030
ATE -0.041 -0.057* -0.016 -0.061* -0.021 -0.057
0.057 0.032 0.054 0.034 0.055 0.036
p > chi2 0.051 0.001 0.407 0.582 0.359 0.411
obs. 556 556 556 556 556 556
on support 540 556 211 418 211 418
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Abadi and Imbens (2006) Robust S.E. below point estimates
In conclusion, the effect on weight for lower income children is higher than that of the
full sample of children. The significant results shown in Table 1.7 estimate an ATT
from 0.16 to 0.26 S.D. Whereas in the estimation for the low income children, the
effect ranges from 0.30 to 0.40 S.D. These results offer evidence that the SBP may have
stronger effects on the weight of children in the lower distribution of income.
1.6 Conclusions
The SBP has been at the core of the alimentary strategy of the Mexican government for
many decades; but the evaluation of its results has been scarce or limited, even more so
at the national level. This research focused on evaluating the impact effects on outcomes
such as cognitive, school and anthropometric measures. OLS and PSM estimations with
0.001 and 0.005) without including ”bad” matches as controls. This also allows to keep a good sample
size for the PSM estimations
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TABLE 1.10: Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) and Average Treatment Effects
(ATE) of the SBP on Kid’s outcomes in 2005 in a sample of kids below and above the
median of income
Nearest (5) Mahalanobis (5) Radius (0.01) Radius (0.01)
Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above
A. Cognitive Test Scores
ATT 0.029 0.059 0.381** 0.117 0.061 0.090 0.074 0.078
0.205 0.294 0.172 0.138 0.155 0.227 0.158 0.226
ATE 0.030 0.016 0.182 0.137 0.118 -0.064 0.127 -0.077
0.184 0.215 0.141 0.128 0.179 0.177
B. Illness Probability
ATT -0.155 -0.268* -0.039 -0.169 -0.074 -0.130 -0.080 -0.132
0.110 0.150 0.066 0.106 0.075 0.119 0.077 0.120
ATE -0.037 -0.161 -0.043 -0.055 0.004 -0.138 0.007 -0.138
0.091 0.125 0.061 0.079 0.097 0.097
C. Standardized Height
ATT 0.314 -0.092 0.391*** -0.079 0.220 -0.207 0.239 -0.217*
0.199 0.233 0.106 0.120 0.161 0.131 0.165 0.129
ATE 0.254 -0.084 0.183* 0.022 0.184 -0.228 0.204 -0.230
0.172 0.192 0.096 0.108 0.140 0.140
D. Standardized Weight
ATT 0.398** 0.063 0.331*** 0.058 0.297** -0.093 0.314** -0.123
0.187 0.227 0.101 0.135 0.141 0.144 0.144 0.145
ATE 0.363** 0.034 0.238** 0.085 0.281 -0.095 0.287 -0.099
0.167 0.220 0.107 0.116 0.145 0.146
E. Grade Repetition
ATT -0.087 -0.044 -0.145** -0.055 -0.058 -0.023 -0.061 -0.027
0.100 0.111 0.063 0.082 0.067 0.062 0.068 0.064
ATE -0.060 -0.065 -0.116** -0.071 -0.027 -0.074 -0.029 -0.082
0.081 0.075 0.054 0.050 0.055 0.055
p > chi2 0.867 0.973 0.020 0.026 0.355 0.712 0.314 0.757
obs. 324 212 324 212 324 212 324 212
on support 286 173 324 212 234 121 234 121
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Abadi and Imbens (2006) Robust S.E. below point estimates
different algorithms were presented. The results suggest that the assignation into treat-
ment does not depend on children’s characteristics like height and weight, moreover,
they suggest an administrative bias in its assignment. The estimations also show a con-
sistent effect on children’s weight which may push them above their standardize average
by age and sex.
Specifically, results coming from Logit models do not support that selection into treat-
ment depends on children’s observable characteristics like their height and weight de-
spite local authorities’ presumption of such assignment criteria. By the contrary, school
characteristics seem to be more related to the application of the SBP suggesting the
presence of an administrative bias. As discussed in Section 1.4, variables like school’s
infrastructure and the closeness of the principals with the local authorities might explain
part of this bias. This is perhaps not surprising considering that the SBP in Mexico is
an old program born and designed in the surge of the so-called corporative State in
Mexico, commonly related to the use of social programs for political purposes.
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The program does not seem to present any significant effects on height in any of the
different estimations in the OLS and the PSM with different logarithms, neither in the
short (1 to 3 years of treatment) nor the medium run (4 to 6 years of treatment). This
is unsurprising since the available evidence on children’s growth show that faltering
in developing countries typically begins in the first three months of life and recov-
ery (catch-up growth) after early childhood is difficult to observe (Eveleth and Tanner,
1976; Grantham-McGregor, Cheung, Cueto, Glewwe, Richter, and Strupp, 2007; Vic-
tora, de Onis, Hallal, Blo¨ssner, and Shrimpton, 2010). Although recent literature sug-
gests that puberty may offer an opportunity window for recovery (Coly, Milet, Diallo,
Ndiaye, Be´ne´fice, Simondon, Wade, and Simondon, 2006; Prentice, Ward, Goldberg,
Jarjou, Moore, Fulford, and Prentice, 2013; Hirvonen, 2013), children in the SBP are
neither in early childhood nor puberty (i.e. 6 to 12 years old children).
In theory, a better nutritional status in the short run can have impacts in the long run
health and this might be reflected in lower children’s dropout rates and less absenteeism.
Some researchers have found immediate effects of breakfast on children’s nutritional
status, including a positive effect on child’s size (see Powell et al. (1998); Cueto and
Chinen (2008)). However, such evaluations do not include any specific measure of
disease probabilities. The results reported here do not show any effect of the SBP on
the probabilities of having a disease after 1 to 3 or 4 to 6 years of treatment. In general,
the sign of the coefficients obtained in the OLS and PSM show a reduction on the
probabilities of having a disease, but the standard errors of these estimations do not
allow to conclude any significant effect.
Grade repetition probabilities do not seem to be significantly affected by the presence
of the SBP in neither the short nor the long-run. Although the sign of the coefficients is
always negative in the PSM, suggesting that the probability of repeating a grade reduces
for the children in the program, the results are generally not robust to the different algo-
rithms presented. Regarding the effects of the SBP on grade repetition, several studies
have found a positive relation between school feeding programs and enrollment or atten-
dance rates in low-income countries in the short term and specifically in undernourished
children (Del Rosso, 1996; CARE, 2004; Grantham-McGregor, 2005; Cueto and Chi-
nen, 2008). However, as mentioned in Section 1.1, the percentage of undernourished
children in Mexico is only 1.6%, which can explain the absence of a significant effect
of the SBP on grade repetition.
In general, PSM results do not show any positive results on children’s cognitive tests.
OLS estimations support a positive effect in the short run; however this is not confirmed
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by the PSM estimations in neither the short nor the medium run. These results are
not surprising since recent evidence on children’s cognitive skills show that gaps in
children’s abilities that play an important role on diverse outcomes, open up very early
across socioeconomic groups (i.e. before the age of 5) and these differences remain
into adulthood. Evidence shows that interventions in early stages of life are the most
important closing IQ gaps; however gains on Raven’s scores fade out around 4 years
after the intervention, and only in earlier more intensive interventions (1 to 2 years old)
cognitive gains last until early adulthood (Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov,
2006; Heckman, 2008; Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev, 2012).
Finally, PSM estimations show a consistent effect of the SBP on weight after 4 to 6
years of treatment. The results presented exhibit an ATT of 0.16 to 0.26 S.D. for the full
sample of children. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that treated children in this sample
are already 0.02 S.D above their average by age and sex as shown in Table 1.3. This
means that after 4 to 6 years of treatment these children could be pushed further above
their standardized average weight as a result of the SBP. More specifically, these effects
could be even more detrimental on children at the bottom half of the income distribution.
In this regard, a qualitative study on a sample of treated students from the State of
Mexico (the most populated state in the country) suggested, after reviewing children’s
consumption habits, that most of SBP children do have breakfast at home, later in the
day, they also receive breakfast at school as part of the program and moreover, some
of them buy even more food at school (see Shamah et al., 2010). This evidence gives
support to SBP effect found in this research of a higher chance of overweight in children.
Chapter 2
Does lengthening the school day
increase academic achievement?
Evidence from a natural experiment
Economic research shows that improvements on math, language and science test scores
relate to increases in economic growth, earnings in adulthood and to the reduction of
the inequality of income between social groups (Murnane et al., 1995, 2000; Lazear,
2003; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Barro and Lee, 2001; Hanushek, 2004, 2013) Ad-
ditionally, other non-monetary benefits from education such as improved health status
and lowered crime have also been reported.1 Nonetheless, the 2009 results of the Pro-
gramme for International Student Assessment (PISA) shows that, Mexico is located in
the 48th place in reading and 50th in math out of 65 countries members and partners of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Similarly, in the case of the Test for the National Assessment of Academic Achievement
in Schools (ENLACE, for its abbreviation in Spanish), which evaluates math and lan-
guage skills of all Mexican children in basic education, the results are not very promis-
ing either. In 2009, around 70% of Mexican students in primary education exhibited
results which are considered ‘insufficient’ or ‘elementary’ in both subjects. Undoubt-
edly, this implies a significant and challenging problem for educators to ensure that
future generations do not suffer from the severe basic skills problems that currently hin-
der many children. However general evidence on education remains unable to offer a
1For a recent review of the available evidence on this matter see Lochner (2011)
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clear guidance of what policies and specific investments should be pursued to increase
educational outcomes, even less so in specific contexts such as the Mexican.
Several policies directed to schools have shown to increase enrollment, however, exper-
imental and non-experimental research regarding diverse public interventions, has not
provided strong evidence on pupil’s achievement. Fee reductions, conditional transfers
and school nutrition programs in developed countries have exhibited effects in enroll-
ment which alas, are not accompanied by increased achievement. Other policies related
to overall expenditures and school initiatives such as lower class size and more educated
teachers are not conclusive in their relation to students outcomes (Hanushek, 2003).2
Similarly, the positive impacts on learning reported in developing countries come from
few variables such as availability of desks, teacher’s knowledge and teacher absence,
which provide little guidance for future policy and programs (see Glewwe, Hanushek,
Humpage, and Ravina, 2011).
In response to the weak evidence about the impact of an increased educational spending,
governments have turned their attention to policies that modify the way schools are run
and organized. For example, by decentralizing schools’ decisions to the level of local
governments and schools rather than national or state bureaucrats3 or by increasing the
lenght of the school day along with a modification in the structure of teaching.
The idea that increasing instructional time is expected to promote learning and achieve-
ment via increased time on task, broader and deeper coverage of curriculum, more op-
portunities for experimental learning and deepened adult-child relationships, is a cen-
tral notion in education that has been broadly discussed in the United States (US) (Link
and Mulligan, 1986; Levin and Tsang, 1987; Brown and Saks, 1987; Slattery, 1995;
NECTL, 2005) and more recently in Latin America (see Holland, Alfaro, and Evans,
2015). Some examples of this type of programs are the No Child Left Behind act in the
US that stimulates the allocation of extra time to teaching math and reading; the Future
for Education and Care in Germany that provides funding for full-time schools; the
Extended School Times project in the Netherlands and the Full-time School Programs
recently implemented in Latin American countries such as Chile and Uruguay.
The current study focuses on the impact analysis of a program of increased hours ap-
plied in basic schools of Mexico known as the Full-time Schools Program (Programa
2Although, evidence from experimental evaluations have found some evidence of a positive effect
from a reduction in class size (Angrist and Lavy, 1999)
3In this regard, a few studies offer evidence of positive effects on test scores and school attendance
of school decentralization programs in Argentina, Mexico, Bolivia and Colombia (Galiani, Gertler, and
Schargrodsky, 2008; Skoufias and Shapiro, 2006; Faguet and Sa´nchez, 2008)
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Excuelas de Tiempo Completo, or PETC) on primary academic achievement,4 mea-
sured in standardized test scores of mathematics and Spanish from the 2008-2009 to
the 2012-2013 academic year.5 PETC seeks to improve learning opportunities by in-
creasing the time children spend at school from four and a half to eight hours everyday,
while incorporating new subjects and activities in the curricula (e.g foreign languages,
arts, culture and nutrition) and granting every year a fixed stipend for operative expenses
and a varying fund according to the number of professors and students in each school.
Every primary school may participate in the program, but PETC is supposed to target
disadvantaged and rural schools.
The program started in the 2007-2008 academic year in 500 basic schools located in
15 out of Mexico’s 32 States.6 By 2013, 6715 basic schools from all the country were
participating in the program (i.e. approximately 10% of all basic schools that can po-
tentially be included). This represents a spending of about US$460 million from 2007
to 2013. Moreover, the 2012 elected federal government has announced an expansion
of the program from 2013-2014 in order to reach 40,000 primary and secondary schools
by 2018. According to the Secretariat of Finance in Mexico, the budget programmed
for 2014-2015 rose US$1 billion. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, the most
recent expansion of PETC has been dictated without any previous public evaluation
of the potential causal impacts on school and children’s outcomes such as test scores
and grade repetition at the national level of this large program that is aimed to be an
important component of the educational strategy in Mexico.
The present research combines different sources of information to generate a novel and
large census dataset including the database of the ENLACE test, PETC administrative
data and school-level information coming from a yearly census survey conducted in
basic schools (better known as statistics 911). These statistics include a wide range of
characteristics such as number of students, professors’ and principals’ level of education
as well as instructional time in Arts, IT, and foreign languages, along with information
on family expenses required by schools on educational materials.
4The study excludes secondary education despite being also affected by the program because grades
9th to 12th are taught in a broad range of institutions, such as Technical Secondary Schools, State Sec-
ondary Schools, Federal Secondary Schools, and “Telesecundarias”. Each of them already use different
time schedules ranging from 5 hours in “Telesecundarias” to 6-8 hours in Technical Secondary Schools.
All of these institutions can participate of PETC, therefore, the effect of the program on time extension is
different. Even though this variation results interesting to analyze, with the data at hand, it is not possible
to identify the different time schedules applied in each secondary school.
5From now on academic years are denoted also as years, so for example, 2008 refers to 2007-2008
academic year.
6By 32 States, I refer to Mexico’s 31 federal entities and the Federal District located in Mexico City.
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A parallel evaluation to PETC conducted by Andrade-Baena (2014) uses DiD and PSM
separately, to evaluate the impact on ENLACE test scores using administrative informa-
tion and characteristics of the municipalities where schools are located. The author finds
positive effects ranging from 0.06 SD to 0.13 SD and 0.07 SD to 0.13 SD for Spanish
and mathematics, respectively. Nonetheless, the study reports significant differences
between controls and treatment groups before PETC introduction (i.e. ‘placebo tests’)
and these remain significant after including controls. This threat could be the result of
the definition of the control group along with the quality of the regressors included (i.e.
at the municipality level and only for 2010). The present research differentiates from
Andrade-Baena (2014) by the inclusion of school level information and the further anal-
ysis on the impact channels of PETC.
The methodology applied in this research takes advantages of the gradual application
of the program in the period from 2009 to 2013 as a natural experiment and uses DiD
to arguably obtain causal effects on achievement separated by years of treatment (i.e.
one and up to four years of treatment). Two reasons define the period to be analyzed: a)
ENLACE test scores are fully accountable and comparable from 2008-2009 onwards;7
and b) schools from the first cohort treated by PETC (2007-2008) included units that
already had different versions of extended times of instruction (e.g. ‘Escuelas de Jor-
nada Extendida’) and these schools could have been working as such from one up to ten
years before PETC introduction; furthermore, these schools are not clearly identified.
The identification strategy relies on the fact that selection into the program is indepen-
dent of the trends on the average outcomes that treated and control groups exhibit before
and after the program started. In other words, although average test results and grade
repetition are different between PETC and control schools, both groups show a parallel
trend in outcomes before policy intervention. Furthermore, in order to avoid further
concerns of unobserved heterogeneity not captured in the DiD models due to the higher
variation observed in the characteristics of the schools used in our large control group
included in the main estimation (57000 schools, approximately), the strategy is refined
by the computation of a PSM that pairs similar schools between the original treated and
control groups. The objective is to reduce the chance of including schools that are very
different to those treated (e.g. much richer/larger or poorer/smaller), hence new DiD
estimations are obtained with a more homogeneous control group.
The contributions of this study are threefold. First of all, it contributes to the scarce
empirical literature on the estimation of causal impacts of extended hours in schools.
7Specific characteristics of this test will be discussed in detail in Section 2.2
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Secondly, it differentiates from previous works by using census data and test scores
from all primary schools in a country and not from a sample. Thirdly, this study is the
first to offer evidence of the effects of PETC on the average and for different subgroups
(i.e. with high marginality) and can be used as a reference to evaluate future extensions
and targeting of the program in Mexico and for its implementation in other developing
countries.
Estimates show average effects close to 0.06 SD on mathematics and 0.07 SD on Span-
ish test scores. Results also show a significant and positive effect on the standardized
test scores of both subjects, ranging from approximately 0.04 SD after two years of
treatment to 0.11 SD after four years of treatment on math and from 0.05 SD to 0.11
SD, respectively, on math scores of a panel of schools with a full set of school character-
istics as controls. These effects are robust to different specifications, the application of
’placebo tests’, examination of different treatment and control groups and the matching
of control schools with similar observable characteristics. Further inspections on causal
channels show that PETC has a higher impact after four years of treatment (0.29 SD) on
both subjects in schools with high marginality and exhibits a positive effect on children
at the botton and at the top of the scores distribution. Results also show that the pro-
gram does not have an effect on dropout rates nor in the selection of ”better” students,
arguably suggesting that the effects do not come from changes in the composition of
students in treated schools.
The rest of this chapter is presented as follows. Section 2.1 discusses prior evidence on
full-time school programs. Section 2.2 outlines the main characteristics of PETC since
its inception. Section 3.2 presents the data and includes descriptive statistics. Section
2.4 discusses the empirical strategy and presents the main results. Section 2.5 discusses
some of the impact channels of PETC on test scores. Section 3.6 concludes.
2.1 Prior evidence
Prior evidence on the extension of the school day remains scarce and shows, at worst,
no effect on test scores and at best, a small relationship between instructional time and
student academic achievement. Research suggests that the relationship is stronger for
students with initially low academic achievement while displaying diminishing effects
of increasing instructional time on student test scores (Wheeler, 1987; Bishop, Worner,
and Weber, 1988; Adelman et al., 1996). Findings also suggest that as the measure of
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time is refined to more closely reflect the amount of time devoted to the outcome ana-
lyzed, the relationship was strengthened (Caldwell, Huitt, and Graeber, 1982), and that
only time spent successfully completing instructional activities and not allocated time,
has a relationship with achievement (Levin and Tsang, 1987; Karweit, 1985). Hence,
this policy could be more effective when considerations are made for how time is used,
including classroom management, the appropriateness of instruction and curriculum,
and student motivation (Aronson, Zimmerman, and Carlos, 1999) 8
Nevertheless, there are many methodological limitations in most of the previous stud-
ies. Longitudinal and rigorous research on time in school is lacking, and existing studies
have been repeatedly challenged for being weakly designed, based on correlational data
and case studies (Cuban, 2008). Several studies make use of small and non-randomly
selected samples and are based on cross-sectional data. Moreover, although some stud-
ies have examined the same classrooms or schools at different times, most of them have
considered relatively short periods of time, typically less than an academic year (Bellei,
2009). Finally, it is not clear to what extent these studies controlled for confounding fac-
tors that may bias the estimates. As a consequence, the literature revealed that designs
are generally weak for making causal inferences (Patall et al., 2010).
A handful of studies arguably allow for causal inference indicating neutral to small ef-
fects. For example, Robin (2005) estimates the impact of preschoolers attending an
extended time program in a urban district of New Jersey. A total of 294 low-income
students were randomly assigned to pre-school programs of different durations. Chil-
dren either attended the experimental program in a public school for 8-hours per day, 45
weeks per year or during half-day, 3.5 hours and 41 weeks. Students in the experimental
program outperformed children in the control group in both math and literacy.
James-Burdumy, Dynarski, Moore, Deke, Mansfield, Pistorino, and Warner (2005)
evaluate the 21st Century after-school centers, a program that typically offered home-
work sessions, academic activities, enrichment activities, such as art, drama, or music,
and recreation activities across 12 school districts in the US. The authors randomly
assigned students either to a treated (1,258 students) or to a control group (1,050 stu-
dents). The intent-to-treat (ITT) impacts, as well as the local average treatment effect
(LATE) show that neither the effects on teacher assigned grades in math and English,
nor standardized reading test scores were significant. Although, subgroup estimates of
8A detailed review of the prior evidence on day extension and number of days spent in school per year
can be found in Patall, Cooper, and Allen (2010)
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ITT impacts suggest a positive effect on English grades for students with low initial
reading test scores.
Meyer and Van Klaveren (2013) conduct a randomized field experiment to estimate the
effect of an extended day program in seven Dutch elementary schools included in the
Extended School Times project on math and reading achievement. Empirical results of
this study show no significant effect on either of the two measured outcomes.
For the case of developing countries, Bellei (2009) takes advantage of the gradual imple-
mentation of the Chilean full-time schools program and uses it as a natural experiment
to calculate Difference-in-Difference (DiD) estimators and evaluate the impact on the
academic achievement of high school students. The results exhibit a small but posi-
tive and significant overall effect on language tests of 0.05 to 0.07 standard deviations
(SD) and a no effect on math in a period of two years. The evidence also suggests that
the program had larger positive effects on rural students, students who attended public
schools and students located in the upper part of the achievement distribution.
Likewise, Cerdan-Infantes and Vermeersch (2007) estimate the impact of the full-time
school program in Uruguay on standardized test scores of 6th grade students. The
program was not randomly placed but targeted to poor urban schools, hence, authors
use propensity score matching (PSM) to cope with the selection problem and construct
a comparable control group. The results show that students in disadvantaged schools
improved their test scores by 0.07 SD per year of participation in the full-time program
in math and 0.04 SD in language.
2.2 PETC Characteristics, Selection and Testing patterns
PETC started in the 2007-2008 academic year aiming to improve learning opportuni-
ties, diet and ensuring retention of children in basic education by extending the school
day from four and a half to eight hours in all public schools of basic education. As a
consequence, this policy increases instructional time to 1200 class-hours distributed in
200 days per scholar year. From its inception, PETC aimed to increase not only the
amount of instructional time dedicated to core subjects such as reading and math, but
it also included six work lines aiming to achieve a holistic education and to develop
lifelong competences: a) fostering learning of curricula contents; b) didactic use of in-
formation and communication technologies (IT); c) learning of additional languages; d)
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art and culture; e) healthy life; and f) recreation and physical development (UNESCO,
2010; Go´mez, Flores, and Alema´n, 2013). This way, the program seeks to give teachers
more time to consolidate reading, writing, oral expression, critical thinking, scientific
and mathematical thinking with the use of IT and teaching of a second language. The
program also seeks to improve children’s feeding and studying habits with the inclusion
of a cafeteria, meals and specific time to help them develop better learning and study
skills (SEP, 2010).9
Although the curricula for PETC schools is flexible, the program allows for a specific
time (i.e. one hour at the end of the school day) for teachers to plan and evaluate their
activities and, if necessary, talk to parents. The program guidelines for schools also
suggest specific hours everyday to tutor students and help them with their homework
during the eight hours at school.10
For the purposes of the program, schools should preferably have a dining room, a com-
puter classroom and sports infrastructure. This has represented a total spending for the
federation of approximately US$460 millions from 2007 to 2013 invested on recondi-
tioning schools with computer classrooms, roofed patios, laboratories, kitchens, dining
halls and toilets. This budget also covers the training and monetary aids for principals,
teachers, and support staff members; monitoring, didactic materials, meal’s services and
supplies (Go´mez et al., 2013). Unfortunately, there is no public data available on the
costs per school for all the years used in this study but it was possible to obtain from the
budget office in SEP, an approximate amount of money granted to an average school is
of approximately US$40,000 of which around US$15,000 are fixed. 11
A comparable program in terms of fixed costs is the Quality Schools Program (Pro-
grama Escuelas de Calidad PEC, for its abbreviation in Spanish) that offers grants of
US$15000 per school and aims to decentralize educational decisions at the school level
and to foster communities participation. PEC has shown some results on attainment
(that is, grade repetition and dropout rates) but results on performance are uncertain
Skoufias and Shapiro (2006). As it will be explained below, PEC is of great relevance
for our analysis as Full-time schools should be part of the Quality Schools Program.
9Secondary objectives of the program include to allow working mothers to extend their workday, to
support mono-parental families and to prevent at-risk students from engaging in harmful activities such
as drugs and crime (SEP, 2010, p.3)
10An of example of the timetable suggested for PETC schools can be found in Table B1in the Ap-
pendix.
11In general terms, the formula used multiplies US$290 per moth per teacher, US$350 per month per
principal, and close to US$25 per month per student.
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Possible threats to the objectives of the program are covered by a study of characteriza-
tion conducted by UNESCO (2010), which surveys 953 principals in full-time schools
in 2008. Some key results are that 81% of the activities covered during the extended
time are conducted mainly by the same teachers who were hired pre-intervention, while
the rest of activities are taught by new external specialists and teachers. This may well
imply an extra load of work for teachers that could compromise their quality. Addi-
tionally, only 60% of the schools report to have received a visit by the technical board
at least once a year and a low 40% declare to have received specific training for the
implementation of the program. Finally, given that it is not mandatory for students to
stay the eight hours at school, 10% of them do not stay during the full school day. Re-
gardless, 90% of principals consider that the program favors the implementation of new
pedagogical strategies and improves students learning, 86% believe that student’s satis-
faction has improved, 76% that students applications increased and 75% consider that
PETC should be mandatory in all basic schools in Mexico, because it helps students to
enhace their competences and it also allows to put more emphasis on students and other
pedagogical activities.
2.2.1 How were PETC schools selected?
Schools selected into PETC from 2008 to 2012 should have generally completed a list
of requirements based on (SEP, 2010), these include:
• Schools should be participating in the Quality Schools Program (”Programa Es-
cuelas de Calidad” PEC, for its abbreviation in Spanish). PEC is a program seek-
ing to decentralize educational decisions to the school level rather than the federal
or state level, giving more participation to the general community. This program
is directed to rural, indigenous and urban schools with high levels of marginality.
PEC schools are planned to be in the program from 1 to 5 years depending of the
needs of each school. This is a key factor in the consideration of the treatment
and control groups as discussed in the next section.12
• There exists a Technical Board in the State where the school’s are located, which
will supervise and follow the implementation of the program.
• The community is open to participate in the activities of the full-time schools (e.g.
offering support in the dining rooms).
12For more details on PEC, see Skoufias and Shapiro (2006).
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• Schools have minimum infrastructure requirements (e.g. space for the construc-
tion of kitchen and computer classrooms, sports infrastructure, and basic services
such as water and electricity).
• Schools are only working in one shift either in the morning or afternoon but not
both. In Mexico, approximately 40% of primary schools offer two shifts. This is
also considered further in the construction of the control group.
• Preferentially, schools should be located in vulnerable geographic areas.
Once eligible schools have been identified by the federal authorities, according to the
aforementioned requirements, potential schools to be treated are suggested to each of
the 32 States. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the list of potential schools only
work as a guideline and each State can lastly define the schools included in PETC. Once
they have been selected, the implementation of PETC consists of two stages: 1) the or-
ganization and preparation of schools previous to their inclusion to the program (i.e. in-
frastructure, teachers and staff hiring) and 2) the design, organization and development
of the teaching objectives. In the second stage, teachers receive printed materials which
suggest pedagogical strategies to be implemented during the extra-time at schools and
to develop the competences necessaries for the instruction of new contents. Along with
it, State’s Technical Boards evaluate and support the implementation of the program
with ‘regular’ visits to the primary schools (UNESCO, 2010).
The program started in the academic cycle 2007-2008 in 500 primary and secondary
schools located in 15 out of the 32 federal entities; by 2009, 953 schools were treated
in 29 states; 2,000 schools were participating in 2010; 2,273 in 2011; 4,758 in 2012
and by 2013, 6,715 were included in all Mexico.13 These numbers represent more than
10% of the approximately 62,500 schools which can potentially be included in PETC,
according to the requirements referred above (CONEVAL, 2013).
2.2.2 ENLACE Test and patterns of application
ENLACE is a census standardized exam of mathematics and Spanish (plus one extra
subject, i.e. science or history rotating every year) directed to evaluate knowledge and
13Note that these numbers are based on treated, pre-scholar, primary and secondary schools, but since
this study will only focus on primary schools, the final number of treated schools will be lower as shown
in the descriptive statistics presented in Section 3.2.
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skills of students from third to sixth grade of primary education, first to third grade of
secondary education and first year of high school. The results of the test are expressed
in a standardized scale comparable through time (200 to 800 points with an average of
500). ENLACE has been applied to both public and private schools since the academic
cycle 2006-2007. Nonetheless, the test was fully accountable and comparable between
years only after 2008-2009, when the staff conducting the test started to be completely
unrelated to the school where ENLACE was taking place.
The test is applied every year in a short period of time either in the last week of May
or during the first week of June. Handily, the PETC schools start their scholar year in
September and finish in July. Given this configuration of time, it is possible to observe
test results before and after schools have entered the program in more than one period
of time.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the data at hand allows us to observe ENLACE results for
the scholar cycle 2008-2009 (test applied in May/June 2009) of the schools that will
enter the program in September of 2009 (named as PETC 2010). These schools are
tested again in May/June 2010, after one scholar year of treatment, and subsequently
until May/June 2013, after 4 years of treatment. This pattern of application allows the
construction of different control and treatment groups and placebo tests, since ENLACE
results are available before and after PETC schools started the program in 2011, 2012
and 2013.
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FIGURE 2.1: Timeline: Pattern application of ENLACE and PETC
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2.2.3 Definition of control and treatment groups
Between 2010 and 2013, treated schools are defined as those entering the program in
each specific year, whereas the controls are defined as schools which can potentially
be treated but have never been treated and remain untreated during the whole period
here analyzed. Potentially treated schools are defined for the purpose of this research,
as general public primary schools operating only in one shift. Alternatively, a second
control group is built from the original controls. The basic method used is that of Heck-
man et al. (1998), where propensity scores are estimated for the ten nearest neighbors
with no replacement and common support, and the sample is then trimmed to exclude
poorly matched schools. School’s observable characteristics are useful to perform this
exercise. Propensity score is an attempt to further standardize the set of treatment and
control schools.14
As mentioned before, PETC schools are required to be in PEC and can be participating
in the latter as much as one and up to five years, depending on the time each school
require to fully decentralize its operations. Table 2.1 shows the total number of schools
participating in both programs. Effectively, contrary to what is stated by the PETC
requirements, not all the schools that belong to PETC belong to PEC. For example, in
2010, 290 schools or 37% of the treated by the full-time schools program do not belong
to PEC. For this reason, two variables are defined to identify schools in both programs:
one identifies the total number of years the schools have been in PEC by the moment
they start participating in the full-time schools program (this variable act as a control in
the regressions I will define in the next section). A second variable identifies schools
that have been at least one year in PEC during the analyzed period, this works to identify
heterogeneous effects of PETC in schools with and without PEC.
Table 2.1 also identifies the number of schools treated, controls and the matched con-
trols to be included in this study. For example, the potential group of schools analyzed
for 2010 is formed by 776 treated; 53,044 control schools and 5,137 matched schools
integrating the second control group, however, during the course of this research all
estimations will be presented for the pooled treatment and control groups.
14The probit models including the variables used for PSM as well as balancing tests for each cohort of
PETC schools can be found in Tables B7 to B14 in the Appendix.
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TABLE 2.1: Treated and Control Primary Schools Participating in Schools Quality
(PEC) and Full-Time Schools Program (PETC) 2010 to 2013
Schools used as control group
Treated All non-PETC With Matching*
PEC No PEC Total PEC No PEC Total PEC No PEC Total
(2009-2010) 365 411 776 25,188 27,856 53,044 3,231 1,906 5,137
47% 53% 100% 47% 53% 100% 63% 37% 100%
(2010-2011) 143 122 265 25,471 28,005 53,476 1,255 658 1,913
54% 46% 100% 48% 52% 100% 66% 34% 100%
(2011-2012) 1,135 793 1,928 24,351 27,639 51,990 6,768 3,193 9,961
59% 41% 100% 47% 53% 100% 68% 32% 100%
(2012-2013) 327 189 516 25,239 27,953 53,192 1,958 594 2,552
63% 37% 100% 47% 53% 100% 77% 23% 100%
Source: author’s elaboration based on PEC and PETC administrative data.
* Probit regressions are used to predict the linear index of the propensity score for the sample of PETC schools
and all non- PETC schools. Units within the ’common support’ are selected for difference-in-differences analysis.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on a novel dataset that includes different sources of
information: a) the results of ENLACE test; b) school census data (known as statistics
911); and c) the administrative data of PETC and PEC which identify the schools treated
in both programs. All data sources combine at the school level for the period 2009 to
2013. As discussed, this rich dataset allows to observe an important number of schools’
characteristics relevant to the analysis conducted.
The results of ENLACE for each of the schools and students are published by SEP. This
dataset include the average results by subject, the percentage of students with levels of
insufficient, fair, good and excellent, as well as the number of students tested and unreli-
able tests per school.15 The geographical location of the schools: state, municipality and
locality is also reported along with five categories of ‘privation’ or marginality suffered
in school’s localities.16
The statistics 911 are self reported questionnaires sent by the schools to SEP at the be-
ginning of each scholar year. They include information on number of students by grade,
15Every year a set of questions to be used in the next year’s test is applied to a controlled sample,
this works to built the standardized scale of the next year’s test and allows to identify students out of
this scale who are labeled as unreliable. Furthermore, ENLACE includes quality controls through an
automatic validation to detect collusion with the use of the models K-Index and Scrutiny as described in
technical details of the ENLACE manual.
16The level of marginality is calculated by the National Council of Population (CONAPO, for its
abbreviation in Spanish) and it is based in eight socioeconomic variables of the locality where the school
is located, considering: average education levels, household’s characteristics (i.e. available services and
infrastructure) and goods availability. For further details see CONAPO (2010)
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age and sex, number of students who passed and failed, number of classrooms, informa-
tion of basic services such as water and electricity, number of teachers, administrative
personal and teachers’ and principals’ level of education. These data can be combined
with ENLACE in order to have information about school’s performance.
A third source of data is the administrative databases of both PEC and PETC, which
serve to identify treated schools, shift, region, municipality and locality where these are
located. Both administrative data sources are also provided by SEP.
2.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 shows the main descriptive statistics of the pooled sample of treated and un-
treated schools from 2008 to 2013. Panel A shows information of variables related to
the ENLACE test. Note that treated schools have a significantly higher number of stu-
dents tested. Proportionally, the number of students tested and with unreliable results is
significantly lower in treated schools (at the 10% level of significance).
Panel B shows that, on average, treated schools have participated almost twice as many
years in PEC than untreated schools and this difference is highly significant. In general,
treated schools have more students, teachers, administrative workers and more class-
rooms. More importantly the marginality index is relatively lower in treated schools
(2.36) than in control schools (2.75), suggesting a better socioeconomic context for
students in treated schools. On average, there are more principals with postgraduate
education present in treated schools (0.21 vs. 0.14 in control schools). Also, note that
the proportion of teachers with bachelors and postgraduate education is higher in PETC
schools.
Panel C show the instructional time of ‘non-core’ activities in schools: sports, artistic
education, IT and English as second language. Unfortunately, time dedicated to core
subjects such as mathematics, reading and science is not reported. The statistics show
that on average, treated schools spend more time on these subjects, specially on the
teaching of a second language and sports. Panel D includes figures showing average
family spending. Differences in spending on books and fees are not statistically different
between treated and control institutions, this is not surprising since all primary schools
are publicly funded. However, average spending in uniforms (usually not provided by
the State) is slightly higher in treated schools (35 pesos, or approximately US$2.5 per
year).
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In general, these numbers suggest that treated schools are different from the controls
in observable and unobservable ways. PETC schools are bigger and feature a slightly
higher proportion of teachers with a professional career and postgraduate studies. On
average, treated schools also seem to be located in a better socioeconomic environment.
A circumstance that may well explain why PETC schools seem to be in a better position
is that SEP can only suggest the potential schools to be treated but each State can choose
the schools that the local government believe are more suitable for the treatment. It is
possible then, that the States are choosing those schools which are easier to access (e.g.
those closer to the municipality offices) or those which already have the infrastructure
to run the program. These units may well be located in geographic areas with a better
socioeconomic environment. This is something that is taken into consideration in the
methodology to evaluate the impact of the program, controlling for school character-
istics including their marginality index and by the computation of a propensity score
based on the observable characteristics of schools, as it will be discussed in detail in
section. 2.4.
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TABLE 2.2: Main descriptive statistics by treatment status from the pooled sample: 2008 to 2013
...
All non-PETC Schools PETC Schools
Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max N Difference
A. ENLACE Test
# students tested 109.04 112.35 1.0 1210.0 336961 130.91 94.72 1.0 752.0 11278 21.87 ***
# tests untrusted 6.00 11.64 0.0 551.0 336961 6.07 10.46 0.0 180.0 11278 0.07
% students tested 93.26 34.95 0.3 100.0 301998 93.87 8.40 5.2 100.0 10150 0.61 *
% untrusted tests 3.36 7.28 0.0 100.0 301998 3.17 6.07 0.0 75.0 10150 0.19 *
B. School characteristics
PEC (years) 1.28 1.93 0.0 6.0 530226 2.63 2.32 0.0 6.0 12360 1.35 ***
Students 179.69 177.10 1.0 2531.0 415842 221.29 148.65 3.0 1146.0 10968 41.60 ***
Principals 1.00 0.31 0.0 3.0 417589 1.02 0.30 0.0 3.0 10926 0.02 ***
Teachers 7.08 5.19 1.0 30.0 364107 8.18 4.71 1.0 30.0 10625 1.10 ***
Administrative workers 1.10 1.67 0.0 15.0 417563 2.53 3.09 0.0 15.0 10762 1.43 ***
# classrooms 6.88 4.40 0.0 17.0 385598 8.39 4.13 0.0 17.0 10016 1.51 ***
Marginality Index 2.75 1.41 1.0 5.0 336961 2.36 1.35 1.0 5.0 11278 -0.39 ***
# of Principals by education
Vocational 0.38 0.51 0.0 3.0 417779 0.35 0.50 0.0 3.0 10928 -0.03 ***
Bachelors 0.46 0.52 0.0 3.0 417694 0.45 0.52 0.0 3.0 10929 -0.01 *
Postgraduate 0.14 0.35 0.0 3.0 417836 0.21 0.42 0.0 2.0 10932 0.07 ***
% of Teacher’s by education
Vocational 36.89 34.02 0.0 100.0 363474 34.01 30.13 0.0 100.0 10563 -2.88 ***
Bachelors 56.89 34.66 0.0 100.0 363476 59.66 30.40 0.0 100.0 10563 2.77 ***
Postgraduate 5.31 13.46 0.0 100.0 363474 5.67 12.85 0.0 100.0 10563 0.36 **
C. Instruction Time (h/week)
Sports 3.61 6.11 0.0 20.0 365605 5.60 6.87 0.0 20.0 8268 1.99 ***
Artistic education 0.61 2.71 0.0 20.0 414151 1.27 3.96 0.0 20.0 10666 0.66 ***
IT education 0.47 2.51 0.0 20.0 414315 1.09 3.92 0.0 20.0 10614 0.62 ***
Second language 0.63 2.90 0.0 20.0 405463 2.33 5.41 0.0 20.0 9731 1.70 ***
D. Spending (pesos/year)
Books 285.94 915.03 0.0 80000.0 418660 290.29 1348.92 0.0 70000.0 11011 4.35
Uniforms 362.67 1106.67 0.0 99800.0 418634 397.93 1742.78 0.0 90000.0 11012 35.26 **
Fees 203.28 1035.29 0.0 98000.0 418443 208.70 931.31 0.0 50750.0 11002 5.42
* p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics for the outcome variables of interest: the stan-
dardized test scores of Spanish and math before and after the application of PETC for
each of the treatment and the two control groups from 2010 to 2013: all primary schools
which can potentially be treated and a smaller control group including the ten nearest
neighbors of each treated school according to a PSM.
Test measures are higher on average in PETC schools at the base time and after treat-
ment. For example in 2010, considering the pre-policy year, treated schools where 0.240
SD above the average in math results, while the controls are 0.184 SD above. Once a set
of matched controls is constructed, differences become smaller and the outcomes ap-
pear to be more similar for the comparison groups of 2010, 2011 and 2012. Although,
in the case of the matched controls in 2013, differences seem to remain considerable.
For valid inference to be drawn, it is necessary to show that baseline differences in
the pre-policy period have remained stable in years previous to the policy intervention
(to ensure a“like with like” comparison). Further evidence on the parallel trends of out-
comes before PETC is presented in the empirical approach contained in the next section.
Bearing this in mind, DiD results presented in Table 2.3 should be read carefully, but the
figures suggest a recurrent non-significant difference between the outcomes of treated
and controls before and after PETC (one year of treatment). More importantly, size and
significance does not vary considerably when the comparison is made to the matched
controls.
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TABLE 2.3: Mean outcomes for various samples
Standardized Test Scores
Number of Schools Pre-policy Post-policy Change DiD
Mathematics PETC 2010
Treated 721 0.240 0.257 0.017
All non-PETC schools as controls 49808 0.184 0.206 0.022 -0.006 (0.022)
Matched controls 4928 0.260 0.282 0.022 -0.006 (0.022)
Spanish PETC 2010
Treated 721 0.217 0.253 0.036
All non-PETC schools as controls 49808 0.178 0.195 0.017 0.020 (0.022)
Matched controls 4928 0.260 0.275 0.015 0.022 (0.024)
Mathematics PETC 2011
Treated 219 0.376 0.423 0.047
All non-PETC schools as controls 51135 0.207 0.219 0.012 0.036 (0.043)
Matched controls 1875 0.342 0.361 0.019 0.028 (0.045)
Spanish PETC 2011
Treated 219 0.335 0.387 0.052
All non-PETC schools as controls 51135 0.196 0.208 0.012 0.041 (0.041)
Matched controls 1875 0.332 0.352 0.02 0.033 (0.049)
Mathematics PETC 2012
Treated 1883 0.348 0.17 -0.178
All non-PETC schools as controls 49885 0.214 0.069 -0.145 -0.032 (0.017)
Matched controls 9872 0.372 0.240 -0.132 -0.029 (0.018)
Spanish PETC 2012
Treated 1883 0.364 0.181 -0.183
All non-PETC schools as controls 49885 0.202 0.044 -0.158 -0.025 (0.016)
Matched controls 9872 0.383 0.219 -0.164 -0.02 (0.017)
Mathematics PETC 2013
Treated 490 0.399 0.416 0.017
All non-PETC schools as controls 47111 0.071 0.106 0.035 -0.019 (0.031)
Matched controls 2495 0.196 0.263 0.067 -0.051 (0.031)
Spanish PETC 2013
Treated 490 0.431 0.469 0.038
All non-PETC schools as controls 47111 0.047 0.086 0.039 -0.002 (0.031)
Matched controls 2495 0.247 0.328 0.081 -0.043 (0.034)
For all non-PETC schools as controls, standard errors are clustered on school; for matched controls, these are clustered on
school and bootstrapped with 100 repetitions and no replacement
2.4 Impact of PETC on Test Scores
This section evaluates the impact of PETC on test scores and grade repetition using DiD
models. This method is based on the Wald estimator and has been broadly described and
used in a number of earlier papers.17 DiD seeks to control for a large number of observ-
able factors and for unobserved school heterogeneity. Considering these factors is im-
portant, owing to the different levels of pre-policy achievement in test scores and grade
repetition between PETC and control schools as discussed. In effect, different observed
and unobserved factors such as the socioeconomic context, marginality of schools and
infrastructure, can explain the difference in results before and after policy intervention.
17See for example Heckman and Robb Jr (1985); Machin and McNally (2008); Hussain (2012)
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Additionally, it is also important to consider that changes after policy intervention are
related to PETC rather than to the historic trends observed in the outcomes. Hence, the
basic estimates are derived from the following model:
Yst = βPETCs + γts +δ1(PETCs ∗ ts)+δ2Xst +pie +µst (2.1)
Where Yst is the outcome of interest for school s in time t; βs accounts for the differences
between treatment and control group (PETC is a dummy equal to one for schools in the
program); γ is a time trend common to control and treatment groups. PETC is interacted
with ts which is set equal to one for the time period when the PETC policy was in effect
and zero in pre-policy period. The coefficient δ1 is the DiD estimate of the PETC
policy; δ2 captures the influence of a vector of controls X which includes characteristics
of schools such as the number of students and classrooms and a marginality index,
instruction time in arts, sports, IT and languages, principals’ and teachers’ education and
family’s spending on schools materials, along with variables indicating the proportion of
students taking the ENLACE test by school and the proportion of results considered as
‘unreliable’, as well as the years schools have participated in PEC; pie denotes regional
fixed-effects and µst is an error term.
Since school differences in the pre-policy period are included in the model captured in
βs, what is measured are within-school changes in test outcomes and grade repetition be-
fore and after PETC introduction in treatment schools relative to within-school changes
in the outcomes of control schools. However, the critical requirement to achieve an
unbiased DiD estimator is the parallel-trend assumption. Formally, the error term:
cov(µst ,PETC ∗ ts) = 0, or in other words, the changes in the outcome of interest be-
tween treated and untreated units should not be explained by other factors previous to
the introduction of the policy (i.e. outcomes could have already been increasing faster
for treated schools previous to PETC).
Figure 2.2 shows the raw average trend of math results. Treated schools have higher
scores in all periods and roughly, the trends for the four treatment and control groups
appear to share the same tendency before the application of PETC. For the first treatment
group (2010), the graphic is useful to observe the post-policy trends, suggesting a small
positive change for PETC schools. The graphic of the last treated and control groups
54
(2013) is more useful to review trends previous to policy intervention, which appear to
be parallel.18
FIGURE 2.2: Trends of ENLACE mathematics average scores by treatment status
18Similar results are observed in the graphs for the average results of Spanish and the matched control
groups of math and Spanish. These can be found in Figures B1, B2 and B3 in the Appendix.
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2.4.1 Basic DiD results
Table 2.4 shows the average effects of PETC on mathematics test scores for treated
schools compared to non-PETC schools and a matched control group. The first col-
umn presents the “raw” effect of a DiD model without any controls, on average and
by separating the effects in years since policy intervention. Results show that treated
schools present a significant difference respect to non-treated of 0.038 SD. First column
also shows a pattern of increasing impacts through time ranging from a non-significant
effect during the first year of treatment and up to 0.78 SD after four years of treatment.
Column 2 shows the effects of a DiD with a full set of school characteristics as controls.
The average effect of the policy is higher compared to column 1, indicating that the
characterisitcs of schools do interact with policy effectiveness. Similarly, during the
first year since policy intervention, there are no effects on math test scores. Nonetheless
from the second year of treatment PETC schools show a positive effect on average
ranging from of 0.036 SD growing to 0.111 SD four years after policy intervention.
Column 3 displays the results for the matched non-PETC schools according to the ob-
servable characteristics of schools. Results do not differ dramatically and keep the same
pattern observed in column 2, on average and by years of treatment, becoming stronger
after two (0.046 SD) and up to four years of treatment (0.107 SD).
TABLE 2.4: Basic Results: PETC on Mathematics Standardized Test Scores
(1) (2) (3)
Control Schools All non-PETC schools With Matching
PETC * Policy On 0.038** 0.059*** 0.061***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
PETC * 1 year after policy 0.014 0.017 0.025*
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
PETC * 2 years after policy 0.020 0.036** 0.046***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
PETC * 3 years after policy 0.043* 0.066*** 0.060**
(0.023) (0.021) (0.025)
PETC * 4 years after policy 0.078*** 0.111*** 0.107***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.027)
Control variables No Yes Yes
School fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Schools 164,520 164,520 59,569
R2 0.003 0.164 0.146
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Columns 1 and 2 show standard errors, clustered by school, in parentheses. Column 3 shows bootstrap standard errors from
100 replications, 100% of replacement and clustered on school, in parentheses.
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Table 2.5 shows the results for the effects of PETC on Spanish. It presents the same
specifications than Table 2.4. The raw effects (column 1) show a significant average ef-
fect for any treated school of 0.054 SD, higher than what was observed for mathematics.
No significant effects are found in column 1 after one year of intervention but similarly
to the results on mathematics test score, from the second year of treatment there is a
significant and cumulative effect of the policy ranging from 0.033 SD to 0.108 SD four
years after policy intervention.
Column 2 shows significantly higher effects on average (0.073 SD) and by years after
policy intervention, being small but significant from the first year of treatment (0.021
SD) and up to 0.137 S.D. after four years. Note that this results are rather similar when
comparing PETC schools to statistically matched non-PETC schools on average and by
years of treatment, as presented in column 3.
TABLE 2.5: Basic Results: PETC on Spanish Standardized Test Scores
(1) (2) (3)
Control Schools All non-PETC schools With Matching
PETC * Policy On 0.054*** 0.073*** 0.067***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
PETC * 1 year after policy 0.018 0.021* 0.027**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
PETC * 2 years after policy 0.033** 0.049*** 0.050***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
PETC * 3 years after policy 0.059*** 0.080*** 0.069***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.022)
PETC * 4 years after policy 0.108*** 0.137*** 0.111***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Control variables No Yes Yes
School fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of Schools 164,520 164,520 59,569
R2 0.004 0.181 0.160
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Columns 1 and 2 show standard errors, clustered by school, in parentheses. Column 3 shows bootstrap standard errors from
100 replication, 100% of replacement and clustered on school, in parentheses.
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2.4.2 Placebo Tests
This section presents placebo tests that allow to discard significant differences in out-
comes between treated and untreated schools before PETC which could be explained
by unobserved factors, once a set of controls is included.
Table 2.6 shows the results of placebo regressions for all outcomes. Columns 1 to
3 show the results for all non-PETC schools used as controls, while columns 4 to 6
show the coefficients for the controls after PSM. Columns in the table show the results
of the diferent treatment cohorts, while the rows show the effects up to three years
before they were treated. This way, column 1 shows the DiD coefficient for math and
Spanish between PETC schools treated in 2011 and their counter-factual one year before
they were treated. Hence, the data allow to observe DiD results between treated and
untreated units up to two years before, in the case of schools that started the program in
2012, and up to three years before for the PETC schools treated in 2013.
Results in columns 1 to 3 for mathematics, show that there are no significant differences
between treated and control schools in the pre-policy period. Note that, once schools
are matched, PETC schools in 2013 appear to have a significant difference in math
results compared to their controls three years before they were treated (0.067 SD in
2009-2010); however, this difference disappears for the coming years.
Regarding Spanish results, similar conclusions can be drawn for PETC schools starting
in 2013. For both type of regressions, including all the controls and only matched
controls, there is a significance difference three years before policy introduction (2009-
2010 in columns 3 and 6). In both cases, this significant difference happens three years
before the program started and disappears for the coming two years before PETC 2013.
In general, the results in Table 2.6 only suggest a possible threat for the conclusions of
the effects on Spanish test scores, specifically for schools treated in 2013.
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TABLE 2.6: Placebo regressions: DiD and PSM-DiD for all outcomes
Math Scores
DiD PSM and DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PETC 2011 PETC 2012 PETC 2013 PETC 2011 PETC 2012 PETC 2013
One Year Before Policy -0.058 -0.026 -0.042 -0.054 -0.014 -0.015
(0.037) (0.022) (0.030) (0.041) (0.011) (0.028)
Number of Schools 98641 98659 95520 3674 22130 5411
Two Years Before Policy 0.007 -0.003 0.020 0.026
(0.012) (0.027) (0.013) (0.025)
Number of Schools 98659 99463 22155 5417
Three Years Before Policy 0.040 0.067***
(0.028) (0.025)
Number of Schools 98637 5434
Spanish Scores
DiD PSM and DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PETC 2011 PETC 2012 PETC 2013 PETC 2011 PETC 2012 PETC 2013
One Year Before Policy -0.025 -0.005 -0.001 -0.018 -0.003 0.022
(0.035) (0.011) (0.030) (0.043) (0.010) (0.029)
Number of Schools 98641 99463 95511 3674 22130 5411
Two Years Before Policy 0.004 -0.009 0.013 0.001
(0.011) (0.029) (0.011) (0.024)
Number of Schools 98659 99440 22155 5417
Three Years Before Policy 0.058** 0.072***
(0.029) (0.027)
Number of Schools 98637 5434
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
DiD regressions show standard errors, clustered on school, in parenthesis. PSM and DiD regressions show robust standard
errors from 100 replications, 100% of replacement and clustered on school, in parentheses. Regressions include a full set of
controls, including school’s teachers’ and principals’ characteristics as well as controls for the number of years in PEC, mar-
ginality of the school area and dummies for six mexican regions.
2.4.3 Heterogenous effects of PETC
In general PETC seems to have a positive effect on test scores, however it is still im-
portant to consider possible heterogeneous effects of PETC. It is plausible to think that
the average positive effect of the policy may well be explained by “the best” schools
doing better without having much effect on more deprived schools which may well on
average have less motivated and/or skilled students and account with less resources to
make the extra time of teaching effective. This could be judged as a negative result if
it translates into an increase in the gap between relatively poorer and richer schools.
Furthermore, it is important to consider the fact that some schools are presenting differ-
ent effects depending on their participation in one or two of the substantially important
educational programs in Mexico, PETC and the Schools Quality Program (PEC), as
discussed above.
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Table 2.7 present heterogeneous effects by schools marginality and PEC participation.
Columns 1 and 2 show the average effect of PETC on mathematics and Spanish test
scores compared to all non-PETC schools separated by their level of marginality.19
The results exhibit a positive a significant effect for both type of schools and on both
subjects, but it is clearly stronger for more deprived schools or with a higher index of
marginality. For example, PETC schools do 0.166 SD better in mathematics and 0.162
SD in Spanish compared to non-PETC schools with high marginality. This contrasts to
lower gains of 0.037 SD and 0.049 SD, respectively, in low marginality PETC schools.
Finally, columns 3 and 4 show slightly higher average effects for schools participating
in both programs, moreover in the case of mathematics when PEC plus PETC schools
present gains of 0.046 SD after policy intervention compared to non-significant effects
on schools only participating of PETC.20
TABLE 2.7: Heterogenous Effects: PETC on Mathematics and Spanish Standardized
Test Scores by level of marginality and PEC participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Marginality High Marginality Only PETC PEC plus PETC
A. Mathematics
PETC * Policy On 0.037** 0.166*** 0.034 0.046***
(0.015) (0.033) (0.026) (0.017)
Number of Schools 90,586 73,939 82,518 82,007
R2 0.161 0.158 0.170 0.153
B. Spanish
PETC * Policy On 0.049*** 0.162*** 0.047* 0.063***
(0.014) (0.032) (0.025) (0.016)
Number of Schools 90,585 73,935 82,513 82,007
R2 0.180 0.142 0.180 0.173
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors, clustered on school, in parentheses.
Results of the effects of PETC on test scores separated by low and high marginality
schools and by years since policy intervention are plotted in Figure 2.3. It can be ob-
served that altough the effect on low marginality schools grows over time, this remains
lower than the improvement presented in more deprived schools. In effect, while low
marginality PETC schools exhibit a positive and significant effect of 0.05 SD in math-
ematics and 0.07 SD in Spanish four years after intervention, more deprived schools
present a significantly higher average gain of 0.29 SD in both subjects.
19Note that the proportion of treated schools with low marginality is 70% while a considerable 30% of
treated schools belong to more deprived localities.
20All PETC effects on math test scores separated by cohort and years of treatment can be found in the
Appendix Table B2 using all non-PETC schools and in Table B3 using a matched control group. For the
case of Spanish these can be found in the Appendix Table B4 and Table B5, respectively.
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Considering that the average math scores of treated schools in the pre-policy period
is 513 points with a SD of 63 in low marginality schools and 463 with and SD of
80 in high marginality schools (a difference of 50 points) these effects translate into a
marginal gain of only 3.2 points for more advantaged schools, while it represents a gain
of 25 points for deprived schools, that is almost half of the pre-policy gap between high
and low marginality schools. For the case of Spanish, with an average of 456 for high
marginality schools (SD of 70) and 510 for low marginality schools (SD of 57), the
gains for deprived schools translate into aproximately a third of the gap between more
advantaged and disadvantaged institutions before policy introduction.
FIGURE 2.3: Average effects of PETC on mathematics and Spanish standardized test-
scores by school’s marginality and years of treatment
Figure obtained from the point estimators and the 95% confidence intervals coming from a DID regression including a set of
dummy variables interacting a post policy dummy with the number of years since intervention. The regression also includes
school fixed effects, time-fixed effects and full set of school characteristics as controls. The counter-factual is constructed from all
non-PETC schools.
Figure 2.4 shows heterogeneous effects by PEC status. The results show a different pat-
tern suggesting that after 2 years of treatment PEC plus PETC schools have a higher im-
pact on test scores but this difference reduces and practically disappears after three and
four years post-policy. Furthermore the effects on mathematics are lower for schools
participating of both programs (0.07 SD) compared to PETC schools (0.10 SD). Hence
in the medium-run, joint effects of PEC and PETC are not additive and participating
only in the full-time schools program seems as effective for school’s improvement as
the participation in both programs. As mentioned, both programs are similar in their
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fixed costs, however, PEC does not seem to be adding more to what PETC alone is
doing in terms of gains in test scores.
FIGURE 2.4: Average effects of PETC on mathematics and Spanish standardized test-
scores by PEC participation and years of treatment
Figure obtained from the point estimators and the 95% confidence intervals coming from a DID regression including a set of
dummy variables interacting a post policy dummy with the number of years since intervention. The regression also includes
school fixed effects, time-fixed effects and full set of school characteristics as controls. The counter-factual is constructed from all
non-PETC schools.
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2.5 Impact channels of the effects of PETC on test scores
2.5.1 Does PETC have an effect on students with different abilities?
Table 2.8 shows the effects of a DiD specification on the distribution of math and Span-
ish scores for PETC schools compared to all non-PETC schools. Columns show the
proportion of students graded as insufficient to excellent as reported in ENLACE. The
estimations suggest that the overall effect of PETC on math scores comes from a de-
crease of 2.0 percentage points (pp) in the proportion of students with elementary results
combined with an increase of 1.7 pp of those graded as excellent, implying that chil-
dren at the bottom of the distribution are not benefiting from an increase in the time of
instruction. Conversely, PETC results on Spanish seem to have an impact across all the
distribution of scores.
TABLE 2.8: Effects of PETC on mathematics and Spanish standardized test scores on
the proportion of students graded as insufficient to excellent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Insufficient Elementary Good Excellent
A. Mathematics
PETC * Policy On 0.140 -1.991∗∗∗ -0.204 1.713∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.301) (0.263) (0.256)
Number of Schools 164525 164525 164525 164525
R2 0.166 0.071 0.179 0.107
B. Spanish
PETC * Policy On -0.708∗∗ -1.482∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.297) (0.278) (0.177)
Number of Schools 164520 164520 164520 164520
R2 0.162 0.088 0.131 0.133
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors, clustered on school, in parentheses
Effects on the proportion of pupils graded as insufficient to excellent in mathematics
scores conditioned to school’s marginality and separated by years since intervention, are
presented in Figure 2.5. The point estimators suggest that the higher treatment effects of
PETC observed on high marginality schools come, in the beginning, from a significant
impact on children at the top of the distribution, but gradually, this effect combines with
a reduction in the percentage of children graded as insufficient and elementary. For
example, in the case of low marginality schools, the small positive effects revised seem
to be driven by children at the top and bottom of the distribution moreover after three
and four years of treatment.
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Schools with high marginality present a significant increase of 1.2 pp in the proportion
of pupils obtaining excellent scores in mathematics one year after policy intervention
(i.e an increase of 45% of the base proportion of 3% before policy). More importantly,
four years after policy, this proportion exhibits an important growth to 7.2 pp, or 2.7
times the base percentage. This combines with a fall of 3.0 pp in the proportion of
students graded as insufficient four years after intervention (i.e. a reduction of 9% to
the base proportion of 36%) and 5.8 pp in the percentage of pupils obtaining elementary
results (13% of the pre-policy share of 45%).
FIGURE 2.5: Average effects of PETC on the distribution of mathematics standardized
test-scores by marginality level and years of treatment
Figure obtained from the point estimators and the 95% confidence intervals coming from a DID regression including a set of
dummy variables interacting a post policy dummy with the number of years since intervention. The regression also includes
school fixed effects, time-fixed effects and full set of school characteristics as controls. The counter-factual is constructed from all
non-PETC schools.
Results for Spanish are presented in Figure 2.6 and suggest a clearer pattern for the most
deprived schools, where students with all different type of abilities are impacted from
the second year of PETC. For example, the proportion of pupils graded as insufficient
and elementary reduces 3.2 pp and 2.1 pp after two years of treatment, respectively,
and this reduction grows to 4.8 pp and 4.0 pp four years after policy, representing a
decrease of 14% respect to the base proportion of 36% in the case of children graded as
insufficient and a smaller 8% respect to the 48% of pupils graded as elementary before
policy intervention.
At the top of the distribution there is a significant increase of 3.0 pp in the proportion
of students obtaining good grades and 2.0 pp for those with excellent results and these
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effects grow after four years of treatment to 4.2 pp and 3.7 pp, respectively. This repre-
sents, four years after intervention, a change of 30% in the proportion of students with
good results respect to the base proportion of 14% before PETC. Similarly for the case
of students graded as excellent there is an increase of 2.5 times the base proportion of
1.5%.
FIGURE 2.6: Average effects of PETC on the distribution of Spanish standardized
test-scores by marginality level and years of treatment
Figure obtained from the point estimators and the 95% confidence intervals coming from a DID regression including a set of
dummy variables interacting a post policy dummy with the number of years since intervention. The regression also includes
school fixed effects, time-fixed effects and full set of school characteristics as controls. The counter-factual is constructed from all
non-PETC schools.
Jointly these results suggest that language skills are absorbed in the mid-run by students
with different abilities within PETC schools, moreover with a lower socioeconomic en-
vironment.This evidence can be interpreted as mechanism that could indeed reduce dif-
ferences between disadvantaged and more advantaged pupils within high marginality
schools. Nonetheless, for the case of math, since the higher effects in more deprived
schools are apparently explained by an important push of children at the top and bottom
of the distribution of scores, it is not clear that the program is reducing differences be-
tween the “best’ and “worst” math students in PETC schools across time. Nonetheless,
according to the overall results conditioned on school’s marginality, it is clear that a
reduction in the gap between deprived and advantaged schools is taking place.
However, a major concern arises from the reduction in the proportion of pupils graded
as insufficient and elementary in both subjects, since this may well be explained by
students simply stepping out of schools. It is plausible to think that longer school days
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are harder to cope by those with lower abilities and in more deprived areas. Drop out
rates in Mexico are nowadays rather low in primary education (1.9% in the period here
analyzed according to the Statistics 911) but in order to address any concern regarding
the effects of PETC on desertion, Table 2.9 shows the effect of the intervention on
dropout rates in schools which present desertion at any given grade and year, on average
and by level of marginality.21 The results suggest that desertion is not driven or modified
by the presence of the policy neither on average nor in more or less deprived schools.22
TABLE 2.9: Effects of PETC on dropout rates by level of marginality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control Schools All non-PETC schools With Matching
Average Low Marg. High Marg. Average Low Marg. High Marg.
PETC * Policy On 0.187 -0.050 0.249 0.046 -0.027 0.032
(0.123) (0.143) (0.245) (0.131) (0.183) (0.280)
Number of Schools 154989 80356 74633 51921 34543 17378
R2 0.097 0.120 0.075 0.098 0.105 0.080
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Coumns 1 to 3 show standard errors, clustered on school, in parentheses. Columns 4 to 6 show bootstrap standard errors
with 100% of replacement and 100 repetitions, clustered on school, in parentheses.
2.5.2 Are PETC effects driven by a selection of students?
As discussed, one of the main points raised by teachers and school principals in the
qualitative evaluation conducted by UNESCO (2010), is the increase parent’s demand
for full-time schools. A worrying concern surging from a higher demand of PETC
schools is that principals and teachers may have more room to select best new students,
who would on average present better results in standardized tests.23 Consequently, the
positive results of the program as discussed before, may well be explained by selection
rather than policy intervention.
The results presented so far do not support this hypothesis, given that schools selection
(or student’s self-selection into PETC schools) can only happen for newcomers who
cannot replace other students already registered at school, and the program is having
an impact not only on students with higher scores but also on children at the bottom of
21Schools that present a positive inflow of students are analyzed separately below.
22Placebo tests on dropout rates are presented in Table B6 in the Appendix
23Of course there is also the possibility of auto-selection where new students can be more motivated
than the average, since conceivably, most motivated parents would be those looking to move their children
from a non-PETC to a PETC school.
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the scores distribution. Selection may explain gains in the upper part of the distribution
of test scores, but it is more difficult to think of a mechanism for which it could have
an effect on those more behind who are also showing improvements. Furthermore, had
the positive impact been explained by pure selection, one would expect low marginality
schools to have a higher chance to select “better” students, and possibly have stronger
average impacts than high marginality schools, and this is not the case supported by the
evidence.
Finally, given that primary schools in Mexico cannot dismiss students already regis-
tered, if there is a mechanism acting to select “better” or more motivated students in
order to achieve higher results in ENLACE, the proportion of newcomers in PETC
schools should have an effect on test scores. In this regard, Table 2.10 shows the results
of a school and time fixed-effects model on test scores including a set of controls and
separated by level of marginality. Estimations are in general significant but very close to
zero indicating that the proportion of new students at any given grade and year in PETC
schools are not positively influencing test scores. Hence, PETC effects are plausibly not
driven by selection.
TABLE 2.10: Fixed-effects OLS of the proportion of new students at any given grade
and year in PETC Schools on Spanish and mathematics test scores
(1) (2) (3)
Subject Average Low Marg High Marg
A. Mathematics
Proportion of new students -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Number of Schools 5512 4388 1124
R2 0.716 0.737 0.725
B. Spanish
Proportion of new students -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Number of Schools 5511 4388 1123
R2 0.716 0.740 0.710
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
School fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors, clustered on school, in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.6 Conclusions
This work analyzes the potential effect on pupil performance in Mexican primary schools
of a change in the time of instruction from 4.5 to 8 hours, the inclusion of new pedagogic
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tools used for children enrolled in these schools, and the structure of teaching imple-
mented by the Full-Time Schools Program (PETC). The gradual inclusion of schools in
the program allowed for the construction of four treatment and control groups as a nat-
ural experiment investigating what happened to pupil achievement in schools were the
policy was introduced relative to pupils in schools that were not subject to PETC during
the whole period. Additionally, this is compared to a matched control group. Hence,
DiD and PSM plus DiD regressions were conducted to conclude overall effects of the
policy separated by years of treatment and school’s marginality and to study effects on
kids with different abilities.
After providing evidence that suggests there are no differences in the trends of pupil
test scores in PETC schools relative to comparison schools in the pre-policy period,
effects on Spanish and mathematics scores exhibit a significant and positive effect on
both subjects. The precise impact ranges from 0.05 SD after two years of treatment
to 0.11 SD after 4 years of treatment on both subjects using a panel of schools with
a full set of controls. These effects are arguably robust to the application of ‘placebo
tests’, examination of different treatment and control groups and the matching of control
schools with similar observable characteristics.
The results also show a stronger impact on average in schools with high marginality
compared to less deprived schools. DiD results show an effect of at least 0.12 SD after
two years of treatment and of 0.29 SD after four years of treatment on both subjects.
These results compare to non-significant average effects on low marginality schools
during the first three years of treatment and a lower positive effect four years after
intervention of around 0.05 SD and 0.07 SD in math and Spanish, respectively. The fact
that high marginality schools are getting the best results signifies a reduction in the gap
between less and more advantaged schools to a half in math and in a third for the case
of Spanish test scores.
After inspecting PETC effects on the distribution of scores results suggest that in the
case of mathematics, after four years of treatment there is a clear pattern of a reduction
in the proportion of students graded as insufficient and an increase of those with ex-
cellent results. This pattern is observed more clearly for schools with high marginality.
For the case of Spanish, policy intervention exhibits effects across all the distribution
of scores also with stronger impacts on high marginality schools. These results are of
key relevance to highlight that less skilled kids even in deprived environments, are also
benefiting for longer school days.
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Further inspections conducted on causal channels show that the program does not have
an effect on drop out rates emphasizing the fact that low achievement students are indeed
benefiting from this policy. Finally, the proportion of new students in treated schools
does not have a positive effect on test scores, allowing to argue against selection of
“better” students as the mechanism for which PETC is having showing improvements
at the top of the distribution of test scores.
Despite PETC schools treated 2013 present significant differences in Spanish test scores
between treated and controls three years before treatment (as show in the placebo tests),
there are no significant differences for all treated groups one and two years before policy
introduction, giving a good support for causal inference. Having subjected the identifi-
cation strategy to a number of robustness checks including the generation of a smaller
control group with similar observable characteristics to the treated, results should con-
stitute a PETC effect on test scores.
The overall findings of this research are of considerable significance when placed into
the wider education debate about what works best in schools for improving pupil per-
formance. Despite the average gain in test scores for PETC schools is relatively small
on average, they are in line with the findings for other Latin-American programs of a
change in the instruction time in basic schools. More importantly, findings on the im-
pact of PETC schools are sustained four years after policy intervention and are higher in
more deprived schools compared to those found in comparable programs in the region.
Chapter 3
Leave them kids alone! The positive
effect of abolishing grade retention on
pupils’ dropout rates: Evidence from a
policy change
Automatic promotion of students who fail to meet specified promotion criteria is often
opposed to on the grounds that it lowers school expectations and student achievement.
In some school systems, grade repetition (sometimes referred as grade retention) is seen
as a valid corrective measure for underachievers as it may work as a deterrent to poor
school performance by inflicting a high penalty on under-performers, working as an
incentive for students to increase their efforts (Manacorda, 2012). Supporters of this
policy also argue that retaining children helps their maturation and it gives them time to
meet the minimum academic standards of any given grade. Indeed, some evidence in
developed countries has attributed positive effects of retention on academic achievement
(Jacob and Lefgren, 2004; Dong, 2010).
On the other hand, grade repetition may be harmful for pupils, as it raises costs for
schools and families, affects children’s motivation and self-esteem, stigmatizes chil-
dren and increases the likelihood of dropout. Some authors argue that those who are
retained may be at a higher risk of dropping out because pupils who are older than their
classmates may feel different than their peers and discouraged (Holmes et al., 1989;
Roderick, 1994). Furthermore, it is considered that repeating grades delays entrance of
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students into the labor market which may pose substantial monetary cost on individ-
uals over the life-cycle. Consequently, some schools are experimenting with different
alternatives to grade repetition in favor of other types of ”social promotion” for chil-
dren who are not keeping up, involving a more holistic evaluation considering parent’s
participation and remedial academic assistance.1 2
Studies in different areas, including economics, psychology and sociology, have broadly
documented that pupils who repeat a grade do not improve their school outcomes and
are significantly more likely to dropout compared to continuously promoted students
(Roderick, 1994; Gomes-Neto and Hanushek, 1994; Jimerson, Anderson, and Whipple,
2002; Manacorda, 2012). Nonetheless, there is a less well studied causal relationship
between retention in grade and its possible outcomes, including dropout, regardless of
children’s Socioeconomic Status (SES) and in contexts of high educational privation as
observed in low- and mid-income countries.
Considering the lack of conclusive empirical findings on the effects of repeaters in
poorer countries, the use of public resources to reduce repetition rates is not completely
justified. In effect, this paper seeks to evaluate the effects of abolishing grade reten-
tion in the first three grades of primary school on pupil’s dropout rates in the context
of a developing country with universal primary education coverage. In August 2012,
Mexico passed from a punitive system in which all children graded below a threshold
were not promoted to the next academic level, to one focused on the mandatory ”social
promotion” of students. The reform allowed children in the first three years of primary
education to pass to the next grade regardless of their level of achievement. This change
caused an exogenous reduction independent of school’s SES of grade repetition rates in
primary schools with varying trends before policy reform. This sharp effect in a short-
span of time, allows to study the effects of such policy in a novel quasi-experimental
manner using a panel of schools and administrative data from 2007 to 2014.
Definitely, neither automatic promotion nor grade repetition completely address the
problems of low achievers, as there are different reasons to repeat a grade and some are
even voluntary. For example, a family may consider this necessary for their offspring
1For a revision of common alternatives to retention in-grade, see Protheroe (2007).
2This also relates to cross-national variations associated with contrasting systems of schooling where
historical reasons also take play. For example, Brophy (2006) documents that Scandinavia and the
English-speaking countries (and developing countries influenced by them) emphasize universal educa-
tion to higher levels, encourage social promotion and grade repetition rates are low. Whereas, France,
Portugal, and Spain (and developing countries influenced by them) emphasize universal education at
lower levels but limit admittance to secondary and post-secondary levels, so repetition rates are higher in
lower school levels.
71
to fully acquire the knowledge from an specific grade. Retention in grade is ”ratio-
nal” if for example, children are continuously absent from school to work or help their
family in housekeeping tasks and this is clearly plausible in poorer countries or con-
texts (Gomes-Neto and Hanushek, 1994). Similarly, other factors outside schools may
as well determine student’s involuntary grade retention and most of them also relate to
their socioeconomic status (SES). High direct costs for example, for buying uniforms,
writing materials, textbooks, etc., and sensitivity to the opportunity costs of attending
school are more likely to strike the children from impoverished backgrounds. Undoubt-
edly, parent’s education and cultural capital have an effect on both, children’s repetition
and dropout likelihood. Finally, malnutrition, which is also related to children’s SES,
may also affect their achievement (Pollitt et al., 1998). In any case, grade repetition is
costly for families and schools, since it increases school needs of material and human
resources and family pecuniary and non-pecuniary investments.
Disentangling socioeconomic and school factors from grade repetition and dropout rates
is difficult in a non-experimental set-up. Poor families and teachers and low-schools
quality, teachers absenteeism, and lack of school infrastructures, often cited as major
problems of school systems in developing countries, may explain both high repetition
rates and students incentives to abandon school. Therefore, it remains important to
understand the practical consequences of systems and policies seeking to abolish re-
tention in grade in favor of a more cost-efficient ”social promotion”, as they may be
undone if for example, children’s socioeconomic context and family decisions are the
main source of high repetition rates. In this case, other policies directed to eliminate
the economic and context causes of grade repetition rather than repetition itself may
be more effective.3 Similarly, untended effects of the policy may have disincentives
on children’s performance at school. As, for example, evidence on Brazil has shown a
negative and significant causal effect of automatic promotion on math test scores Kop-
pensteiner (2014).
The estimations presented in this chapter show a positive effect of exogenously reduc-
ing grade repetition on dropout rates despite the short period of analysis. Two-way
fixed effects models exhibit an impact of 0.3 % points lower dropout rates after policy
change. Results are consistent across different socioeconomic contexts and remain after
two years in either, public and private institutions and in schools with different “family
investments”. Furthermore, regressions on the impacts of policy change on student’s
3For example, Patrinos, Lo´pez-Calva, Bando et al. (2005) show evidence that in Mexican indigenous
households, conditional cash transfers coming from the PROGRESA program have increased attendance
and reduced grade repetition and school dropout rates.
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achievement show that eliminating the ”threat” of grade retention does not have nega-
tive effects on the average results of standardized Spanish and mathematics test scores.
These results are a clear contribution on the broader debate in favor of the ”social pro-
motion” of children in less developed countries.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1 discusses in detail policy
change in promotion criteria in Mexico. Section 3.2 presents the panel of schools used
for the analysis and some descriptive statistics. Section 3.3 describes the empirical
strategy. Section 3.4 discuses average effects and presents further robustness checks.
Section 3.4 shows the heterogeneous effects of the reform in different types of schools.
Section 3.6 includes some concluding remarks.
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3.1 Automatic promotion in Mexican Schools
On August 2012 the Mexican Secretariat of Education (SEP, for its abbreviation in
Spanish) conducted a reform of the general rules for the student’s evaluation, promotion
and certification in basic education starting in the academic cycle 2012-2013.4 Before
the reform, all children in primary and secondary schools with an average mark lower
than six (on a scale of one to ten), were considered to have an ’insufficient’ level of
knowledge to be promoted to the next grade or educational level. Nonetheless, the
change in grade retention laws transformed the way children from first to third grade
of primary education were evaluated and promoted. As from the academic cycle 2012-
2013, all first to third graders in both, public and private schools would be automatically
promoted to the next grade. The reform at the national level, also established that first
to third graders who got a mark lower than six would only repeat grade if their parent’s
required it. 5
Figure 3.1 shows grade repetition trends in first to third grades for the 31 Mexican
States and the Federal District. The lines show a sharp reduction in grade repetition
from varying higher rates to varying lower rates, generally converging below a 1% of
repetition and remaining stable through the next academic cycle,6 Except for the case
of two states with traditional lower educational outcomes, Oaxaca and Michoaca´n for
which repetition rates remained notably higher than the average. Note that the nature
of the intervention caused a higher/ lower impact in States (and schools) with differ-
ent repetition levels in the pre-policy period, allowing to compare some schools with
higher repetition to others with lower rates before and after the exogenous change in
policy. This is the key argument for our identification strategy as it will be discussed in
Subsection 3.3.
4All details of the reform can be consulted in the ’Pact 648’ (Acuerdo 648 in Spanish) in the Nation’s
Official Diary (Diario Oficial de la Nacio´n) published on August 14th, 2012.
5It is worth mentioning that before policy change, all children were graded using evaluations designed
by each teacher. Thus it cannot be ruled out that teacher’s criteria had an influence on children’s retention
in-grade. However, despite the lack of a national test to evaluate whether children are promoted to the
next grade or not, there exist a national curricula and a national criteria of what should be the standard
knowledge acquired at any grade during basic education in Mexico, including primary and secondary
schools. Hence teacher’s design of evaluations and criteria should not be the dominant cause of the
variation in school’s average grade repetition rates before policy change. For the purpose of this research,
all the results presented in subsequent sections include controls for teacher’s education as a proxy of their
characteristics in the classroom.
6Note that despite the policy change abolished retention in-grade, the remaining 1% of repetition rates
may be explained by pearents requiring their children to repeat a grade, for different own personal reasons
involving maturation, financial restrictions, etcetera.
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FIGURE 3.1: Average repetition rates in 1st to 3rd grades: trends by States before and
after policy change
In September 2013, the newly elected Mexican government made an amendment to the
recently approved general rules for the evaluation of children. The new reform, ap-
proved only some days before the next academic cycle started, brought back the ’condi-
tional’ possibility of grade repetition for second and third graders. Hence, only children
in the first year of primary education would be automatically promoted to the next year
regardless of their marks. However with the newest amendment, even those children
in second and third grade who had ’insufficient’ results, could be ’conditionally’ pro-
moted according to teacher’s personal criteria and ’parent’s commitment’ to support
children’s tasks in the next academic year. Additionally, children could only repeat a
year once, either in the second or third grade. This way, if a children was retained in
second grade, by no means she could be retained in third grade. Moreover, teachers
should now grade children not only based on exams but the also on ”specif children’s
needs and their context”.7 In practical terms, the abolition of the reform didn’t reverse
the changes previously applied and did not affect considerably repetition rates in second
and third grade in the next academic year 2013-2014 as shown in Figure 3.2. For which,
we assume that the effect of abolishing retention in grade, from first to third grade of
primary education, remained active since September 2012 and throughout the next two
academic cycles.
7All details about the 2013 reform can be consulted in the ’Pact 696’ (Acuerdo 696 in Spanish) in the
Nation’s Official Diary (Diario Oficial de la Nacio´n) published on September 30th, 2013.
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FIGURE 3.2: Average repetition rates in 1st, 2nd and 3rd grades before and after policy
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data for this paper comes primarily from the annual national Statistics 911 in the
academic years 2006-2007 to 2013-2014. This is a census dataset coming from schools
questionnaires applied by SEP at the beginning and at the end of each academic year.
The Statistics 911 offer information on school’s infrastructure such as number of class-
rooms and basic services like water and electricity. They also offer characteristics of
teachers and principals like the proportion of those in each school with any given level
of education, from primary to the postgraduate level, and information on number of
students by grade, age and sex, number of pupils who passed and failed and those who
are repeating a grade. This allows to estimate the total proportion of children repeat-
ing grade in any given year and those dropping out from school during the academic
year (intra) and between school cycles (inter) and consequently the total dropout rate,
considered as the sum of intra- and inter-course dropout rates.
Note that the Statistics 911 only offer information at the school level, for which our
dropout measure represents changes in net enrollment at school j, in time t for grade g.
Consequently, we are not able to observe when any specific child drops out from school,
but we can realize when a school “loses” students in any given grade at the end of each
academic year and at the beginning of the next one. Naturally, some of these children
dropping out from a school may move to a different one, however, on average we can
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still compute an overall measure of dropouts. For example, if every school is “losing”
less/more children in any given grade g in time t with respect to t− 1, we assume that
the average dropout rates for grade g in time t are lower/higher. In other words, we
can observe if the school system as a whole is “losing” more or less students across
time. Effectively, as we cannot observe which children are simply changing schools
and which are dropping out from the school system, the scope of this research is limited
to the analysis of average changes to the net enrollment in primary schools.8
Statistics 911 are also merged with each schools’ proportion of students receiving a
PROSPERA Scholarship9 in order to explore differences between poorer and richer
schools. Furthermore, we also integrate the average third grade results in standardized
tests of Spanish and mathematics from 2008 to 2013 to test if abolishing the ’threat’
of grade repetition had an impact in student’s achievement in that grade.10 ENLACE
includes the number of students tested and the proportion of unreliable tests in each
school.11 It also reports five categories of ‘privation’ suffered in school’s localities,
which work to build a variable indicating if schools are from a ’low’ socioeconomic
status (SES) or a medium- to high-SES otherwise.12
The main descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.1. We exclude indigenous
schools from the sample (about 7% of the total) because these are located in remote
8In specific, our dropout measures indicate the inter-dropout rates consisting of those students aban-
doning their courses between two academic years t and t +1 for every 100 students enrolled at the begin-
ning of the academic year t, as indicated by the formula: ((tFEg -t+1IEg+1) - (t SFg+1)/tFEg) * 100, where
tFEg represents students enrollment at the end of the academic cycle t in grade g; t+1IEg+1 represents
students enrollment in the next grade g+1 at the beginning of the next academic cycle t +1; and t SFg+1
represents the number of students who failed grade g+1 in time t. We also compute intra-dropout rates
according to the formula (tFEg - tIEg)/100, that considers changes between initial and final enrollment
during the academic cycle t in grade g. Consequently, the total dropout rate is given by the sum of both
the inter- and intra-dropout measures.
9PROSPERA, before PROGRESA or OPORTUNIDADES, is a conditional cash transfer program
directed to the poorest families in Mexico.
10ENLACE test was suspended by the federal authorities after the academic cycle 2012-2013. A new
test named PLANEA was applied for the school cycle 2014-2015 but statistics on dropout rates and grade
repetition are still not available for such period.
11Every year a set of questions to be used in the next year’s test is applied to a controlled sample,
this works to built the standardized scale of the next year’s test and allows to identify students out of
this scale who are labeled as unreliable. Furthermore, ENLACE includes quality controls through an
automatic validation to detect collusion with the use of the models K-Index and Scrutiny as described in
technical details of the ENLACE manual.
12The five different categories of privation are provided by the National Council of Population
(CONAPO, for its abbreviation in Spanish). These are based in eight socioeconomic variables of the
school’s locality: average education levels, household’s characteristics (i.e. available services and in-
frastructure) and goods availability. Low-SES are those schools with the two highest levels of priva-
tion whereas mid- to high-SES are those located in the lowest three categories. For further details see
CONAPO (2010).
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areas, they are often multi-grade and thus, grade repetition is harder to compute. There-
fore we keep public and private general schools. The number of units for which there
exists full information about grade repetition and dropout rates for the eight years pe-
riod in a balanced panel is of 463,424 school-year observations or approximately 59,000
schools in each academic year. This represents approximately 77% of the total private
and public schools that exist in Mexico. Note that, regarding ENLACE test scores, the
number of observations available is lower, this is because we only include informa-
tion from 2008-2009 to 2012-2013. Average grade retention rates for the cited period
corresponding to 1st to 3rd grades is of 3.82% while total dropout rates are of 1.51%
on average. Dropout rates are higher when we consider all primary education (1.93%)
while retention is lower (2.62%). This implies that grade repetition is higher in lower
grades, when children are younger, but dropout is higher in 4th to 6th grades when
students are typically between 9 and 12 years old.
TABLE 3.1: Main Descriptive Statistics
Variable N*Years Mean SD Min Max
Grade Repetition 1st-3rd 57,928∗8 3·82 5·22 0 100
Dropout 1st-3rd 57,928∗8 1·51 10·88 −100 100
Repetition 1st-6th 57,928∗8 2·62 3·59 0 100
Dropout 1st-6th 57,919∗8 1·93 9·01 −100 100
A. Teacher’s Education
Vocational 57,850∗8 37·05 33·00 0 100
Bachelors 57,850∗8 56·79 33·44 0 100
Postgraduate 57,850∗8 5·20 12·58 0 100
B. Schools’s Characteristics
Number of Students 57,928∗8 213·69 174·27 20 1416
Number of Teachers 57,928∗8 7·64 5·07 1 30
“Carrera Magisterial” 57,928∗8 3·15 3·75 0 33
Low-SES School 57,928∗8 0·35 0·48 0 1
Public School 57,928∗8 0·89 0·31 0 1
Morning Shift 57,928∗8 0·82 0·38 0 1
C. ENLACE results
Math Avg. 3rd Grade 62,103∗6 535·38 75·82 103 914
Spanish Avg. 3rd Grade 62,101∗6 538·44 82·25 64 897
Source: Author’s elaboration using Statistics 911 for the school years 2006-2007 to 2013-2014
and ENLACE databases from 2008-2009 to 2012-2013. ”Carrera Magisterial” is a national
program that offers monetary incentives to “the best” teachers according to a set of standard-
ized evaluations. The variable presented refers to the percentage of teachers receiving such
incentives in each school.
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TABLE 3.2: Average repetition and dropout rates from 2007 to 2014
Grade Repetition Dropout
School Year 1st-3rd Grades 1st-6th Grades 1st-3rd Grades 1st-6th Grades
2006-2007 5.79 3.95 3.14 3.25
2007-2008 5.83 4.01 2.59 2.71
2008-2009 5.41 3.75 2.53 2.56
2009-2010 4.88 3.32 1.82 1.94
2010-2011 4.46 3.01 1.76 1.72
2011-2012 3.26 2.22 1.03 1.29
2012-2013 1.18 0.92 0.87 0.94
2013-2014 1.14 0.91 0.06 0.61
Source: Author’s elaboration using Statistics 911 for the school years 2006-2007 to 2013-2014
Table 3.2 presents average grade repetition rates for 1st to 3rd and 1th to 6th grades
across years. Note the decreasing trend for all variables along with a clear sharp reduc-
tion in both grade repetition and dropout rates from the school cycle 2012-2013. For
example in the case of 1st to 3rd grades, we observe a decline in retention rates, from
3.26% to 1.14% from 2011-2012 to 2013-2014, respectively. This same reduction is
registered in dropout rates, as they go from an already low 1.03% to a lower 0.06%,
respectively. Such trends can be graphically depicted in Figure 3.3. It is worth mention-
ing again the clear downwards pre-trend in both, repetition and dropout rates. A sense
of anticipation to the policy change may be suggested, however, as mentioned, repeti-
tion laws in Mexico are only approved at the national level and it would be unlawful
if some states or schools change their evaluation criteria without a previous consulta-
tion to the federal authorities. In any case, any state/county pretrend is addressed in the
methodology and falsification tests presented in the coming sections.
3.3 Empirical Specification
Our estimation strategy uses the variation in grade repetition rates across schools in
time to identify the effect on dropout rates of abolishing grade retention for students
not passing mandated assessments. The intuition is that schools with higher grade rep-
etition rates would be affected ’more intensively’ by the exogenous change in policy,
compared to schools with already low levels of grade repetition. The key assumption is
that the reduction in grade repetition rates is independent of unobserved school charac-
teristics. This is plausible, as the elimination of retention in grade was mandatory for all
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FIGURE 3.3: Average grade repetition and dropout rate in 1st to 3rd grades
schools regardless of their characteristics. As a matter of fact, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show
that regardless of school’s socioeconomic status (SES) and type of funding (public or
private) all schools, after policy change, converge towards the same repetition rate of
around 1%.13 The clear downwards trend in retention rates presented for all states may
reflect the general improvement in education outcomes across different States in Mexico
through time. However, there is the concern that it may also represent an ’anticipation’
from local authorities to the policy change. To the best of our knowledge, States in Mex-
ico cannot change promotion rules as these are determined by law at the federal level
for which “social promotion” was not allowed before 2012. Additionally, different time
trends at the state and county levels are considered in the corresponding estimations to
account for differences between state or county in the general downward trend across
schools explained by unobserved factors happening at the county/state level. Thus if
lower retention is associated with lower dropout rates the change in grade repetition
rates from 2012 to 2013 will be negatively related to the proportion of children aban-
doning school after the reform. This is captured by the following equation:
Dropoutsti = α1 +α2Repetitionsti ∗Post +Dt +Ds +α3Xst +D j ∗Year+ εsti j (3.1)
13Despite policy change completely abolished grade retention, the rates do not completely go to zero.
This may be due to children abandoning school during the school year and coming back one year later
to repeat the grade in which they were registered. Another reason may be voluntary repetition, when
parent’s believe that their children did not accumulate the ’necessary’ knowledge for any given grade.
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Where Dropoutsti is the total dropout rate in school s in time t=2007-2014 and grade
i.‘Post’ is a dummy taking the value of 1, in the after policy period and zero otherwise.
Repetitionsti measures average repetition rates in the pre-policy period and after policy
change in school s and grade i. Hence, Repetitionsti ∗Post captures the effect of the ex-
ogenous change in repetition rates for school s in time t=2013/2014. Xst includes school
level potential predictors of dropout rates for the whole pre- and post-policy period, like
number of students, teachers per every 100 pupils and teachers’ and principals’ average
education. Dt is a time dummy variable that accounts for changes in pre- and post-
policy period that might have affected school’s outcome trends differently. Ds are time
invariant school dummies capturing fixed school characteristics which might affect the
outcome of interest. Finally, D j*Year represents state j (or county j) year trends that
may correlate to policy change.
This two-way fixed-effects model compares schools dropout rates between units with
high and low repetition rates before and after policy change. The unit of observation
is schools but as we include county/state year trends we cluster standard errors on state
level. α2 is our coefficient of interest and measures the impact of abolishing retention
in-grade (or exogenously reducing grade repetition rates) on drop out rates in percentage
points.14 If the policy change had an impact we would expect α2 to be negative. More
specifically, this term will tell us for schools where repetition rates are 1% point higher
in the pre-policy period, how much would dropout rates change after abolishing grade
retention.
The causal interpretation of α2 in the above framework rests on the assumption that after
controlling for time fixed-effects, state/county year trends and time invariant character-
istics of schools, εtsi j is independent of the interaction term. In other words, that there
are no time-varying unobserved school-specific and state/county factors that are corre-
lated with the change in grade repetition after policy intervention. As mentioned, we
believe this is rather plausible as the sharp reduction in retention in-grade comes from
a modification of the federal law to asses pupils independent of school characteristics.
In section 3.5 we also present different estimations of α2 on inter-course and intra-
course dropout rates. We believe that the nature of this two measures is different. For
example, inter-course dropout rates take into account all those children who finish grade
i in year t but do not come back to school the next year. Such children (and their par-
ents) could be discouraged by the grades they receive at the end of the year increasing
14This strategy is similar to the one used by (Duflo, 2000) and more recently by Chakraborty and
Bakshi (2016)
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their likelihood to abandon school. On the other hand, children abandoning school be-
fore even knowing their grades (intra-course) could be more driven by other factors
independent of their performance and more related to their family’s socioeconomic and
cultural conditions which are not affected in any way by a policy for the “social pro-
motion” of children. Consequently, we expect that the change in retention rules should
affect more inter-course dropout rates, as children are not failed anymore regardless of
their grades, and thus, they are plausibly “encouraged” to continue in school.
In this regard, we also present different estimations of α2 for subgroups of schools
according to their type (public or private), their SES and a proxy of varying “family
investments” on children. The idea is to test if the social promotion of pupils is encour-
aging them to continue in school after “failing” a grade, regardless of their context. In
such case, we expect inter-course dropout rates to show a reduction after policy change
regardless of pupil’s socioeconomic status, while intra-dropout rates, which are on av-
erage higher in poorer contexts, should not be strongly affected. With this, we seek
to deepen the analysis on the nature of dropout rates and if they depend entirely on
children’s socioeconomic and family context or if there is indeed a chance for school
policies and in specific for “social promotion” to reduce them.
FIGURE 3.4: Average grade repetition 1st to 3rd grade: trends before and after policy
change by SES
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FIGURE 3.5: Average grade repetition in 1st to 3rd grades of public and private
schools: Trends before and after policy change
3.4 Does abolishing retention in-grade reduce pupil’s
dropout rates?
Table 3.3 shows the main results of the specification in Equation (1). Column 1 shows
the results of the interaction between grade repetition rates and the after policy pe-
riod, or the effect of the policy change on total dropout rates including school and time
fixed effects. Columns 2 and 3 show the effect on total dropout rates by adding state
time year fixed-effects and county times year fixed-effects, respectively. For the three
different specifications the coefficient attached to the change in policy shows a highly
significant reduction in total dropout rates of approximately 0.26% points on average
(S.E. of 0.02) for schools with repetition rates 1% higher in the pre-policy period. For
which, an school going from 4% to 1% after policy change would translate into ap-
proximately a reduction of 0.78 % points in dropout rates. Similarly, considering that
the average repetition rate before policy was already at a low 1.18% this impact trans-
lates into an average reduction of approximately 21% of the pre-policy change dropout
rate. Note that other variables included in the model also seem to present sensible signs
regarding their effects on dropouts. For example, bigger schools have more dropouts
but increasing the ratio of teachers in 1 per 100 students significantly reduces dropout
rates. Not surprisingly, teacher’s education at higher levels than vocational studies, also
relates negatively to dropout rates.
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TABLE 3.3: Two-way fixed-effects models of dropout rates on grade repetition
Dropout Dropout Dropout
(1) (2) (3)
Repetition * After −0·251∗∗∗ −0·269∗∗∗ −0·254∗∗∗
(0·040) (0·044) (0·045)
# Students 0·182∗∗∗ 0·183∗∗∗ 0·192∗∗∗
(0·009) (0·008) (0·009)
Students-sq −0·000∗∗∗ −0·000∗∗∗ −0·000∗∗∗
(0·000) (0·000) (0·000)
Teacher/Stud. Ratio −1·529∗∗∗ −1·545∗∗∗ −1·584∗∗∗
(0·100) (0·094) (0·097)
A. Teacher’s Education
Vocational −0·007 −0·007 −0·007
(0·004) (0·004) (0·005)
Bachelors −0·011∗∗ −0·011∗∗ −0·010∗∗
(0·004) (0·005) (0·005)
Postgrad −0·016∗∗∗ −0·017∗∗∗ −0·016∗∗∗
(0·005) (0·005) (0·005)
Carrera Magisterial −0·047∗∗ −0·036∗ −0·044∗∗
(0·020) (0·020) (0·020)
School Fixed- Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes
State * Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes No
County * Year Fixed-Effects Yes No Yes
R-squared 0·243 0·259 0·267
Number of schools 435822 435822 435822
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered on state, in parenthesis. Teacher’s education is measured as
the proportion of these with any given educational level in each school. ”Carrera Magisterial”
is a national program that offers monetary incentives to “the best” teachers according to a set of
standardized evaluations; the variable included in the model refers to the proportion of teachers
receiving such incentives in each school. Teachers/Stud Ratio is measured as the number of
teachers per 100 students at the school level.
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3.4.1 Falsification Tests
Figure 3.6 plots the results of different regressions including interactions between grade
repetition and a set of dummies taking the value of 1 in the years 2008-2012, as if policy
had changed before 2012. Across all models, we use 2007 repetition rates as a base. Es-
timations, as those coming from Equation 1 include time, school fixed-effects (left hand
figure) and a combination of school, time and county-year fixed-effects (right hand fig-
ure). Regressions also include a set of school and teacher’s characteristics as controls.15
The results offer the relationship between grade repetition changes and dropout rates
independent of school-time fixed-effects and county trends in retention rates for the
pre-policy period, as well as the effects after policy change in the school cycle 2012-
2013. If the estimate of α2 is confounded with unobserved factors that vary directly
with repetition rates, for any year before policy change, α2 would be different from
zero.
Note that the coefficients in the pre-policy period are non- significantly different from
zero at the 95% of confidence for all periods previous to policy reform, ruling out a
possible anticipation to policy change and implying that the average coefficient α2 rep-
resents the effect of the change in promotion rules in Mexican primary schools, as unob-
served factors independent of time nor school-fixed or county changing characteristics
causing varying grade repetition rates are plausibly not correlated with our estimator
of interest. This offers support to the conclusion that exogenously abolishing retention
in-grade caused a reduction in dropout rates in Mexico, and that the effect remains (and
is statistically higher) two years after policy change.
3.4.2 Robustness checks
This section presents the estimates of two different specifications to measure the effects
of the reform in promotion rules. The first estimation is similar in spirit to a triple
difference strategy as defined by the equation:
Dropoutst = α1 +α2Repetitions ∗Post ∗nonMX +Repetitions ∗Dt +nonMX ∗Dt +Dt +Ds +α3Xst + εst
(3.2)
15Detailed results for these specifications and another one including state-year fixed-effects are in-
cluded in the Annex Table C2
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FIGURE 3.6: Falsification test of a reduction in grade repetition on dropout rates in the
pre- and post-policy period including school and time fixed effects (left) and school,
time and county-year fixed effects (right)
Point estimates and the 95% confidence intervals are obtained from a regression including
interactions between grade repetition and year dummies taking the value of 0 in the pre-policy
period and 1 in the subsequent years, 2008-2012 as if policy had changed before 2012. We
use 2007 repetition rates as a base. Estimations include time, school fixed-effects (left) and a
combination of county-year fixed-effects (right). Regressions also include a set of school and
teacher’s characteristics as controls.
In this regression, α2 gives the casual estimate of the effect of policy change in all states
different from Mexico City (non-MX) on dropout rates. Repetitions, Post, Dt , Ds and
Xst are defined as before. Non-CDMX is an indicator that takes value 1 for any state
different from Mexico City. Mexico City schools are used because repetition rates there
did not chance dramatically after policy intervention, plausibly because they were al-
ready at a very low level, nonetheless, as the rest of Mexico they also depict an absolute
downwards trend years before policy intervention as shown in Annex Figure C1. The
interactions Repetitions ∗Dt between average repetition rates before policy change and
time dummies, denote time trends that account for any time varying differences in reten-
tion rates between Mexico City’s schools and the rest of Mexico apart from the change
in promotion rules. Moreover there can be differences in the education conditions and
policies between non-MX states and Mexico City, this is controlled by the varying state
effects non−MX ∗Dt . This strategy allows schools with varying high and low repeti-
tion rates to have different time specific trends. It rests on the assumption that difference
in retention trends between high and low repetition schools is identical across non-MX
states and Mexico City. This is likely to hold once state specific factors are controlled
for.
The second alternative estimation measures the effect of policy change using a specifi-
cation similar to a triple difference but using intra-school variation as the identification
strategy. As denoted before, change in promotion rules only affected 1st to 3rd grade
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students while the same guidelines were left for children in grades 4th to 6th. Annex
Figure C2 shows first to third grade average grade repetition trends in comparison to
fourth to sixth grades, which should not be affected by policy change. The lines show
a reduction in repetition for lower grades and a less clear reduction in the after policy
period for higher grades. The difference between the two rates in each school is used












Repetitions ∗A f ter+Dt +Ds+α3Xst +εst
(3.3)
Equation 3 takes the first differences between dropout rates from 1st to 3rd grades and
4th to 6th grades in each school S in time t=2007-2014 and uses as dependent variable,
this way, all unobserved factors at the school level describing varying repetition trends
between schools are differentiated out. This strategy uses 4th to 6th grade year trends
as a control groups. Repetitions, Post, Dt , Ds and Xst remain as before. Similarly, α2
gives the casual estimate of the effect of policy change accounting for time and school
fixed-effects.
The results of both specifications on dropout rates are presented in Table 3.4. They show
a slightly higher average reduction of about 0.35 % points on dropout rates compared to
our main estimations. Notheless the results are similar an in-line with what was already
concluded before.
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TABLE 3.4: Alternative models of dropout rates: Triple differences using Mexico City




A. Using Mexico City as a Control
Repetition * After * nonMX −0·346∗
(0·186)
B. Differences between grades as dependent
Repetition * After −0·344∗∗∗
(0·036)
R-squared 0·233 0·234
Number of schools 462495 462719
School Fixed- Effects Yes Yes
Time Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered on county, in parenthesis. Other controls included are
teacher’s education measured as the proportion of these with any given educational level in
each school and ”Carrera Magisterial” refering to the proportion of the ’best’ teachers receiv-
ing incentives in each school. Teachers/Stud Ratio measured as the number of teachers per 100
students at the school level along with number of students is also included.
3.5 Heterogenous effects of abolishing grade retention
3.5.1 Do policy effects differ for children dropping out during the
academic year or between courses?
In order to explore some underlying factors behind the effects of abolishing retention
in grade, Table 3.5 includes the average results separated by intra (during the academic
year) and inter-droput rates (between academic years). The estimations suggest that pol-
icy change effects come from students promoted to the next grade, who are now return-
ing for the next academic cycle, as dropout rates between courses (inter) are reducing in
a similar proportion to total dropout rates. This effect plausibly relates to students not
feeling ’discouraged’ after they are not failed. On the other hand, intra-course dropout
rates do not seem to be affected.16 Plausibly, children abandoning school during the
16In recent years, intra and inter-course dropout rates are similar on average as it can be noticed in the
Annex Table C1. For wich half of the proportion of children droping out of school was not affected by
the policy.
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academic year are doing it for reasons less related to retention laws or school charac-
teristics. In this regard, another variable shown in Table 3.5 related to the ’academic
environment’ of schools such as the proportion of teachers in ”Carrera Magisterial”, an
incentive program directed to “the best” of them according to a set of standardized eval-
uations, do not seem to be related to intra-course dropout rates either, also suggesting
that these type of dropout relates less to school/teacher policies and characteristics and
more to other context and children/family unobserved characteristics.
TABLE 3.5: Two-way fixed-effects models of dropout rates on grade repetition
Total Intra-course Inter-course
(1) (2) (3)
Repetition * After −0·254∗∗∗ −0·000 −0·248∗∗∗
(0·043) (0·019) (0·046)
# Students 0·190∗∗∗ 0·068∗∗∗ 0·122∗∗∗
(0·008) (0·006) (0·005)
Students-sq. −0·000∗∗∗ −0·000∗∗∗ −0·000∗∗∗
(0·000) (0·000) (0·000)
Teacher/Stud Ratio −1·556∗∗∗ −0·548∗∗∗ −0·940∗∗∗
(0·095) (0·050) (0·088)
Vocational −0·004 0·000 −0·003
(0·005) (0·003) (0·004)
Bachelors −0·008 −0·001 −0·005
(0·005) (0·002) (0·004)
Postgrad −0·013∗∗ −0·002 −0·008∗
(0·006) (0·003) (0·005)
Carrera Magisterial −0·040∗∗ 0·003 −0·047∗∗∗
(0·019) (0·010) (0·016)
School Fixed- Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes
County * Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0·268 0·253 0·247
Number of schools 462798 462617 462495
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parenthesis. Teacher’s education is measured as
the proportion of these with any given educational level in each school. ”Carrera Magisterial”
is a national program that offers monetary incentives to “the best” teachers according to a set of
standardized evaluations; the variable included in the model refers to the proportion of teachers
receiving such incentives in each school. Teachers/Stud Ratio is measured as the number of
teachers per 100 students at the school level.
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3.5.2 Do policy effects differ by school’s socioeconomic contexts?
One important test for the results is whether the effects of abolishing retention in-grade
hold for different socioeconomic contexts or not. For example, having no impacts of
policy change in poorer schools may undone the whole purpose of a policy seeking
to help vulnerable kids to stay longer in school. In this regard, Table 3.6 presents the
estimation defined in Equation 1 using the same sample of schools separated by low-
and high-SES including school, time and county-year fixed effects.17 The results remain
similar to those shown in Table 3.3 as there is a significant dropout rates reduction in
poorer and richer schools and the inter-course dropout rates remain driving general
results in both type of schools. This is confirmed by the estimations presented in Table
3.7 which separates schools above (poorer) and below (richer) each state’s average of
students with a PROSPERA scholarship.
TABLE 3.6: Heterogenous effects between low- and mid/high-SES schools
Low-SES Mid to High-SES
Total Intra-course Inter-course Total Intra-course Inter-course
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Repetition*After −0·206∗∗∗ −0·009 −0·212∗∗∗ −0·294∗∗∗ 0·011 −0·281∗∗∗
(0·060) (0·017) (0·066) (0·055) (0·030) (0·053)
School Fixed- Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County * Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0·268 0·243 0·250 0·273 0·264 0·250
Number of schools 161094 161009 160957 301704 301608 301538
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parenthesis. Point estimates come from the
interaction between school’s grade repetition rates and a dummy taking the value of 1 in the
after-policy period. Estimations include time and school fixed-effects and a set of school and
teacher’s characteristics as controls as described in equation 1.
Note that, when comparing the estimations on total and inter-course dropout rates in
both sets of results presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, the effect of policy change is not
significantly different in richer schools once standard errors are considered. For exam-
ple, the effect observed in Low-SES schools on total dropout rates is of -0.21 % points
(S.E. of 0.06) vs -0.29 % points (S.E. of 0.06). This same conclusion holds for the
inter-course dropout rates.
17The remaining estimations will also include this setup as according to the Falsification tests presented
above, seems to control for pre-trends in a more robust way
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TABLE 3.7: Heterogenous effects: Proportion of students receiving a PROGRESA
scholarship
Schools Above State Average Schools Below State Average
Total Intra-course Inter-course Total Intra-course Inter-course
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Repetition * After −0·198∗∗∗ −0·011 −0·201∗∗∗ −0·293∗∗∗ 0·009 −0·276∗∗∗
(0·045) (0·018) (0·043) (0·058) (0·028) (0·062)
School Fixed- Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County * Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0·277 0·254 0·263 0·312 0·308 0·287
Number of schools 175407 175347 175299 281587 281465 281385
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered on state, in parenthesis. Point estimates come from the in-
teraction between school’s grade repetition rates and a dummy taking the value of 1 in the
after-policy period. Estimations include time and school fixed-effects and a set of school and
teacher’s characteristics as controls as described in Equation 1.
Further results by SES are presented in Figure 3.7 which separates schools by their
socioeconomic status as reported in the ENLACE dataset. The results allow to confirm
no significant differences for most schools with different levels of privation. Although,
results suggest a statistically significant higher effect for the Very High-SES compared
to Low-SES schools. This effect is sensible as one would expect that dropout rates
for poorer children would be less driven by school promotion policies and more by
their context. Additionally, a possibility behind higher effects in richer schools may
relate to the type of dropout observed in such contexts, as plausibly, richer children may
temporarily dropout to return later to finish their studies and now they do not find the
need to do it. Contrary, effects in poorer schools may be lower because dropouts in such
contexts may be leaving schools definitively.
Another differentiated effect of interest to test varying effects across different socioeco-
nomic backgrounds is the one between public and private schools as both differ in the
composition of their students and their previous trends of grade repetition as presented
before in Figure 3.5. Table 3.8 shows the results by type of school. First thing to note
is that points estimates are more similar between these two types of schools compared
to those observed between low- and high-SES schools. This understandable as 25% of
public schools are also located in high-SES localities, although this is still a small pro-
portion compared to the 80% of private schools. The estimations exhibit that the effect
of policy change in total dropout rates is fairly similar in public and private institutions,
i.e. 0.25 % points (S.E of 0.02) and 0.23 % points (S.E.of 0.07), respectively. Similar
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FIGURE 3.7: Policy effects on dropout rates by different categories of SES.
Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals come from the interaction between grade rep-
etition rates in each school in the pre- and post-policy period and a dummy taking the value
of 1 in the after policy period and zero otherwise. The estimation includes time and school
fixed-effects and a set of school and teacher’s characteristics as controls
point estimators should not be surprising as average repetition rates in the pre-policy
period are higher in public institutions than in private, and thus one can expect a higher
relative impact in public schools.
TABLE 3.8: Heterogenous effects between private and public schools
Public Private
Total Intra-course Inter-course Total Intra-course Inter-course
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Repetition*After −0·254∗∗∗ −0·008 −0·249∗∗∗ −0·230∗∗ 0·054 −0·242∗∗∗
(0·043) (0·020) (0·046) (0·099) (0·059) (0·087)
School Fixed- Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County * Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0·263 0·262 0·229 0·309 0·243 0·321
Number of Schools 412639 412511 412414 50159 50106 50081
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered on state, in parenthesis. Point estimates come from the in-
teraction between school’s grade repetition rates and a dummy taking the value of 1 in the
after-policy period. Estimations include time and school fixed-effects and a set of school and
teacher’s characteristics as controls as described in Equation 1.
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3.5.3 Do family investments modify the effect of abolishing reten-
tion in-grade?
A possibly different way to observe relevant differences between varying socioeco-
nomic contexts is to asses the effect of the policy change conditional on family in-
vestments, as these may undo the intended effect of abolishing retention in-grade for
some disadvantaged groups. If for example, abolishing grade retention does not have
an effect on children who receive less pecuniary and non-pecuniary investments from
their parents relative to their relative socioeconomic context, the whole purpose of the
policy, assuming that children receiving lower family investments are the most likely to
abandon school, can be undone.
As discussed, the data at hand does not offer individual information on children’s back-
ground. Thus, we use the proportion of children in any given school with one to three
years of pre-school education as proxy for average family investments. Specifically, if
a school has a proportion of children with one year of preschool that is higher than the
average of the State where the school is located, it takes the value of 1 and zero oth-
erwise, and so forth for schools with proportions above averages of children with two
and three years of kindergarten. The intuition is that schools with higher proportions
of children who received more years of preschool concentrate pupils who receive more
investments from their parents and the opposite in the case of those schools below the
average.
In this regard, Table 3.9 shows the separated effects in schools with lower and higher
proportions of children with pre-school education In panel A we can observe point
estimators for public schools and in Panel B for private schools. We separate the results
by Public and Private schools as themselves represent different investments on children.
Column 1 presents the effect of policy change on schools with a proportion of children
with at least one year of pre-school education below their state’s average. Column 2 to
4 presents the results for schools above the average proportion of children with one to
three years of pre-school.
Results show, after considering the standard errors of each estimation, that in public
schools there are no significant differences between schools with lower or higher pro-
portions of children with pre-school education. Regarding private schools, the higher
standard errors possibly coming from a reduction of the number of observations, do not
allow to confirm significant effects in columns 3 and 4. This is sensible as this would
indicate that more advantaged children who receive the highest investments combining
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more years of pre-school and education coming from private schools are not presenting
effects of the policy change, plausibly because grade repetition rates are close to zero in
such contexts. Similarly, there seems to be a higher effect of the policy on schools with
a higher proportion of children with 1 year of preschool (-0.62 % points, S.E. of 0.31)
versus schools below the average proportion as reported in Column 1 (-0.21 % Points,
S.E. of 0.07) . This suggests that the policy is presenting lower effects in private schools
that concentrate children who receive relatively less parental investments.
TABLE 3.9: Policy effects on public and private schools with higher proportions of
children with pre-school education
Preschool Education Below Average 1 Year 2 years 3 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Public Schools
Repeat*After −0·236∗∗∗ −0·243∗∗∗ −0·262∗∗∗ −0·281∗∗∗
(0·053) (0·059) (0·046) (0·057)
R-squared 0·304 0·405 0·428 0·406
Number of schools 280057 120159 74808 95390
B. Private Schools
Repeat*After −0·206∗∗∗ −0·619∗ −0·417 −0·706
(0·072) (0·305) (0·271) (0·444)
R-squared 0·324 0·524 0·537 0·515
Number of schools 42548 6096 4106 5196
School Fixed- Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County*Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered on state, in parenthesis. Point estimates come from the inter-
action between school’s grade repetition rates and a dummy taking the value of 1 in the after-
policy period. Estimations include a set of fixed-effects and controls as described in Equation
1.
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3.5.4 Does abolishing retention in grade affect pupil’s performance?
One of the most common arguments in favor of retention in grade, is that it acts as a
deterrent to poor school performance by inflicting a high penalty on under-performers,
working as an incentive for students to increase their efforts. Therefore a plausible
unintended outcome coming from the automatic promotion of students, is a possible
negative effect of eliminating the “threat” of grade repetition on children’s performance
at school. It is also worth considering that the effect of abolishing grade repetition on
performance, may vary by socioeconomic status and may be more detrimental in the
case of children from more deprived contexts or with less motivated parents.
In order to explore the consequence of changing promotion guidelines in Mexico, we
take advantage of the same set-up presented in Equation (1) to evaluate the effects on
standardized Math and Spanish test scores. We use the ENLACE results for that pur-
pose. Dismally, the analysis is constrained by the fact that the test was only applied
until the school year 2012-2013 and that it is only applied to children in 3th to 6th
grade. Conveniently, we can study the effects of policy change on test scores of 3rd
graders as change in promotion guidelines started from September 2012, whereas the
last round of the ENLACE test was applied at the end of the school year, in June 2013.
So it is important to highlight that the effect we are exploring here is not that of the “au-
tomatic promotion” as we would need to observe test results of children who shouldn’t
have been promoted in the absence of the policy, consequently, we study the elimination
of the ”threat” of grade retention in the year were the test score was applied, as this may
discourage children to perform.
Table 3.10 shows the effects of policy change on mathematics in Panel A and on Spanish
in Panel B. The columns show different heterogeneous results for low- and high-SES
schools, both public and private. The estimations in Column 1 suggest a statistically
significant but economically insignificant positive effect of abolishing grade retention in
both Mathematics and Spanish test scores of 0.4-0.7% of a Standard Deviation. These
point estimators translate into a marginal gain of just 4 to 7 points in a test with an
average of 500 points. Note that when the schools are separated into low and high-SES,
the effect becomes non-different from zero. In the overall results in Table 3.10 suggest
that eliminating the “threat” of grade repetition could have not reduced the effort of third
graders. An alternative interpretation is that policy change could have increased school
resources and efforts devoted to children who progress but would not have progressed
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in the absence on the reform. Unfortunately, this is a question that remains open given
the data at hand.
TABLE 3.10: Two-way fixed-effects models of standardized math and Spanish test
scores on grade repetition
Average Low-SES High-SES
Public Private Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Mathematics
Repetition*After 0·004∗∗ −0·002 0·007 0·005 −0·002
(0·002) (0·004) (0·013) (0·003) (0·001)
R-squared 0·547 0·467 0·850 0·502 0·863
Number of schools 370904 112669 2968 218965 36302
B. Spanish
Repetition*After 0·007∗∗∗ −0·000 0·018 0·007∗∗ 0·000
(0·002) (0·004) (0·018) (0·003) (0·001)
R-squared 0·605 0·462 0·902 0·554 0·910
Number of schools 370844 112633 2968 218952 36291
School Fixed- Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County*Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered on state, in parenthesis. Regressions include a full set of
controls such as teacher’s average education at the school level, if they participate in “Carrera
Magisterial”, number of students and teacher-to-student ratio, as well as the number of student’s
tested and the proportion of results considered as unreliable in each school.
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper evaluated the impact effects of an exogenous policy change that took place
in 2012 which modified Mexico’s grade retention laws for 1st to 3rd grade students
on dropout rates. The data at hand offered the possibility to study a panel of schools
between 2007 to 2014 and to explore different heterogeneous effects by socioeconomic
status and type of schools. Additionally, it was possible to summarily test if abolishing
grade repetition ’threat’ would affect children’s performance.
The main results obtained exhibit a significant effect of abolishing grade retention on
dropout rates of approximately 0.25% points. General findings do not seem to respond
to pre-trends in retention rates as placebo tests probe that our identification strategy
manages to isolate the effect of the exogenous change in retention laws. Similarly,
alternative specifications allowed to confirm similar effects.
The average reduction in dropout rates is not minimal if we consider that the average
before policy change was already close to a 1%. Such effects are observed one and two
years after policy change. Indeed this is a very short span of time and we acknowledge
that they are rather preliminary and will be more relevant when more data on dropout
and pupil’s performance is available as it will be interesting to analyze if the short
term effects remain once children grow older and go to secondary school where recent
dropout rates in Mexico can be as high as 8%. Nonetheless, these results are a good
a first approach to the possible effects of a policy that as mentioned, it has now been
revoked, despite the lack of an impact evaluation on relevant outcomes.
Furthermore, results show that the effects of policy change are rather stable across dif-
ferent socioeconomic backgrounds and in private and public schools and it does not
seem to affect children’s performance. This offers support to the idea that grade repeti-
tion is not only dependent of children’s socioeconomic and cultural conditions and that
education policies have an important role. In fact, we have shown that a low-cost policy
which only needed to modify retention laws independent of other inputs at the school
level, can directly enhance children’s overall achievement without seemingly affecting
pupil’s general performance. This is of great relevance in the Mexican context where
authorities face an important challenge to improve education outcomes.
General Conclusions
This thesis focuses on the evaluation of three interventions at the school and student
level in Mexico with the use of quasi-experimental techniques. The first chapter anal-
ysed the effect of a school breakfast program (SBP) that as been active for decades. Sec-
ond chapter focused on exploring the impacts of one of the most important education
policies implemented in Mexico in the last ten years, the Full-Time Schools Program
or PETC. Last chapter discussed the effects of abolishing grade retention for the first
grades in primary schools.
The main results regarding the SBP show that program’s targeting is a central issue.
Evidence shows that the treatment does not depend on children’s characteristics like
height and weight, as it is claimed by national education authorities. Contrary, results
suggest an administrative bias in the allocation of breakfasts, plausibly subjected to
characteristics of schools. For example, results suggest that schools with more students
and with more prepared principals have a higher chance to participate of the breakfast
policy, when these are usually the most deprived. The estimations also show a consistent
effect on children’s weight which may push them above their standardise average by age
and sex. Such effects could be even more detrimental on children at the bottom half of
the income distribution. Results on other outcomes such as cognitive skills and grade
repetition are not significant.
The evaluation of the SBP offers some interesting conclusions regarding the future of
the policy. It opens the debate on the objectives and targeting of the program in a
context where nutritional challenges are different. When the SBP started, its goal was to
reduce children’s under-nutrition, but nowadays Mexican children are in a very different
situation, facing now a greater risk of obesity rather than low-weight. Nonetheless,
obvious limitations constrain the strength of the conclusions reached in Chapter 1. The
sample used is rather small, and although it comes from a nationally representative
survey, sample size most surely affects the efficiency of our estimations and some results
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may be significant with a different and/or larger sample. This opens a space for future
research. Possibly an experimental set-up would be a suitable alternative to test different
nutrition interventions directed to improve how much and what children eat at schools
to set the initial stages of an updated children’s nutrition program.
The empirical research presented in this document also included an evaluation to the
school day reform, the flagship education policy of the previous federal administration
(2006-2012) and one of the most important in the present government. The program
implied a big investment on material and teaching resources and nowadays it continues
expanding at a fast pace. The evaluation presented its effects on pupil’s achievement
between 2007 and 2013 using standardised test scores of mathematics and Spanish as
an outcome. The results showed positive impacts of up to 0.11 SD after 4 years of
treatment on both subjects. The results also show an impact almost three times higher
in poorer schools. Estimations also suggest that for the case of mathematics, after four
years of treatment there is a clear reduction in the proportion of students graded as
insufficient and an increase of those with excellent results. These results are of key
relevance to argue that less skilled children even in deprived environments, are also
benefiting for longer school days.
These conclusions are helpful to guide the continuous fast expansion of the program
which aims to grow from around 6,000 schools treated in 2012 to 40,000 by 2018.
Resources may be more efficiently invested if they concentrate in poorer schools in
accordance to the empirical evidence reported above. Nevertheless, it is important to
mention that, although the results presented in Chapter 2 are robust to different speci-
fications, the program has grown quickly and its effectiveness has surely changed, for
which is important to update the evaluation of its impacts and make sure that with a
newer, bigger and more challenging sample in terms of policy control and intervention,
such results remain positive.
The final chapter evaluates the arguably causal impacts of a change to the general rules
for the student’s evaluation, promotion and certification in basic education. The reform
only affected children from first to third grades. The main results obtained exhibit a
significant effect of abolishing grade retention on dropout rates of approximately 0.25%
points with no seeming effects of eliminating the threat of grade repetition on student’s
test score. The general findings are robust to different specifications and falsification
tests and are consistent across different socioeconomic backgrounds, types of schools
and a proxy for family investments. Unfortunately, this policy was modified again only
one year later in order to bring back the older laws allowing grade retention of 2nd and
3rd graders despite the lack of any empirical evidence at that moment on the Mexican
case.
The estimations are informative of the short term effects of the program and give some
support to the continuation and possibly, the expansion of ’social promotion’ to other
grades in the Mexican education system rather than continuing with a punitive system,
specially in secondary schools where dropout rates can be as much as seven times higher
than in primary schools. Unfortunately, possible experimental setups to evaluate such
expansions are limited due to the fact that changes in promotion laws in Mexico have
to happen at the federal level. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in Chapter 3 is a
good start to open the debate and develop future research on the topic as the question on
the mid-run effects of abolishing grade repetition is still open considering that the short
term effects on reducing dropouts can still vanish once children go to higher levels of
education.
In the overall, this thesis sought to contribute to the reduced ambit of the impact eval-
uation of education policies in Mexico. The main objective was to discuss, as much as
possible, the causal effects of specific policies, but with the broader intention to point
out the urgent need to generate or redesign interventions based on a deeper understand-
ing of their overall achievements. This is important not only because education policies
make use of a large amount of public resources, but also because the mistakes that gov-
ernments make in this respect can potentially affect entire generations and may have
lasting detrimental effects, specially, among the most vulnerable.
Annex tables and figures: Chapter 1
TABLE A1: Determinants of the assignment into treatment SBP in Mexico. BMI,
Height(Cm.), Weight(Kg.) and Height over Weight by age and sex
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SBP SBP SBP SBP SBP
Body Mass Index -0.007 0.007 0.044 0.069 0.090
(0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.059) (0.061)
Height(Cm.) -0.006 0.003 0.011 -0.014 -0.006
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.039) (0.037)
Weight(Kg.) -0.004 -0.001 0.015 0.039 0.046
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.039) (0.040)
Height/Weight -0.060 -0.006 0.120 0.119 0.198
(0.089) (0.093) (0.101) (0.159) (0.162)
Observations 587 587 587 317 317
Kids Controls X X X X X
Context Controls X X X
Progresa X X X
School Controls X X X
Municipality Fixed-effects X X
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
iv
TABLE A2: Treated and untreated average of covariates used in the PSM for the panel
of kids 2002-2005: Nearest Neighbour (5)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 9.796 9.922 -0.126
Log of Income Sqrd. 96.947 99.221 -2.274
Mother Schooling 7.043 7.030 0.014
Father Schooling 7.450 7.543 -0.092
Siblings 2.485 2.359 0.126
PROGRESA 0.199 0.145 0.054
Girl 0.515 0.463 0.052
Age 8.212 8.123 0.089
IQ 0.052 -0.002 0.055
Standard. Height 0.019 0.064 -0.046
Standard. Weight -0.039 0.041 -0.080
Illness dummy 0.610 0.609 0.001
Multi-grade School 0.130 0.135 -0.005
#Teachers 10.377 10.193 0.184
#Teachers Sqrd. 127.790 124.980 2.810
#Students 313.350 289.830 23.520
Principal Education 1.745 1.607 0.138
Principal Female 0.225 0.331 -0.106
Principal Another Job 0.420 0.373 0.047
Cleaning Personnel 0.658 0.707 -0.049
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.429 0.376 0.052
Good Ceiling Condition 0.900 0.884 0.016
Region 3.597 3.485 0.112
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A3: Treated and untreated average of the covariates used in the PSM for the
Panel of Kids 2002-2005: Mahalanobis Distance (5)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 9.7859 9.9333 -0.1474
Log of Income Sqrd. 96.752 99.337 -2.585
Mother Schooling 6.9707 7.154 -0.1833
Father Schooling 7.3305 7.8259 -0.4954
Siblings 2.5607 2.5598 0.0009*
PROGRESA 0.21339 0.12469 0.0887
Girl 0.5272 0.50795 0.01925
Age 8.2218 8.1498 0.072
IQ 0.04977 -0.04482 0.09459
Strd. Height 0.01892 -0.03698 0.0559
Strd. Weight -0.03185 -0.16 0.12815
Illness dummy 0.61925 0.64017 -0.02092
Multi-grade School 0.12552 0.06695 0.05857
#Teachers 10.331 9.9113 0.4197**
#Teachers Sqrd. 126.22 112.26 13.96**
#Students 310.63 300.33 10.3
Principal Education 1.7866 1.5456 0.241
Principal Female 0.21757 0.18912 0.02845
Principal Another Job 0.43933 0.34895 0.09038
Cleaning Personnel 0.63598 0.77741 -0.14143
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.41423 0.21423 0.2
Good Ceiling Condition 0.90377 0.89205 0.01172
Region 3.6778 3.3582 0.3196*
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A4: Treated and untreated average of the covariates used in the PSM for the
panel of kids 2002-2005: Radius with caliper (0.001)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 9.8948 9.9656 -0.0708
Log of Income Sqrd. 99.09 100.16 -1.07
Mother Schooling 7.3038 6.9251 0.3787
Father Schooling 7.4557 7.5646 -0.1089
Siblings 2.5823 2.4622 0.1201
PROGRESA 0.18987 0.18776 0.00211
Girl 0.5443 0.47996 0.06434
Age 8.2532 8.1846 0.0686
IQ -0.0289 0.0801 -0.109
Std. Height -0.04471 -0.03074 -0.01397
Std. Weight 0.08698 -0.05193 0.13891
Illness dummy 0.58228 0.56624 0.01604
Multi-grade School 0.12658 0.09283 0.03375
#Teachers 10.152 9.9681 0.1839
#Teachers Sqrd. 123.47 119.68 3.79
#Students 297.24 282.45 14.79
Principal Education 1.557 1.6589 -0.1019
Principal Female 0.26582 0.26962 -0.0038
Principal Another Job 0.44304 0.45844 -0.0154
Cleaning Personnel 0.73418 0.73312 0.00106
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.34177 0.34304 -0.00127
Good Ceiling Condition 0.87342 0.84705 0.02637
Region 3.5823 3.289 0.2933
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A5: Treated and untreated average of the covariates used in the PSM for the
panel of kids 2005-2005: Radius with caliper (0.005)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 9.836 9.877 -0.042
Log of Income Sqrd. 97.762 98.276 -0.514
Mother Schooling 7.012 6.972 0.040
Father Schooling 7.406 7.690 -0.284
Siblings 2.558 2.553 0.005
PROGRESA 0.176 0.155 0.021
Girl 0.503 0.520 -0.017
Age 8.164 8.181 -0.017
IQ -0.027 0.140 -0.167
Std. Height 0.024 0.049 -0.025
Std. Weight 0.019 -0.007 0.026
Illness dummy 0.612 0.569 0.043
Multi-grade School 0.121 0.186 -0.065
#Teachers 10.206 9.799 0.407
#Teachers Sqrd. 126.420 117.070 9.350
#Students 301.410 287.880 13.530
Principal Education 1.588 1.570 0.018
Principal Female 0.261 0.285 -0.024
Principal Another Job 0.352 0.392 -0.041
Cleaning Personnel 0.673 0.673 -0.001
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.352 0.367 -0.015
Good Ceiling Condition 0.879 0.888 -0.010
Region 3.491 3.515 -0.024
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A6: Treated and untreated average of the covariates used in the PSM for the
panel of kids 2002-2005: Kernel bandwidth (0.001)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 9.8948 9.9783 -0.084
Log of Income Sqrd. 99.09 100.38 -1.290
Mother Schooling 7.3038 6.8618 0.442
Father Schooling 7.4557 7.5488 -0.093
Siblings 2.5823 2.4575 0.125
PROGRESA 0.18987 0.18714 0.003
Girl 0.5443 0.47997 0.064
Age 8.2532 8.1669 0.086
IQ -0.0289 0.07544 -0.104
Std. Height -0.04471 -0.01497 -0.030
Std. Weight 0.08698 -0.03024 0.117
Illness dummy 0.58228 0.5554 0.027
Multi-grade School 0.12658 0.10013 0.026
#Teachers 10.152 10.025 0.127
#Teachers Sqrd. 123.47 121.56 1.910
#Students 297.24 284.69 12.550
Principal Education 1.557 1.6547 -0.098
Principal Female 0.26582 0.28698 -0.021
Principal Another Job 0.44304 0.46687 -0.024
Cleaning Personnel 0.73418 0.73968 -0.005
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.34177 0.34658 -0.005
Good Ceiling Condition 0.87342 0.85057 0.023
Region 3.5823 3.315 0.267
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A7: Treated and untreated average of the covariates used in the PSM for the
panel of kids 2002-2005: Kernel bandwidth (0.005)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 9.8356 9.8992 -0.064
Log of Income Sqrd. 97.762 98.713 -0.951
Mother Schooling 7.0121 7.0528 -0.041
Father Schooling 7.4061 7.7142 -0.308
Siblings 2.5576 2.5531 0.004
PROGRESA 0.17576 0.14583 0.030
Girl 0.50303 0.50874 -0.006
Age 8.1636 8.1894 -0.026
IQ -0.02674 0.17012 -0.197
Std. Height 0.0243 0.05846 -0.034
Std. Weight 0.01927 0.00516 0.014
Illness dummy 0.61212 0.5635 0.049
Multi-grade School 0.12121 0.1901 -0.069
#Teachers 10.206 9.8616 0.344
#Teachers Sqrd. 126.42 118.43 7.990
#Students 301.41 289.53 11.880
Principal Education 1.5879 1.5812 0.007
Principal Female 0.26061 0.2814 -0.021
Principal Another Job 0.35152 0.39558 -0.044
Cleaning Personnel 0.67273 0.68889 -0.016
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.35152 0.36488 -0.013
Good Ceiling Condition 0.87879 0.88188 -0.003
Region 3.4909 3.5029 -0.012
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A8: Treated and untreated average of covariates used in the PSM for the cohort
of kids 2002: Nearest Neighbour (5)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 9.8734 9.9583 -0.085
Log of Income Sqrd. 98.394 99.936 -1.542
Age 8.3699 8.4491 -0.079
Mother Schooling 6.8934 6.8488 0.045
Father Schooling 7.3981 7.2792 0.119
Siblings 2.4702 2.5037 -0.033
PROGRESA 0.19749 0.14499 0.053
Girl 0.50157 0.48685 0.015
Multi-grade School 0.15674 0.12081 0.036
#Teachers 10.345 10.255 0.090
#Teachers Sqrd. 129.08 128.01 1.070
#Students 313.5 299.84 13.660
Principal Education 1.7241 1.5894 0.135
Principal Female 0.24451 0.28743 -0.043
Principal Another Job 0.44514 0.42283 0.022
Cleaning Personnel 0.67085 0.72645 -0.056
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.43887 0.36185 0.077
Good Ceiling Condition 0.90282 0.87943 0.023
Region 3.5549 3.5101 0.045
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A9: Treated and untreated average of the covariates used in the PSM for the
Cohort of Kids 2002: Mahalanobis Distance (5)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 9.8475 10.025 -0.178
Log of Income Sqrd. 97.924 101.08 -3.156
Age 8.3795 8.3922 -0.013
Mother Schooling 6.8133 7.3127 -0.499
Father Schooling 7.2711 7.8946 -0.624
Siblings 2.5512 2.2922 0.259
PROGRESA 0.21988 0.11446 0.105
Girl 0.51807 0.50602 0.012
Multi-grade School 0.1506 0.06687 0.084
#Teachers 10.292 10.347 -0.055**
#Teachers Sqrd. 127.2 123.7 3.500**
#Students 310.31 320.07 -9.760
Principal Education 1.7741 1.5934 0.181
Principal Female 0.23494 0.21928 0.016
Principal Another Job 0.46687 0.38614 0.081*
Cleaning Personnel 0.64458 0.83855 -0.194
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.42169 0.25482 0.167
Good Ceiling Condition 0.90663 0.9012 0.005
Region 3.6506 3.3367 0.314
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A10: Treated and untreated average of the covariates used in the PSM for the
cohort of kids 2002: Radius with caliper (0.001)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 10.114 10.098 0.016
Log of Income Sqrd. 102.94 102.69 0.250
Age 8.3464 8.561 -0.215
Mother Schooling 7.0261 7.1389 -0.113
Father Schooling 7.3203 8.122 -0.802***
Siblings 2.5294 2.317 0.212
PROGRESA 0.14379 0.13671 0.007
Girl 0.4902 0.51198 -0.022
Multi-grade School 0.14379 0.08497 0.059**
#Teachers 10.261 10.278 -0.017
#Teachers Sqrd. 130.26 124.45 5.810
#Students 300.64 309.08 -8.440
Principal Education 1.6405 1.6122 0.028
Principal Female 0.36601 0.27832 0.088
Principal Another Job 0.45098 0.40632 0.045
Cleaning Personnel 0.75163 0.79847 -0.047
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.34641 0.34259 0.004
Good Ceiling Condition 0.86928 0.8671 0.002
Region 3.4183 3.3154 0.103
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A11: Treated and untreated average of the covariates used in the PSM for the
cohort of kids 2002: Radius with caliper (0.005)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 9.9372 10.03 -0.093
Log of Income Sqrd. 99.656 101.33 -1.674
Age 8.3466 8.4379 -0.091
Mother Schooling 6.9044 6.6949 0.210
Father Schooling 7.4263 7.3224 0.104
Siblings 2.4622 2.2887 0.174
PROGRESA 0.16733 0.15048 0.017
Girl 0.50199 0.50957 -0.008
Multi-grade School 0.15139 0.12394 0.027
#Teachers 10.247 10.346 -0.099
#Teachers Sqrd. 128.93 128.06 0.870
#Students 301.84 305.25 -3.410
Principal Education 1.5936 1.5756 0.018
Principal Female 0.29084 0.28141 0.009
Principal Another Job 0.40239 0.42937 -0.027
Cleaning Personnel 0.69323 0.73075 -0.038
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.36653 0.38478 -0.018***
Good Ceiling Condition 0.88446 0.88822 -0.004
Region 3.3625 3.4264 -0.064
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A12: Treated and untreated average of the covariates used in the PSM for the
cohort of kids 2002: Kernel bandwidth (0.001)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 10.114 10.086 0.028
Log of Income Sqrd. 102.94 102.44 0.500
Age 8.3464 8.5695 -0.223
Mother Schooling 7.0261 7.1341 -0.108
Father Schooling 7.3203 8.1713 -0.851***
Siblings 2.5294 2.3214 0.208
PROGRESA 0.14379 0.14106 0.003
Girl 0.4902 0.49718 -0.007
Multi-grade School 0.14379 0.08783 0.056**
#Teachers 10.261 10.299 -0.038
#Teachers Sqrd. 130.26 124.86 5.400
#Students 300.64 309.56 -8.920
Principal Education 1.6405 1.6004 0.040
Principal Female 0.36601 0.28357 0.082
Principal Another Job 0.45098 0.39698 0.054
Cleaning Personnel 0.75163 0.7978 -0.046
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.34641 0.33981 0.007
Good Ceiling Condition 0.86928 0.862 0.007
Region 3.4183 3.3346 0.084
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE A13: Treated and untreated average of the covariates used in the PSM for the
cohort of kids 2002: Kernel bandwidth (0.005)
Variable Treated Mean Control Mean Difference
Log of income 9.9372 10.036 -0.099
Log of Income Sqrd. 99.656 101.45 -1.794
Age 8.3466 8.462 -0.115
Mother Schooling 6.9044 6.7026 0.202
Father Schooling 7.4263 7.3218 0.105
Siblings 2.4622 2.2976 0.165
PROGRESA 0.16733 0.15212 0.015
Girl 0.50199 0.51285 -0.011
Multi-grade School 0.15139 0.12186 0.030
#Teachers 10.247 10.276 -0.029
#Teachers Sqrd. 128.93 126.14 2.790
#Students 301.84 303.06 -1.220
Principal Education 1.5936 1.5752 0.018
Principal Female 0.29084 0.28479 0.006
Principal Another Job 0.40239 0.41931 -0.017
Cleaning Personnel 0.69323 0.73286 -0.040***
Bathroom/Water/Soup 0.36653 0.38302 -0.016*
Good Ceiling Condition 0.88446 0.88311 0.001
Region 3.3625 3.4215 -0.059
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01















































































































Annex tables and figures: Chapter 2
TABLE B1: Suggested Time Table for Full-Time Primary Schools in Mexico
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
8:30-12:30
Math Math Math Math Math
Spanish Spanish Spanish Spanish Spanish
Spanish Science Science Science History
Break Break Break Break Break
Arts Geography Geography Civism Sports
12:30-13:00 English Arts Sports Sports Arts
13:00-14:00 Food Break Food Break Food Break Food Break Food Break
14:00-14:15 Time out Timeout Timeout Timeout Timeout
14:15-14:45 Tutoring* Tutoring Tutoring Tutoring Tutoring
14:45-15:15 IT Social IT Social Social
15:15-16:00 Sports IT English Arts English
16:00-17:00 Planning** Planning Planning Planning Planning
Source: Secretariat of Basic Education
*To hep students with homework and/or further instruction on core subjects
**For the professors to plan and structure their lessons or talk to parents.
***Arts, English and IT are new to the curricula.
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FIGURE B1: Trends of Spanish average scores ENLACE by treatment status
FIGURE B2: Trends of math average scores ENLACE after PSM by treatment status
TABLE B2: Differences in Differences: Standardized Mathematics Test Scores by
PETC Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Raw Controls Panel Low Mg High Mg No PEC PEC Subsample)
One Year of Treatment
(2009-2010) -0.006 -0.012 -0.005 -0.019 0.056 0.041 -0.041 -0.002
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.058) (0.040) (0.027) (0.022)
N 101958 98647 87631 60245 41441 52525 49161 90251
R2 0.000 0.290 0.273 0.299 0.196 0.265 0.271 0.281
(2010-2011) 0.036 0.057 0.074∗ 0.019 0.194∗ 0.171∗∗ -0.011 0.038
(0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.037) (0.110) (0.076) (0.045) (0.040)
N 102949 99445 87351 59918 42563 52855 49626 90444
R2 0.000 0.258 0.243 0.259 0.191 0.249 0.220 0.254
(2011-2012) -0.032∗ -0.013 0.013 -0.016 -0.019 -0.018 -0.026 0.005
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.049) (0.037) (0.018) (0.016)
N 99524 95541 87135 58043 40471 50362 48152 89335
R2 0.008 0.229 0.235 0.219 0.199 0.232 0.176 0.240
(2012-2013) -0.019 0.096∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.046 0.102 -0.004 0.039 0.092∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030) (0.146) (0.071) (0.033) (0.030)
N 97862 94348 87182 57421 39851 49477 47795 88980
R2 0.002 0.194 0.200 0.165 0.166 0.183 0.129 0.203
Two Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.040 0.068∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.037 0.180∗∗∗ 0.035 0.065∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.063) (0.046) (0.032) (0.027)
N 102195 98548 87346 59557 42022 52496 49083 89987
R2 0.001 0.272 0.257 0.280 0.200 0.254 0.248 0.267
(2010-2011) 0.107∗ 0.119∗ 0.117∗ 0.029 0.431∗∗∗ 0.194∗ 0.066 0.109∗
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.058) (0.159) (0.116) (0.069) (0.058)
N 98959 95621 87408 58720 39882 50381 48221 89580
R2 0.007 0.227 0.233 0.222 0.184 0.229 0.179 0.238
(2011-2012) 0.023 0.057∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.022 0.179∗∗∗ 0.032 0.027 0.077∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.053) (0.040) (0.021) (0.019)
N 102196 98191 87137 58632 42538 51959 49211 89863
R2 0.005 0.184 0.194 0.159 0.144 0.174 0.121 0.202
Three Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.047 0.089∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.038 0.268∗∗∗ -0.020 0.112∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.098) (0.069) (0.044) (0.038)
N 98195 94725 87403 58360 39341 50023 47678 89124
R2 0.004 0.229 0.232 0.229 0.180 0.228 0.189 0.239
(2010-2011) 0.072 0.119∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.044 0.300∗∗ 0.168 0.037 0.111∗
(0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.073) (0.143) (0.133) (0.077) (0.067)
N 101625 98271 87410 59307 41951 51978 49280 90108
R2 0.004 0.180 0.191 0.165 0.131 0.171 0.127 0.199
Four Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.064∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.048 0.122∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.095) (0.068) (0.047) (0.039)
N 100870 97375 87405 58946 41411 51620 48737 89652
R2 0.002 0.186 0.195 0.179 0.130 0.174 0.144 0.204
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard errors, clustered on school, in parentheses. Columns 4 to 8 include a full set of ‘X’ controls based on charachteristics
of an unbalanced panel of schools. Column 8 excludes the states of Michoacan, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Campeche, since these
states have been recently signaled by the Mexican media as not being accountable in their ENLACE results.
TABLE B3: PSM and Differences in Differences: Standardized Mathematics Test
Scores by PETC Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Raw Controls Panel Low Mg High Mg No PEC PEC Subsample
One Year of Treatment
(2009-2010) -0.006 -0.008 -0.010 -0.028 0.086 0.049 -0.028 -0.008
(0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.025) (0.069) (0.042) (0.032) (0.024)
N 11514 11291 10182 8189 3142 4124 7207 10524
R2 0.000 0.273 0.256 0.277 0.224 0.273 0.261 0.265
(2010-2011) 0.028 0.049 0.063 0.009 0.192 0.198∗∗ -0.028 0.034
(0.043) (0.052) (0.049) (0.038) (0.122) (0.086) (0.045) (0.031)
N 4236 4185 3675 3126 1071 1425 2772 3790
R2 0.001 0.263 0.256 0.270 0.239 0.270 0.253 0.264
(2011-2012) -0.029∗ -0.003 -0.012 -0.007 -0.020 -0.023 -0.004 -0.009
(0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019) (0.062) (0.034) (0.019) (0.016)
N 23505 22972 22117 17209 5907 7183 15933 22351
R2 0.012 0.204 0.206 0.195 0.196 0.228 0.169 0.207
(2012-2013) -0.051 0.030 0.038 -0.006 -0.019 -0.055 -0.003 0.051
(0.031) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) (0.167) (0.076) (0.030) (0.033)
N 6033 5708 5429 5142 856 1407 4591 5410
R2 0.010 0.159 0.162 0.145 0.206 0.217 0.133 0.156
Two Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.038 0.071∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.030 0.144∗ 0.021 0.095∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.032) (0.074) (0.050) (0.032) (0.030)
N 11450 11201 10160 8026 3215 4084 7157 10458
R2 0.001 0.258 0.249 0.266 0.237 0.260 0.252 0.255
(2010-2011) 0.109∗ 0.108 0.090∗ 0.006 0.408∗∗ 0.202∗ 0.072 0.088
(0.064) (0.066) (0.052) (0.057) (0.168) (0.122) (0.083) (0.069)
N 4038 3987 3675 2990 1009 1315 2684 3737
R2 0.009 0.238 0.250 0.254 0.230 0.278 0.214 0.252
(2011-2012) 0.037∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.029 0.166∗∗∗ 0.031 0.063∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.062) (0.044) (0.022) (0.019)
N 23523 22976 22115 17126 5994 7173 15947 22334
R2 0.007 0.152 0.151 0.129 0.118 0.152 0.106 0.156
Three Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.063∗ 0.082∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.039 0.263∗∗ 0.006 0.127∗∗∗ 0.074∗
(0.035) (0.042) (0.044) (0.036) (0.115) (0.069) (0.046) (0.041)
N 11026 10797 10162 7870 2967 3858 6979 10375
R2 0.006 0.227 0.223 0.236 0.234 0.254 0.204 0.227
(2010-2011) 0.028 0.042 0.057 -0.033 0.108 0.089 -0.008 0.027
(0.077) (0.093) (0.073) (0.078) (0.152) (0.149) (0.072) (0.071)
N 4170 4116 3675 3013 1115 1388 2740 3755
R2 0.002 0.157 0.185 0.131 0.182 0.167 0.148 0.187
Four Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.064∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.189∗ 0.056 0.149∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.105) (0.072) (0.050) (0.041)
N 11364 11118 10161 7950 3208 4014 7144 10406
R2 0.002 0.169 0.177 0.178 0.137 0.172 0.153 0.177
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard errors, clustered on school, in parentheses. Columns 4 to 8 include a full set of ‘X’ controls based on charachteristics
of an unbalanced panel of schools. Column 8 excludes the states of Michoacan, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Campeche, since these
states have been recently signaled by the Mexican media as not being accountable in their ENLACE results.
TABLE B4: Differences in Differences: Standardized Spanish Test Scores by PETC
Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Raw Controls Panel Low Mg High Mg No PEC PEC Subsample
One Year of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.020 0.001 0.009 -0.006 0.072 0.045 -0.025 0.012
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.058) (0.038) (0.027) (0.022)
N 101958 98647 87631 60245 41441 52525 49161 90251
R2 0.000 0.330 0.312 0.335 0.202 0.288 0.312 0.316
(2010-2011) 0.041 0.060 0.073∗∗ 0.020 0.186∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.003 0.037
(0.041) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.097) (0.067) (0.043) (0.036)
N 102949 99445 87351 59918 42563 52855 49626 90444
R2 0.000 0.302 0.287 0.301 0.197 0.280 0.266 0.293
(2011-2012) -0.025 -0.004 0.021 -0.020 -0.011 -0.004 -0.021 0.013
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.047) (0.036) (0.017) (0.016)
N 99513 95532 87126 58041 40462 50351 48152 89326
R2 0.011 0.260 0.268 0.245 0.200 0.254 0.206 0.271
(2012-2013) -0.002 0.110∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.028 0.192 0.048 0.020 0.110∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.035) (0.032) (0.030) (0.139) (0.070) (0.033) (0.030)
N 97852 94340 87173 57420 39842 49467 47795 88972
R2 0.002 0.219 0.228 0.194 0.158 0.208 0.154 0.231
Two Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.068 0.087∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.063) (0.044) (0.031) (0.026)
N 102195 98548 87346 59557 42022 52496 49083 89987
R2 0.001 0.315 0.299 0.321 0.201 0.281 0.293 0.304
(2010-2011) 0.084 0.101∗ 0.095∗ 0.010 0.352∗∗ 0.151 0.051 0.093∗
(0.057) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.137) (0.101) (0.060) (0.051)
N 98948 95612 87399 58718 39873 50370 48221 89571
R2 0.009 0.259 0.265 0.246 0.186 0.251 0.208 0.269
(2011-2012) 0.027 0.069∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.017 0.168∗∗∗ 0.031 0.034∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.052) (0.038) (0.020) (0.018)
N 102197 98192 87137 58633 42538 51960 49211 89864
R2 0.007 0.218 0.234 0.200 0.145 0.208 0.157 0.239
Three Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.062∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.045 0.280∗∗∗ -0.002 0.129∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.095) (0.068) (0.043) (0.037)
N 98184 94716 87394 58358 39332 50012 47678 89115
R2 0.006 0.260 0.263 0.253 0.174 0.245 0.219 0.268
(2010-2011) 0.073 0.109∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.026 0.255∗∗ 0.154 0.018 0.109∗
(0.065) (0.063) (0.066) (0.068) (0.129) (0.116) (0.073) (0.061)
N 101626 98272 87410 59308 41951 51979 49280 90109
R2 0.005 0.216 0.231 0.205 0.131 0.206 0.162 0.236
Four Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.078∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.041 0.157∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.095) (0.063) (0.046) (0.037)
N 100871 97376 87405 58947 41411 51621 48737 89653
R2 0.003 0.223 0.236 0.220 0.125 0.206 0.183 0.241
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard errors, clustered on school, in parentheses. Columns 4 to 8 include a full set of ‘X’ controls based on charachteristics
of an unbalanced panel of schools. Column 8 excludes the states of Michoacan, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Campeche, since these
states have been recently signaled by the Mexican media as not being accountable in their ENLACE results.
TABLE B5: PSM and Differences in Differences: Standardized Spanish Test Scores
by PETC Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Raw Full Sample Panel Low Mg High Mg No PEC PEC Subsample
One Year of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.022 0.004 0.000 -0.015 0.097 0.046 -0.009 0.003
(0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.066) (0.045) (0.034) (0.023)
N 11514 11291 10182 8189 3142 4124 7207 10524
R2 0.000 0.316 0.294 0.313 0.224 0.288 0.305 0.298
(2010-2011) 0.033 0.054∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.011 0.208∗ 0.163∗∗∗ -0.010 0.035
(0.043) (0.027) (0.032) (0.039) (0.109) (0.062) (0.046) (0.031)
N 4236 4185 3675 3126 1071 1425 2772 3790
R2 0.001 0.295 0.287 0.291 0.241 0.294 0.285 0.291
(2011-2012) -0.020 0.004 -0.002 -0.011 0.011 -0.012 0.002 0.001
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.051) (0.037) (0.018) (0.018)
N 23504 22971 22116 17209 5906 7182 15933 22350
R2 0.015 0.227 0.229 0.203 0.209 0.235 0.195 0.231
(2012-2013) -0.043 0.028 0.032 -0.014 0.074 -0.029 -0.012 0.049∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.028) (0.165) (0.074) (0.034) (0.027)
N 6033 5708 5429 5142 856 1407 4591 5410
R2 0.010 0.163 0.172 0.129 0.195 0.212 0.127 0.173
Two Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.057∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.053∗ 0.134∗ 0.031 0.108∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.071) (0.045) (0.033) (0.026)
N 11450 11201 10160 8026 3215 4084 7157 10458
R2 0.002 0.299 0.288 0.300 0.235 0.273 0.298 0.290
(2010-2011) 0.079 0.082 0.062 -0.015 0.342∗∗ 0.116 0.058 0.065
(0.053) (0.061) (0.056) (0.057) (0.143) (0.107) (0.054) (0.055)
N 4038 3987 3675 2990 1009 1315 2684 3737
R2 0.009 0.258 0.270 0.256 0.233 0.275 0.239 0.266
(2011-2012) 0.021 0.051∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.019 0.149∗∗∗ -0.003 0.063∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.049) (0.033) (0.020) (0.017)
N 23523 22976 22115 17126 5994 7173 15947 22334
R2 0.007 0.175 0.176 0.151 0.123 0.176 0.138 0.181
Three Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.063∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.038 0.267∗∗ 0.007 0.130∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.124) (0.070) (0.048) (0.040)
N 11025 10796 10161 7870 2966 3857 6979 10374
R2 0.007 0.254 0.246 0.254 0.223 0.253 0.232 0.249
(2010-2011) 0.024 0.034 0.059 -0.035 0.118 0.062 -0.011 0.032
(0.074) (0.065) (0.076) (0.088) (0.145) (0.136) (0.081) (0.070)
N 4170 4116 3675 3013 1115 1388 2740 3755
R2 0.001 0.184 0.218 0.151 0.176 0.193 0.182 0.215
Four Years of Treatment
(2009-2010) 0.064 0.132∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.028 0.173∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.035) (0.044) (0.042) (0.104) (0.068) (0.053) (0.037)
N 11364 11118 10161 7950 3208 4014 7144 10406
R2 0.002 0.203 0.211 0.210 0.127 0.190 0.191 0.209
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard errors, clustered on school, in parentheses. Columns 4 to 8 include a full set of ‘X’ controls based on charachteristics
of an unbalanced panel of schools. Column 8 excludes the states of Michoacan, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Campeche, since these
states have been recently signaled by the Mexican media as not being accountable in their ENLACE results.
FIGURE B3: Trends of Spanish average scores ENLACE after PSM by treatment status
TABLE B6: Placebo regressions: DiD and PSM-DiD for dropout rates
DiD PSM and DiD
PETC 2011 PETC 2012 PETC 2013 PETC 2011 PETC 2012 PETC 2013
One Year Before Policy 0.219 -0.200 -0.193 0.139 -0.333 -0.146
(0.591) (0.195) (0.434) (0.645) (0.228) (0.482)
N 65327 63857 60245 2594 13710 2881
Two Years Before Policy 0.038 0.954∗∗ -0.040 0.630
(0.181) (0.398) (0.178) (0.425)
N 65338 63846 14207 2933
Three Years Before Policy 0.044 -0.059
(0.339) (0.311)
N 65324 3067
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
DiD regressions show standard errors, clustered on school, in parenthesis. PSM and DiD regressions show robust standard
errors from 100 replications, 100% of replacement and clustered on school, in parentheses. Regressions include a full set of
controls, including school’s teachers’ and principals’ characteristics as well as controls for the number of years in PEC, mar-
ginality of the school area and dummies for six mexican regions.
TABLE B7: Probability of schools being treated, 2010
Variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
PEC 0.14934 0.04292 3.48 0.0010 0.06523 0.23346
# students 0.00026 0.00289 0.09 0.9280 -0.00540 0.00593
# students squared -0.00001 0.00001 -1.33 0.1830 -0.00002 0.00000
# principals 0.21756 0.14212 1.53 0.1260 -0.06100 0.49611
# teachers -0.44947 0.26640 -1.69 0.0920 -0.97162 0.07267
# teachers square 0.00882 0.00190 4.65 0.0000 0.00511 0.01254
# administrative workers 0.07149 0.03566 2.00 0.0450 0.00160 0.14138
# principals vocational -0.29247 0.12395 -2.36 0.0180 -0.53542 -0.04953
# principals bachelors -0.26640 0.12340 -2.16 0.0310 -0.50827 -0.02454
# principals postgraduate -0.21370 0.13031 -1.64 0.1010 -0.46911 0.04171
# teachers vocational 0.44983 0.26380 1.71 0.0880 -0.06720 0.96687
# teachers bachelors 0.45577 0.26367 1.73 0.0840 -0.06101 0.97255
# teachers postgraduate 0.29498 0.26619 1.11 0.2680 -0.22674 0.81670
# secretary -0.01411 0.08360 -0.17 0.8660 -0.17797 0.14975
# deputy administrative -0.32496 0.21062 -1.54 0.1230 -0.73777 0.08785
# cleaning personel -0.09972 0.05794 -1.72 0.0850 -0.21329 0.01385
# janitors -0.04656 0.08170 -0.57 0.5690 -0.20670 0.11357
hours instruction sports 0.00481 0.00394 1.22 0.2220 -0.00290 0.01253
hours instruction arts -0.00831 0.01026 -0.81 0.4180 -0.02842 0.01180
hours instruction IT 0.01145 0.01000 1.15 0.2520 -0.00814 0.03105
hours instruction English 0.02799 0.00640 4.37 0.0000 0.01545 0.04054
# teachers “carrera magisterial” -0.00066 0.01128 -0.06 0.9530 -0.02276 0.02144
# classrooms -0.00301 0.01278 -0.24 0.8140 -0.02805 0.02203
# classrooms per grade -0.10560 0.02834 -3.73 0.0000 -0.16114 -0.05006
# classrooms per grade (adapted) -0.00266 0.02235 -0.12 0.9050 -0.04647 0.04115
average spending in books 0.00003 0.00001 1.79 0.0730 0.00000 0.00006
average spending in uniforms -0.00002 0.00005 -0.38 0.7030 -0.00013 0.00009
average spending in fees -0.00028 0.00015 -1.96 0.0500 -0.00057 0.00000
students tested 0.00456 0.00437 1.04 0.2960 -0.00400 0.01313
students tested squared -0.00001 0.00001 -0.86 0.3920 -0.00004 0.00002
# of untrusted tests 0.01629 0.00537 3.03 0.0020 0.00576 0.02682
# of untrusted tests squared -0.00030 0.00014 -2.14 0.0320 -0.00058 -0.00003
Marinality index 2 -0.11280 0.05942 -1.90 0.0580 -0.22927 0.00367
Marginality Index 3 -0.28312 0.06778 -4.18 0.0000 -0.41596 -0.15027
Marginality index 4 -0.49965 0.06618 -7.55 0.0000 -0.62936 -0.36994
Marginality index 5 -0.57769 0.11987 -4.82 0.0000 -0.81264 -0.34274
Region 2 -0.13618 0.06859 -1.99 0.0470 -0.27062 -0.00174
Region 3 -0.75196 0.07784 -9.66 0.0000 -0.90452 -0.59941
Region 4 -0.80797 0.10101 -8.00 0.0000 -1.00594 -0.60999
Region 5 -0.41425 0.06378 -6.49 0.0000 -0.53926 -0.28924
Region 6 -0.29368 0.06437 -4.56 0.0000 -0.41983 -0.16753
Constant -1.48603 0.11583 -12.83 0.0000 -1.71305 -1.25901
*Propensity score matching using 34165 observations in 2010. Prob > chi2 is equal to 0.0000 and Pseudo
R2 = 0.1028. Marginality index 1 and Region 1 are ommited
TABLE B8: Probability of schools being treated, 2011
Variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>Z [95% Conf. Interval]
PEC 0.20229 0.06504 3.11 0.0020 0.07480 0.32977
# students 0.00441 0.00369 1.20 0.2320 -0.00282 0.01164
# students squared 0.00000 0.00001 -0.12 0.9030 -0.00002 0.00001
# principals -3.45948 92.69351 -0.04 0.9700 -185.13540 178.21650
# teachers -0.12488 0.30540 -0.41 0.6830 -0.72346 0.47370
# teachers square -0.00523 0.00347 -1.51 0.1320 -0.01202 0.00157
# administrative workers 0.06718 0.05518 1.22 0.2230 -0.04097 0.17533
# principals vocational 3.18948 92.69344 0.03 0.9730 -178.48630 184.86530
# principals bachelors 3.35250 92.69344 0.04 0.9710 -178.32330 185.02830
# principals postgraduate 3.38726 92.69344 0.04 0.9710 -178.28860 185.06310
# teachers vocational 0.16549 0.29929 0.55 0.5800 -0.42111 0.75210
# teachers bachelors 0.18364 0.29900 0.61 0.5390 -0.40238 0.76966
# teachers postgraduate 0.05191 0.30389 0.17 0.8640 -0.54370 0.64752
# secretary 0.05513 0.11532 0.48 0.6330 -0.17088 0.28115
# deputy administrative -0.24102 0.27492 -0.88 0.3810 -0.77985 0.29781
# cleaning personel -0.17867 0.08886 -2.01 0.0440 -0.35283 -0.00451
# janitors -0.18449 0.12225 -1.51 0.1310 -0.42409 0.05512
hours instruction sports 0.00622 0.00568 1.10 0.2730 -0.00490 0.01734
hours instruction arts 0.02232 0.01021 2.19 0.0290 0.00232 0.04232
hours instruction IT 0.00927 0.01109 0.84 0.4030 -0.01246 0.03100
hours instruction English 0.00575 0.00806 0.71 0.4750 -0.01004 0.02154
# teachers “carrera magisterial” 0.02076 0.01722 1.21 0.2280 -0.01298 0.05450
# classrooms 0.01539 0.01900 0.81 0.4180 -0.02185 0.05263
# classrooms per grade -0.01485 0.05216 -0.28 0.7760 -0.11708 0.08738
# classrooms per grade (adapted) -0.04384 0.04310 -1.02 0.3090 -0.12832 0.04064
average spending in books -0.00006 0.00013 -0.47 0.6420 -0.00031 0.00019
average spending in uniforms 0.00002 0.00006 0.26 0.7980 -0.00010 0.00013
average spending in fees 0.00001 0.00005 0.28 0.7820 -0.00008 0.00011
students tested -0.00458 0.00566 -0.81 0.4180 -0.01566 0.00651
students tested squared -0.00001 0.00002 -0.34 0.7320 -0.00004 0.00003
# of untrusted tests 0.01519 0.00868 1.75 0.0800 -0.00181 0.03220
# of untrusted tests squared -0.00031 0.00024 -1.29 0.1970 -0.00077 0.00016
Marinality index 2 -0.34220 0.09613 -3.56 0.0000 -0.53060 -0.15379
Marginality Index 3 -0.26440 0.10217 -2.59 0.0100 -0.46464 -0.06416
Marginality index 4 -0.45650 0.10213 -4.47 0.0000 -0.65668 -0.25633
Marginality index 5 -0.36308 0.14876 -2.44 0.0150 -0.65465 -0.07150
Region 2 0.25336 0.10642 2.38 0.0170 0.04477 0.46195
Region 3 -0.16267 0.10796 -1.51 0.1320 -0.37427 0.04893
Region 4 -0.31072 0.14050 -2.21 0.0270 -0.58610 -0.03534
Region 5 0.09216 0.09320 0.99 0.3230 -0.09051 0.27484
Region 6 -0.03362 0.10887 -0.31 0.7570 -0.24701 0.17976
Constant -2.54411 0.18488 -13.76 0.0000 -2.90645 -2.18176
*Propensity score matching using 33084 observations in 2010. Prob > chi2 is equal to 0.0000 and Pseudo
R2 = 0.0889, marginality index 1 and Region 1 are ommited
TABLE B9: Probability of schools being treated, 2012
Variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
PEC 0.24902 0.03123 7.97 0.0000 0.18782 0.31023
# students 0.00002 0.00191 0.01 0.9930 -0.00373 0.00376
# students squared 0.00000 0.00000 0.06 0.9480 -0.00001 0.00001
# principals -0.07586 0.13495 -0.56 0.5740 -0.34036 0.18865
# teachers 0.07504 0.10515 0.71 0.4750 -0.13105 0.28112
# teachers square -0.01333 0.00164 -8.14 0.0000 -0.01655 -0.01012
# administrative workers 0.14577 0.02423 6.02 0.0000 0.09828 0.19327
# principals vocational 0.20232 0.12252 1.65 0.0990 -0.03782 0.44245
# principals bachelors 0.18437 0.12189 1.51 0.1300 -0.05453 0.42327
# principals postgraduate 0.17432 0.12461 1.40 0.1620 -0.06991 0.41855
# teachers vocational 0.09653 0.10120 0.95 0.3400 -0.10181 0.29487
# teachers bachelors 0.12777 0.10089 1.27 0.2050 -0.06997 0.32551
# teachers postgraduate 0.10947 0.10247 1.07 0.2850 -0.09136 0.31030
# secretary -0.16655 0.05944 -2.80 0.0050 -0.28304 -0.05005
# deputy administrative -0.11199 0.07160 -1.56 0.1180 -0.25232 0.02835
# cleaning personel -0.19033 0.04035 -4.72 0.0000 -0.26941 -0.11125
# janitors -0.07756 0.05315 -1.46 0.1450 -0.18174 0.02662
hours instruction sports -0.00385 0.00275 -1.40 0.1620 -0.00923 0.00154
hours instruction arts 0.01417 0.00598 2.37 0.0180 0.00246 0.02588
hours instruction IT 0.01872 0.00604 3.10 0.0020 0.00688 0.03056
hours instruction English 0.01718 0.00360 4.77 0.0000 0.01011 0.02424
# teachers “carrera magisterial” 0.00511 0.00812 0.63 0.5290 -0.01080 0.02101
# classrooms 0.03664 0.00926 3.95 0.0000 0.01848 0.05480
# classrooms per grade 0.00820 0.02521 0.33 0.7450 -0.04120 0.05761
# classrooms per grade (adapted) 0.00989 0.01484 0.67 0.5050 -0.01920 0.03898
average spending in books 0.00000 0.00003 0.10 0.9170 -0.00006 0.00006
average spending in uniforms -0.00018 0.00006 -3.26 0.0010 -0.00030 -0.00007
average spending in fees 0.00002 0.00003 0.49 0.6270 -0.00005 0.00008
students tested 0.00136 0.00287 0.47 0.6350 -0.00427 0.00699
students tested squared -0.00001 0.00001 -1.01 0.3110 -0.00002 0.00001
# of untrusted tests -0.00430 0.00291 -1.48 0.1390 -0.00999 0.00140
# of untrusted tests squared 0.00000 0.00005 0.03 0.9800 -0.00009 0.00009
Marinality index 2 0.02195 0.04391 0.50 0.6170 -0.06411 0.10800
Marginality Index 3 -0.16590 0.05305 -3.13 0.0020 -0.26989 -0.06192
Marginality index 4 -0.20521 0.04881 -4.20 0.0000 -0.30088 -0.10954
Marginality index 5 -0.08946 0.09226 -0.97 0.3320 -0.27028 0.09136
Region 2 0.33088 0.07021 4.71 0.0000 0.19326 0.46850
Region 3 -0.18247 0.04734 -3.85 0.0000 -0.27527 -0.08968
Region 4 -0.68344 0.08333 -8.20 0.0000 -0.84676 -0.52013
Region 5 0.05558 0.04470 1.24 0.2140 -0.03203 0.14319
Region 6 -0.09418 0.05220 -1.80 0.0710 -0.19649 0.00813
Constant -2.68645 0.10290 -26.11 0.0000 -2.88813 -2.48478
*Propensity score matching using 30710 observations in 2010. Prob > chi2 is equal to 0.0000 and Pseudo
R2 = 0.1277, marginality index 1 and Region 1 are ommited
TABLE B10: Probability of schools being treated, 2013
Variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
PEC 0.15963 0.06728 2.37 0.0180 0.02776 0.29150
# students 0.00566 0.00361 1.57 0.1170 -0.00142 0.01274
# students squared -0.00001 0.00001 -1.23 0.2180 -0.00002 0.00001
# principals -0.00836 0.28201 -0.03 0.9760 -0.56108 0.54436
# teachers 0.33171 0.13147 2.52 0.0120 0.07402 0.58939
# teachers square -0.01369 0.00366 -3.74 0.0000 -0.02087 -0.00651
# administrative workers 0.04298 0.03091 1.39 0.1640 -0.01760 0.10356
# principals vocational -0.02333 0.22855 -0.10 0.9190 -0.47128 0.42461
# principals bachelors -0.00838 0.22659 -0.04 0.9710 -0.45249 0.43573
# principals postgraduate -0.08975 0.23208 -0.39 0.6990 -0.54462 0.36512
# teachers vocational -0.05017 0.11211 -0.45 0.6540 -0.26990 0.16956
# teachers bachelors -0.03252 0.11123 -0.29 0.7700 -0.25053 0.18549
# teachers postgraduate -0.05551 0.11596 -0.48 0.6320 -0.28278 0.17176
# secretary 0.11890 0.08029 1.48 0.1390 -0.03846 0.27626
# deputy administrative -0.01220 0.13533 -0.09 0.9280 -0.27744 0.25305
# cleaning personel 0.10015 0.06259 1.60 0.1100 -0.02252 0.22282
# janitors 0.18526 0.09835 1.88 0.0600 -0.00750 0.37802
hours instruction sports -0.00360 0.00555 -0.65 0.5170 -0.01448 0.00728
hours instruction arts 0.02086 0.01088 1.92 0.0550 -0.00046 0.04218
hours instruction IT 0.00764 0.01089 0.70 0.4830 -0.01371 0.02898
hours instruction English 0.03421 0.00599 5.71 0.0000 0.02246 0.04595
# teachers “carrera magisterial” -0.04870 0.01760 -2.77 0.0060 -0.08320 -0.01421
# classrooms 0.03586 0.01787 2.01 0.0450 0.00084 0.07089
# classrooms per grade 0.00003 0.04655 0.00 1.0000 -0.09122 0.09127
# classrooms per grade (adapted) -0.00186 0.03090 -0.06 0.9520 -0.06242 0.05871
average spending in books -0.00027 0.00016 -1.67 0.0950 -0.00058 0.00005
average spending in uniforms 0.00005 0.00005 0.97 0.3310 -0.00005 0.00014
average spending in fees 0.00003 0.00004 0.79 0.4290 -0.00005 0.00011
students tested -0.01181 0.00488 -2.42 0.0150 -0.02137 -0.00225
students tested squared 0.00002 0.00002 1.16 0.2470 -0.00001 0.00005
# of untrusted tests 0.00707 0.00735 0.96 0.3360 -0.00733 0.02148
# of untrusted tests squared 0.00006 0.00014 0.45 0.6540 -0.00021 0.00034
Marinality index 2 0.24862 0.09156 2.72 0.0070 0.06916 0.42809
Marginality Index 3 0.08242 0.12041 0.68 0.4940 -0.15357 0.31841
Marginality index 4 0.11755 0.10720 1.10 0.2730 -0.09255 0.32765
Marginality index 5 -0.10298 0.34415 -0.30 0.7650 -0.77749 0.57154
Region 2 0.00000 (omitted)
Region 3 -1.25276 0.29562 -4.24 0.0000 -1.83216 -0.67336
Region 4 0.13380 0.09902 1.35 0.1770 -0.06028 0.32788
Region 5 -0.67754 0.13684 -4.95 0.0000 -0.94575 -0.40934
Region 6 0.14215 0.09493 1.50 0.1340 -0.04391 0.32822
Constant -3.73173 0.27565 -13.54 0.0000 -4.27199 -3.19147
*Propensity score matching using 29172 observations in 2010. Prob > chi2 is equal to 0.0000 and Pseudo
R2 = 0.2111. Marginality index 1 and Region 1 are ommited
TABLE B11: Balance test for treated and matched controls in 2010
Mean t-test
Variable Treated Control % of bias t p-value
PEC 0.373 0.373 0.00 0.01 0.9950
# students 143.060 151.160 -7.20 -1.28 0.2010
# students squared 29427.000 32528.000 -6.00 -1.23 0.2200
# principals 0.968 0.980 -4.30 -0.69 0.4920
# teachers 5.412 5.711 -7.80 -1.23 0.2200
# teachers square 42.601 46.992 -8.20 -1.26 0.2070
# administrative workers 0.927 1.038 -9.10 -1.23 0.2180
# principals vocational 0.371 0.374 -0.50 -0.07 0.9420
# principals bachelors 0.416 0.413 0.60 0.10 0.9220
# principals postgraduate 0.150 0.158 -2.10 -0.31 0.7590
# teachers vocational 2.234 2.327 -3.80 -0.57 0.5670
# teachers bachelors 2.991 3.181 -6.90 -1.07 0.2870
# teachers postgraduate 0.159 0.168 -1.60 -0.30 0.7670
# secretary 0.075 0.085 -3.40 -0.48 0.6280
# deputy administrative 0.006 0.007 -0.80 -0.15 0.8780
# cleaning personel 0.472 0.513 -6.20 -0.93 0.3540
# janitors 0.097 0.107 -3.40 -0.48 0.6310
hours instruction sports 4.176 4.692 -8.50 -1.23 0.2180
hours instruction arts 0.436 0.491 -2.50 -0.37 0.7100
hours instruction IT 0.418 0.506 -4.20 -0.55 0.5840
hours instruction English 1.193 1.489 -10.10 -1.15 0.2480
# teachers “carrera magisterial” 2.530 2.740 -8.10 -1.22 0.2230
# classrooms 6.693 6.958 -7.10 -1.11 0.2670
# classrooms per grade 5.682 5.949 -8.00 -1.28 0.2000
# classrooms per grade (adapted) 0.240 0.230 1.10 0.17 0.8670
average spending in books 340.380 339.660 0.00 0.01 0.9960
average spending in uniforms 337.920 343.230 -0.50 -0.27 0.7860
average spending in fees 154.700 157.850 -0.60 -0.33 0.7440
students tested 88.313 93.330 -7.10 -1.25 0.2110
students tested squared 11387.000 12578.000 -5.80 -1.19 0.2350
# of untrusted tests 5.384 5.612 -2.70 -0.42 0.6740
# of untrusted tests squared 96.084 100.530 -1.20 -0.23 0.8210
Marinality index 2 0.238 0.227 2.90 0.42 0.6760
Marginality Index 3 0.161 0.150 2.90 0.44 0.6580
Marginality index 4 0.253 0.243 2.20 0.36 0.7220
Marginality index 5 0.030 0.032 -1.10 -0.19 0.8510
Region 2 0.114 0.122 -2.80 -0.41 0.6850
Region 3 0.054 0.071 -5.30 -1.12 0.2620
Region 4 0.028 0.037 -3.70 -0.79 0.4280
Region 5 0.133 0.137 -1.10 -0.16 0.8710
Region 6 0.131 0.129 0.50 0.08 0.9380
TABLE B12: Balance test for treated and matched controls in 2011
Mean t-test
Variable Treated Control % of bias t p-value
PEC 0.469 0.490 -4.40 -0.35 0.7250
# students 164.010 165.280 -1.10 -0.10 0.9170
# students squared 37608.000 38260.000 -1.20 -0.12 0.9060
# principals 0.959 0.965 -2.30 -0.21 0.8370
# teachers 5.786 5.785 0.00 0.00 0.9970
# teachers square 44.269 44.128 0.30 0.03 0.9780
# administrative workers 1.083 1.066 1.10 0.09 0.9300
# principals vocational 0.248 0.239 1.90 0.17 0.8630
# principals bachelors 0.503 0.499 0.80 0.07 0.9450
# principals postgraduate 0.207 0.226 -5.10 -0.40 0.6920
# teachers vocational 1.855 1.801 2.50 0.22 0.8290
# teachers bachelors 3.690 3.715 -0.90 -0.08 0.9340
# teachers postgraduate 0.234 0.261 -4.00 -0.37 0.7090
# secretary 0.097 0.106 -3.00 -0.20 0.8410
# deputy administrative 0.014 0.014 0.00 0.00 1.0000
# cleaning personel 0.497 0.515 -2.80 -0.24 0.8100
# janitors 0.103 0.096 2.20 0.18 0.8600
hours instruction sports 5.641 5.688 -0.70 -0.06 0.9530
hours instruction arts 1.172 1.106 2.00 0.15 0.8830
hours instruction IT 0.800 0.850 -1.80 -0.12 0.9020
hours instruction English 1.510 1.859 -9.80 -0.66 0.5090
# teachers “carrera magisterial” 2.614 2.590 0.90 0.08 0.9390
# classrooms 7.262 7.310 -1.40 -0.12 0.9030
# classrooms per grade 6.152 6.192 -1.20 -0.12 0.9080
# classrooms per grade (adapted) 0.172 0.193 -3.00 -0.29 0.7750
average spending in books 262.690 257.080 0.80 0.16 0.8740
average spending in uniforms 369.620 351.980 2.20 0.48 0.6310
average spending in fees 201.720 175.090 5.20 0.93 0.3510
students tested 100.410 101.420 -1.40 -0.13 0.8940
students tested squared 14223.000 14552.000 -1.50 -0.15 0.8780
# of untrusted tests 5.635 5.296 4.10 0.36 0.7190
# of untrusted tests squared 101.230 86.329 4.50 0.50 0.6190
Marinality index 2 0.138 0.159 -5.90 -0.51 0.6100
Marginality Index 3 0.145 0.138 1.90 0.17 0.8670
Marginality index 4 0.214 0.192 4.90 0.47 0.6420
Marginality index 5 0.062 0.070 -3.10 -0.26 0.7950
Region 2 0.159 0.156 0.80 0.06 0.9490
Region 3 0.103 0.091 3.40 0.36 0.7220
Region 4 0.048 0.050 -0.50 -0.05 0.9570
Region 5 0.255 0.273 -4.60 -0.35 0.7300
Region 6 0.124 0.130 -1.90 -0.16 0.8750
TABLE B13: Balance test for treated and matched controls in 2012
Mean t-test
Variable Treated Control % of bias t p-value
PEC 0.564 0.573 -1.90 -0.43 0.6640
# students 181.710 184.180 -2.10 -0.56 0.5770
# students squared 43284.000 44418.000 -2.00 -0.53 0.5980
# principals 1.009 1.010 -0.70 -0.18 0.8540
# teachers 6.595 6.677 -2.30 -0.60 0.5460
# teachers square 53.118 54.471 -2.60 -0.66 0.5100
# administrative workers 1.591 1.490 5.50 1.07 0.2850
# principals vocational 0.345 0.346 -0.20 -0.04 0.9710
# principals bachelors 0.441 0.439 0.30 0.07 0.9460
# principals postgraduate 0.209 0.212 -0.80 -0.16 0.8710
# teachers vocational 1.841 1.864 -1.10 -0.26 0.7930
# teachers bachelors 4.286 4.335 -1.70 -0.42 0.6780
# teachers postgraduate 0.440 0.451 -1.30 -0.29 0.7720
# secretary 0.072 0.072 0.00 0.01 0.9940
# deputy administrative 0.027 0.030 -1.40 -0.28 0.7810
# cleaning personel 0.623 0.619 0.50 0.11 0.9140
# janitors 0.149 0.146 0.90 0.18 0.8600
hours instruction sports 5.577 5.588 -0.20 -0.04 0.9690
hours instruction arts 0.897 0.964 -2.70 -0.51 0.6130
hours instruction IT 0.724 0.908 -7.70 -1.32 0.1870
hours instruction English 2.145 2.207 -1.40 -0.27 0.7880
# teachers “carrera magisterial” 2.849 2.911 -2.40 -0.55 0.5800
# classrooms 8.053 8.097 -1.20 -0.30 0.7630
# classrooms per grade 6.867 6.984 -3.60 -0.92 0.3580
# classrooms per grade (adapted) 0.268 0.288 -2.10 -0.43 0.6670
average spending in books 262.840 274.370 -1.90 -0.47 0.6360
average spending in uniforms 339.930 340.330 -0.10 -0.03 0.9750
average spending in fees 197.730 207.800 -2.40 -0.41 0.6790
students tested 114.610 116.260 -2.20 -0.58 0.5600
students tested squared 17329.000 17792.000 -2.00 -0.53 0.5960
# of untrusted tests 5.549 5.837 -2.70 -0.65 0.5170
# of untrusted tests squared 131.160 141.740 -1.50 -0.45 0.6500
Marinality index 2 0.228 0.222 1.60 0.34 0.7310
Marginality Index 3 0.117 0.118 -0.50 -0.13 0.8980
Marginality index 4 0.233 0.238 -1.10 -0.28 0.7780
Marginality index 5 0.030 0.029 0.70 0.18 0.8580
Region 2 0.057 0.068 -4.90 -1.06 0.2890
Region 3 0.134 0.127 1.70 0.44 0.6600
Region 4 0.049 0.032 6.40 1.97 0.0490
Region 5 0.245 0.262 -4.60 -0.93 0.3520
Region 6 0.113 0.118 -1.70 -0.39 0.6930
TABLE B14: Balance test for treated and matched controls in 2013
Mean t-test
Variable Treated Control % of bias t p-value
PEC 0.519 0.556 -7.70 -0.66 0.5120
# students 199.080 200.170 -0.90 -0.09 0.9250
# students squared 49645.000 50670.000 -1.70 -0.17 0.8640
# principals 1.013 1.010 1.30 0.15 0.8830
# teachers 7.577 7.511 1.90 0.19 0.8470
# teachers square 66.218 65.635 1.10 0.10 0.9210
# administrative workers 1.968 2.092 -7.80 -0.51 0.6070
# principals vocational 0.359 0.351 1.80 0.15 0.8790
# principals bachelors 0.436 0.479 -8.50 -0.74 0.4600
# principals postgraduate 0.192 0.164 7.30 0.65 0.5180
# teachers vocational 2.224 2.146 3.60 0.30 0.7650
# teachers bachelors 4.801 4.792 0.30 0.03 0.9770
# teachers postgraduate 0.494 0.526 -3.70 -0.30 0.7630
# secretary 0.231 0.230 0.20 0.01 0.9920
# deputy administrative 0.038 0.035 2.00 0.17 0.8640
# cleaning personel 0.936 0.926 1.40 0.11 0.9120
# janitors 0.179 0.213 -9.00 -0.64 0.5230
hours instruction sports 6.199 6.535 -5.20 -0.43 0.6670
hours instruction arts 1.583 1.425 4.70 0.33 0.7440
hours instruction IT 1.340 1.349 -0.30 -0.02 0.9850
hours instruction English 4.455 4.412 0.80 0.05 0.9580
# teachers “carrera magisterial” 2.590 2.573 0.70 0.07 0.9470
# classrooms 9.128 9.247 -3.40 -0.31 0.7530
# classrooms per grade 7.763 7.749 0.40 0.04 0.9670
# classrooms per grade (adapted) 0.276 0.308 -3.20 -0.23 0.8150
average spending in books 239.540 240.500 -0.20 -0.04 0.9660
average spending in uniforms 431.900 464.050 -4.20 -0.30 0.7660
average spending in fees 232.440 201.640 5.50 0.76 0.4470
students tested 122.940 124.050 -1.50 -0.15 0.8830
students tested squared 19423.000 19856.000 -1.80 -0.17 0.8620
# of untrusted tests 5.000 5.034 -0.40 -0.04 0.9720
# of untrusted tests squared 102.060 91.910 3.40 0.26 0.7940
Marinality index 2 0.372 0.388 -3.70 -0.30 0.7630
Marginality Index 3 0.115 0.110 1.70 0.16 0.8720
Marginality index 4 0.224 0.206 4.10 0.40 0.6910
Marginality index 5 0.006 0.004 1.30 0.23 0.8180
Region 2 0.000 0.000 . . .
Region 3 0.006 0.006 0.00 0.00 1.0000
Region 4 0.205 0.210 -1.40 -0.11 0.9110
Region 5 0.051 0.060 -2.90 -0.32 0.7490
Region 6 0.244 0.265 -5.60 -0.44 0.6600
Annex tables and figures: Chapter 3
TABLE C1: Average Total Intra- and Inter-course Dropout Rates
Dropout rates on 1st to 3rd grades
School Year Total Intra-course Inter-course
2006-2007 3.14 2.06 1.00
2007-2008 2.59 1.81 0.77
2008-2009 2.53 1.90 0.57
2009-2010 1.82 1.36 0.39
2010-2011 1.76 1.30 0.36
2011-2012 1.03 0.56 0.51
2012-2013 0.87 0.33 0.47
2013-2014 0.06 -0.38 0.39
FIGURE C1: Repetition trends in Mexico City and the rest of Mexico in the pre- and
post-policy period.
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Repetition * Policy on 2008 0·024 0·019 0·002
(0·018) (0·017) (0·015)
Repetition * Policy on 2009 −0·023 −0·026 −0·035∗
(0·022) (0·020) (0·19)
Repetition * Policy on 2010 −0·028 −0·028 −0·030
(0·022) (0·022) (0·022)
Repetition * Policy on 2011 −0·020 −0·020 −0·017
(0·019) (0·019) (0·019)
Repetition * Policy on 2012 −0·035 −0·036 −0·024
(0·025) (0·025) (0·025)
Repetition * Policy on 2013 −0·144∗∗ −0·159∗∗ −0·148∗∗
(0·064) (0·069) (0·070)
Repetition * Policy on 2014 −0·356∗∗∗ −0·367∗∗∗ −0·347∗∗∗
(0·028) (0·032) (0·036)
School Fixed- Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes
State * Year Fixed-Effects No Yes No
County * Year Fixed-Effects No No Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0·243 0·258 0·266
Number of schools 435822 435822 435822
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered on state, in parenthesis. Regressions include interactions
between grade repetition and year dummies taking the value of 0 in the pre-policy period and
1 in the subsequent years, 2008-2012 as if policy had changed before 2012. We use 2007
repetition rates as a base. Estimations include time, school fixed-effects and a combination of
county-year fixed-effects. Regressions also include a set of school and teacher’s characteristics
as controls.
FIGURE C2: Average grade repetition 1st to 3rd and 4th to 6th grade: trends before
and after policy. change
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